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PRIVATE EQUITY REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: IS TITLE IV OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT THE RIGHT ANSWER? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DODD-FRANK AND THE CASE
AGAINST THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS UNDER TITLE IV

Gal Golod
ABSTRACT
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules set out a major reform of the
private investment fund industry and establish a new framework for regulatory and supervisory
oversight of private investment funds. Title IV eliminated the private adviser exemption
previously available under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and required the SEC to
establish rules and regulations requiring advisers to "private investment funds", including
private equity funds, to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Through the elimination of the private adviser exemption, Title IV and its implementing rules
now require that investment advisers to private equity funds, hedge funds and certain other
funds with assets under management of $150 million or more register with the SEC, comply with
certain SEC books, records, disclosure and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive
periodic SEC examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions. This new regulatory
regime is designed to bring transparency and oversight to the activities of private investment
funds, control the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system and address the market and
regulatory failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
In this paper, I will i) analyze the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act and its impact
on the regulation of the private equity sector; ii) critically assess and challenge the Dodd-Frank
and its implementing rules approach to the regulation of private equity funds; iii) evaluate the
underlying economic theory of regulation and its relevance to the private equity sector; iv)
challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing systemic risk and
protecting fund investors; v) examine the relationship between private equity funds and systemic
risk; vi) analyze the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage;
and vii) offer an alternative approach to the regulation of the private equity industry and the
risks associated with leveraged lending to private equity funds. Additionally, this paper will
specifically explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit
analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its
implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of regulators
and the implementing agency evaluating tradeoffs and whether society, the financial system and
the economy gain enough from the regulation to justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to
ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions.
In other words, the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action.
This paper will further examine the costs and benefits of Title IV and its implementing rules, in
light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and demonstrate how cost benefit analysis, when
used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators to ensure that
regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a whole.
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I will argue in this paper that the decision of regulators to regulate private equity funds
and subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements (as reflected in Title
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act) is inadequate, unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused,
based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not properly
address the risk of too much leverage. Furthermore, this paper will take the position that Title
IV’s implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification
standards set by the D.C. Circuit Court in the Business Roundtable decision. The SEC, in
implementing Title IV, failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and to consider the
impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation in the context of
private equity funds. It failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its
regulatory actions, including a rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures
it was trying to address and the regulatory choices made. This paper will argue that Title IV and
its implementing rules are not supported by i) the cost benefit analysis that would survive
judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling
argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs.
Like any other post-crisis reform legislation, Title IV may have satisfied a political need,
but it will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor
welfare and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. I
argue, instead, that since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play
a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and
sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be subject to a
reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and disclosure
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The concerns associated
with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage should be
addressed through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter
underwriting practices, standards and policies. By setting new standards for underwriting of
leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can ensure that
private equity funds will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore,
reducing the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. Also,
this paper will conclude that overall financial regulators, and particularly the SEC should
ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards, consistent with the
Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and efficient
regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike Title IV of
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve
its goals and imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy
actually gain enough from the regulation to justify its costs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the U.S. economy experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression,
regulators and policy-makers started to recognize the need for a comprehensive regulatory
reform of the financial sector. The near-collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, followed by the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and the bailout of American
International Group on September 16, 2008, clearly demonstrated that the regulatory framework
in place prior to the financial crisis was inadequate. Thus, in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
U.S. regulators have sought to bring enhanced transparency to the financial sector, protect
investors, improve the stability and integrity of the market and reduce systemic risk in the
financial system through the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory reform.1
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, representing the most comprehensive and far-reaching overhaul
of the nation’s financial regulatory system since the 1930s.2 The Dodd-Frank Act dramatically
changes the regulatory landscape for all financial services companies in the U.S. and seeks to fill
the gaps in the pre-crisis regulatory framework. Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its
implementing rules set out a major reform of the private investment fund industry and establish
a new framework for regulatory and supervisory oversight of private investment funds.3 Title IV
eliminated the private adviser exemption previously available under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 and required the SEC to establish rules and regulations requiring advisers to
"private investment funds", including private equity funds, to register with the SEC under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.4 Through the elimination of the private adviser exemption,
Title IV and its implementing rules now require that investment advisers to private equity funds,
hedge funds and certain other funds with assets under management of $150 million or more
register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), comply with certain
SEC books, records and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive periodic SEC
1

See Viral V. Acharya et al, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global
Finance, (NYU Stern School of Business 1st ed 2011).
2
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act” or simply “Dodd-Frank”].
3
See Acharya et al, supra note 1.
4
See Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments To Investment Advisers Act,
Washington DC, June 22, 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm. These rules and
rule amendments are designed to give effect to the provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act that, among other
things, increase the statutory threshold for registration by investment advisers with the SEC, require advisers to
hedge funds, private equity funds and other private funds to register with the SEC, and require reporting by certain
investment advisers that are exempt from registration. The new SEC rules are of particular importance to private
fund managers and others evaluating whether they must register as investment advisers with the SEC or whether
they can rely on an exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” in the Investment Advisers Act or on
certain exemptions from registration created by the Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC rules are described in two adopting
releases. The “Registration Release” sets forth final rules implementing certain amendments to the Investment
Advisers Act required by the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC registration requirements. The second release, the
“Exemption Release” sets forth final rules implementing new exemptions, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, from the
registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act, including: i) defining “venture capital funds” for purposes
of the new Investment Advisers Act exemption for advisers to venture capital funds; ii) exempting from registration
certain private fund advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management in the United
States; and iii) clarifying the meaning of certain terms used in the new exemption for foreign private advisers.
(available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf).

5

examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions.5 This new registration and reporting
regime is designed to bring transparency and oversight to the activities of private investment
funds and their advisers.6 The primary objectives of this legislation are to control the build-up of
systemic risk in the financial system, enhance financial stability, address the market and
regulatory failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis and reduce the likelihood of a major
financial crisis in the future.7
In this paper, I will: i) analyze the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act, its impact
on the regulation of the private equity sector and the argument that financial reforms introduced
after a financial crisis are usually flawed, overbroad and excessive;8 ii) critically assess and
challenge the Dodd-Frank and its implementing rules approach to the regulation of private equity
funds; iii) evaluate the underlying economic theory of regulation and its relevance to the private
equity sector; iv) challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing
systemic risk and protecting fund investors; v) examine the relationship between private equity
funds and systemic risk; vi) analyze the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of
excessive leverage; and vii) offer an alternative approach to the regulation of the private equity
industry and the risks associated with leverage lending to private equity funds. Additionally, this
paper will specifically explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC9 and the importance, role and application of
cost benefit analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title
IV and its implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of
regulators and the implementing agency evaluating alternative regulatory approaches, tradeoffs
and whether society, the financial system and the economy gain enough from the regulation to
justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness
and consequences of their regulatory actions and determine the best course of action. In other
words, the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action.
In Business Roundtable v. SEC the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck
down the SEC’s proxy access rule10 which had been promulgated under the Securities Exchange

5

See §§ 401-419 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the "private adviser
exemption" contained in Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and introduced the requirement
for advisers to "private funds", including private equity funds to register with the SEC. The amended Section
203(b)(3) reads as follows: (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to— (1) any investment adviser,
other than an investment adviser who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund, all of whose clients are
residents of the State within which such investment adviser maintains his or its principal office and place of
business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports with respect to securities listed or admitted to
unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange.
6

Id.
See Acharya et al, supra note 1.
8
See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance (September 25,
2004). NYU, Law and Econ Research Paper 04-032; Yale Law & Econ Research Paper 297; Yale ICF Working
Paper 04-37; ECGI - Finance Working Paper 52/2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.596101
9
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10
Compulsory proxy access has been debated for more than seventy years in what a former SEC Commissioner has
called “a knockdown, drag-out political brawl.” See Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules:
Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 Bus. Law. 361, 378 (2009).
7
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Act of 1934, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act.11 The court held that the rulemaking process
was “arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law” and that the SEC had failed to
perform an adequate cost benefit analysis of the rule.12 The court vacated the rule on the basis
that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act13 and that the SEC “failed adequately to
consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation”.14 In concluding
that the SEC had failed to meet its cost benefit analysis obligations, the court made clear that the
rule required “a far more rigorous economic analysis and cost benefit justification than the SEC
had assumed was necessary.”15 In the words of Judge Ginsburg, “the SEC fell far short of its
statutory obligation to determine as best it could the economic implications of the rule”.16
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions since cost
benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators strictly accountable
for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.17 The decision is significant as it was the first
challenge of a rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s
failure to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis.18 It also represents a turning point indicative
of an unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new
look at their rulemaking process.19 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of
financial regulation. Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process20 or make the rules that
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”21

11

Rule 14a-11 or the Proxy Access Rule (adopted by the SEC in 2010) required that prior to board elections, public
companies must include in the proxy statement a limited number of candidates for director positions nominated by
certain large shareholders. The purpose of the rule was to loosen management’s control over the company’s
directors.
12
See Business Roundtable v. SEC, supra note 9.
13
Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, enacted on June 11, 1946.
14
See Business Roundtable v. SEC, supra note 9.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking (2013). Seattle
University Law Review, Vol. 36, P. 695 (2013); U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-34.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164423.
18
See Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation (April 22, 2014). University of
Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 660. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2346466
19
See Jessica Holzer, Corporate News: Court Deals Blow to SEC, Activists, Wall St. J., July 23, 2011, at B3
(arguing that “the court’s holding could have far-reaching implications for all Dodd-Frank rulemaking”); See also
Ben Protess, Court Ruling Offers Path to Challenge Dodd-Frank, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2011) http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2011/08/17/court-ruling-offers-path-to-challenge-dodd-frank (explaining that “Business Roundtable
exposes many Dodd-Frank rules to challenge since the economic analysis in the SEC’s proxy access rule is better
than most other final rules”).
20
See Recent Case, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1088, 1092,
1095 (2012) (arguing that “the Business Roundtable approach creates a judicial blockade that will result in
ossification of SEC regulations”)
21
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 122, 185–90 (2006); See
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165, 225–26 (1999); See Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 461, 476 (2003) (arguing that “requirements obliging agencies to explain their decision making process and
7

This paper will further examine the costs and benefits of Title IV and its implementing
rules, in light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and demonstrate how cost benefit analysis,
when used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators to ensure
that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a whole. It
will evaluate whether Title IV and its implementing rules i) are supported by the cost benefit
analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable; ii)
represent the best regulatory choice and are tailored to impose the least burden on society, the
financial system and the economy; and iii) reflect a regulatory approach that maximizes net
benefits.
I will argue in this paper that the decision of regulators to regulate private equity funds
and subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate,
unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its
underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused, based on fundamental misconceptions as
to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the risk of too much leverage. It will
not accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic risk in the U.S.
financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. It follows the
traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually excessive, burdensome, flawed and
populist in nature. It tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that are not a
major source of systemic risk problems.
Furthermore, this paper will take the position that Title IV’s implementing rules do not
meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit court
in the Business Roundtable decision. The SEC in implementing Title IV, failed to perform an
adequate cost benefit analysis and to consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency,
competition and capital formation in the context of private equity funds. It failed to articulate a
satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a rational connection
between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the regulatory choices
made. This paper will argue that Title IV’s implementing rules are not supported by i) the cost
benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable,
and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title IV’s
implementing rules are greater than their costs.
Like any other post-crisis financial reform legislation, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
may have satisfied a political need, but will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a
whole, will not improve investor welfare and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds
may pose to the financial system. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008 financial crisis
and does not represent the proper legislative response that is geared toward correcting and
mitigating the problems and failures that actually led to the 2008 financial crisis. This
government intervention in the private equity sector was driven by the political pressure on
Congress to quickly launch a comprehensive reform of the financial system, following the 2008
financial crisis. It reflects a questionable public policy decision that does not adequately address
the propensity of the financial sector to put the entire system at risk, and fails to protect the

justify their decisions ensure rational decision making”); See, Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with CostBenefit Analysis, 68 U. Chi L. Rev. 1137, 1185–93 (2001).
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benefits that private equity funds bring to the national economy. Its targeting of the private
equity industry is simply misguided.
This paper also offers a conceptual framework for examining whether private equity
funds create a systemic risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of private
equity funds and the use of leveraged buyout techniques, how (if at all) those risks should be
regulated and whether Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules through their
disclosure-based regulatory solution are the right answer.
I further argue in this paper, that since private equity funds are not a major source of
systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have
the resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should
be subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration and reporting
requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The concerns
associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage
should be addressed through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter
underwriting practices, standards and policies. By setting new standards for underwriting of
leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can ensure that private
equity firms will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore, reducing
the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. This approach
will: i) eliminate the unnecessary, costly and burdensome compliance requirements of Title IV
and its implementing rules; ii) reduce and mitigate the potential risk posed by private equity
funds and their use of leverage; and iii) protect the benefits that private equity funds bring to the
economy.
This paper will also conclude that overall financial regulators and particularly the SEC
should ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards, consistent with
the Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and efficient
regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike Title IV of
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve
its goals and imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy
gain enough from the regulation to justify its costs. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, a
leading academic commentator on cost benefit analysis, “rigorous cost benefit analysis creates
confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate solutions to market
problems. It also deters regulators from proceeding with rules that promise to impose big
economic burdens without corresponding gains.”22 This approach is important especially now
that the Dodd-Frank Act has significantly increased the amount of financial rulemaking. The
scale and scope of Dodd-Frank regulations have made it critical for regulators to apply rigorous
cost benefit analysis to the rulemaking process and ensure they adequately consider the
effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions.
From this Introduction, this paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes the private
investment funds industry and compares private equity to hedge funds and venture capital funds.
It also examines the regulation of private investment funds, before and after the Dodd-Frank
22

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2012), available
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-cost-benefit-analysis.html.
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Act. Part III examines the case against the regulation of private equity funds under the DoddFrank Act and challenges the Dodd-Frank and its implementing rules approach to the regulation
of private equity funds. It analyzes the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act, the nature of
post-crisis financial reforms and their tendency to be excessive, overbroad, populist in nature
and heavily influenced by the post-crisis political and economic environment. It also explores
the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business
Roundtable v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit analysis in financial
regulation and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules. It
examines whether Title IV’s implementing rules are supported by the cost benefit analysis that
would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable. Part III also evaluates
the underlying economic theory of regulation and Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the
primary method of reducing systemic risk and protecting fund investors. Part IV examines the
relationship between private equity and systemic risk and looks more closely at the question of
whether private equity funds create a systemic risk problem through their use of leverage. Part V
then outlines a set of recommendations for establishing more substantive rules like leveraged
lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices, standards and policies. It looks at recent
legislative initiatives and offers an alternative approach to the regulation of private equity funds
and the risk of excessive leverage. It also evaluates the challenges of leveraged lending
regulation. The paper closes, in Part VI, with a brief summary of the research and conclusion.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

Private equity is a broad term that refers to any type of equity investment in an asset in
which the equity is not freely tradable on a public stock market. 23 Private equity funds are
closed-end pooled investment vehicles, most frequently organized as limited partnerships that
invest in privately held operating businesses.24 In essence, these are investment funds which: i)
buy, own and sell controlling positions in mature companies; ii) finance a substantial part of their
investments through the use of debt; iii) employ fund managers paid by performance; and
iv) have a finite life span of usually 10-12 years.25
A private equity fund typically is controlled by its general partner, which makes
investment decisions for the fund and is affiliated with the private equity firm that advises the
fund.26 The private equity fund obtains capital commitments, at the beginning of its term though
private placement transactions, from sophisticated institutional investors who agree to become

23

See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 172, 191 (2008).
See Testimony of Douglas Lowenstein, former President & CEO, Private Equity Growth Capital Council
(PEGCC), before the House Financial Services Committee, Washington DC, October 6, 2009 available at
www.house.gov/apps/list /hearing/...dem/lowenstein_testimony.pdf; and PEGCC Comment Letter by Douglas
Lowenstein to the SEC (April 12, 2011) available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-11/s70511-26.pdf.
25
See Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Private Equity Transactions – Understanding Some Fundamental Principles, 17 Bus. L.
Today 51 2007-2008.
26
See Lowenstein, supra note 24.
24
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limited partners of the fund.27 The limited partners contribute capital to the fund over its term
(usually between ten to twelve years) and are not involved in the management and control of the
fund. After committing their capital, the limited partners, have little say as to how the general
partner uses the investment funds, as long as the basic covenants of the fund partnership
agreement are followed. It is also customary for the general partner to provide at least one
percent of the total capital committed.
Limited partners of private equity funds usually include corporate pension funds, public
retirement plans, foundations, endowments, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and to
a lesser extent high net worth individuals.28 This general partner-limited partner structure gives
investors in the fund the opportunity to benefit from the experience and expertise of the fund
manager and therefore achieve greater returns on investment than if they otherwise invested on
their own. The investment strategies of private equity funds are mostly long-term “buy and hold”
strategies, as opposed to trading strategies which are more associated with hedge funds. They
purchase highly illiquid securities and are typically prohibited, by the terms of their partnership
agreements or other governing documents, from: i) hedging for speculative purposes; ii)
purchasing commodities or derivatives; and iii) investing in hedge funds or publicly traded
securities.29
Private equity funds pursue a variety of investment strategies (e.g., venture capital,
growth capital, real estate, buyout, distressed and mezzanine investing) and invest in a broad
range of industries and geographic regions.30 They seek to acquire a controlling interest in
undervalued or under-managed companies that they can grow or improve with a view toward
eventual sale or public offering.31 The goal is to transform these under-performing and
undervalued companies into capital efficient and profit generating companies.
Private equity funds typically have a fixed life, usually ten to twelve years, but can be
extended for up to three additional years. The private equity firm normally has up to five years to
invest the fund’s committed capital into companies, and then has an additional five to seven
years to return the capital to its investors.32 Once in control, private equity funds tend to alter the
structure of their target companies by disposing of assets that the target companies do not use
efficiently, streamlining the operations of the target companies and replacing or restructuring
management and the targets business plan to enhance value. They typically hold companies for
27

See Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, A Primer on Private Equity At Work, Center for Economic and Policy
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3-5 years and then sell them or take them public hoping to realize a gain as a result of the
increased value they have created through their restructuring and reorganization efforts during
their period of ownership. As a “closed-end” vehicle, investors in the fund cannot withdraw their
funds until the fund is terminated (as opposed to mutual funds where investors can withdraw
their funds whenever they like).33 Therefore, private equity investments are very illiquid with
investors committing their capital for the full investment window.
The private equity firm or general partner is usually compensated in three ways. First, the
general partner earns an annual management fee, typically a percentage of capital committed,
and then, as investments are realized, a percentage of capital employed.34 This management fee
is usually two percent. Second, the general partner earns a share of the profits of the fund,
referred to as “carried interest,” that almost always equals twenty percent (once a hurdle rate of
return has been achieved).35 Finally, some general partners charge deal and monitoring fees to
the companies in which they invest. The extent to which these fees are shared with the limited
partners is a somewhat contentious issue in fundraising negotiations. These fees are commonly
split 50–50 between general and limited partners.
The role of leverage is central in the private equity investment strategy and the use of
debt has always been a substantial part of private equity transactions as it increases the return on
equity. Private equity funds usually acquire companies through the use of leveraged buyout
financing, taking advantage of the cheaper cost of debt and the deductibility of interest
expenses.36 They use the assets of the target company as collateral to borrow the funds necessary
to acquire the company and the debt remains on the target company’s balance sheet as part of its
capital structure. Therefore, private equity funds seek companies that can generate sufficient cash
flow to service the debt that is incurred to acquire them.37 A typical private equity investment
will utilize a relatively small portion of equity and a large pool of debt financing, with the
objective being to deliver superior risk-adjusted returns by improving the financial performance,
operations and growth profile of the acquired companies.38 Because such a large portion of the
fund’s investment is paid for with debt, the fund realizes a greater return on its own equity
investment when it liquidates that interest in the future.39 Assuming the return on the total value
invested by the fund is higher than the interest the fund pays on the borrowed debt, leverage
increases return on equity. In a traditional private equity transaction the deal is usually financed
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with anywhere between seventy and ninety percent debt and the remaining portion is financed
with equity commitments of the private equity fund.40
Private equity funds buy businesses the way that individuals purchase houses, namely
with a down payment or deposit supported by a mortgage.41 A major difference, however, is that
homeowners pay their own mortgages, whereas private equity funds require the companies they
buy for their portfolios to take out these loans, thus making them, not the private equity fund or
its investors, responsible for the loans.42 The only money that the private equity fund and its
investors have at risk is the initial equity they put up as a down payment.43 In essence, leveraged
buyout financing is very similar to a nonrecourse mortgage in which an acquirer buys an asset
borrowing funds against this asset.
Consider the individual who purchases a house for $100,000 with a $10,000 down
payment and a mortgage for $90,000. If the house appreciates in value by $30,000 to $130,000,
the buyer will have a net gain of $20,000 (the $30,000 appreciation less the down payment of
$10,000) reflecting a 200% return on the initial investment of $10,000. If the house declines in
value by $30,000 and the homeowner defaults on the loan, the bank will foreclose on the house.
In this scenario, the individual will lose only his or her initial investment of $10,000. The bank
will lose $20,000. A very similar logic applies when private equity funds acquire companies
putting up very little equity and financing the rest of the purchase through the use of debt. The
use of leverage by private equity funds simply magnifies the return to the fund investors from its
successful investments while minimizing the losses from its unsuccessful efforts.
Because such a large percentage of a typical private equity investment is financed with
debt, the more debt that a private equity fund can secure (typically loans from banks or other
financial lenders) and the cheaper it is to secure the debt, the less of its own capital it will have to
use to purchase the initial interest in the portfolio company. Therefore, when the fund eventually
sells the interest, the investment will be more profitable because the fund will internalize more of
the gains from the sale, resulting in greater return on equity. The debt used by private equity
funds almost always includes a loan portion that is senior and secured and is arranged by a bank
or an institutional investor. The debt component in leveraged buyout transaction also often
includes a junior, unsecured portion that is financed by either high yield bonds or “mezzanine
debt (debt which is subordinated to the senior debt).44
By way of illustration, suppose a new private equity fund begins with $1,000,000 of its
own capital obtained through capital commitments from limited partners. Then suppose that the
private equity fund can borrow $15,000,000 from banks or other lenders at an interest rate of 6%.
Then the private equity fund invests the entire $16,000,000 in a single investment, which the
general partner is confident will generate an annual return of 15%. The private equity fund plans
to return the borrowed capital plus interest at the end of the year. Therefore, the value of the
40
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investment at the end of the year will be $18,400,000 and the fund will pay back the banks and
other lenders $15,900,000 ($15,000,000 in principal and $900,000 in interest). The fund would
be then left with a total of $2,500,000 and a net positive gain of $1,500,000 once it subtracts the
initial investment of $1,000,000. This example reflects a 150% return on an investment that had
an unleveraged return of 15%. This financing technique is reinforced by the fact that after the
private equity fund liquidates its position in a portfolio company the debt that was used to
purchase the fund’s initial controlling interest ultimately remains on that company’s balance
sheet as a part of its capital structure. This is the primary reason for the use of leverage and
leveraged buyout financing techniques by private equity funds.
It is important to note that the use of leverage by private equity funds may have a
significant impact on investment results because, while it may enhance investment gains as
described above, it may also magnify investment losses.45 It magnifies the potential positive or
negative impact that any change in a company’s earnings may have on the return on equity.46
As the use of leveraged buyout financing has accelerated since the 1980s, mainly as a
result of low interest rates and innovative financial engineering, concerns about financial
stability and the risk associated with excessive leverage have been raised. Much of the criticism
of the private equity industry has been focused on this concept and the use of leverage, namely
that the use of leverage increases the risk of insolvency and that in many cases “companies will
need to devote at least half their yearly cash flow to meet interest payments on their debt.”47
Regulators, policymakers and commentators argue that there is a cost to using massive debt in a
company’s capital structure. That cost is the fact that financial risk increases when a company
uses extensive leverage because debt and interest must be paid regardless of whether a company
is profitable and generates sufficient operating cash flows.
Additionally, if a portfolio company of a private equity fund experiences distress or
enters bankruptcy, the equity partners in the fund will lose their stake in this company and
creditors can seize the property or business, but the private equity firm that sponsored the private
equity investment is not liable for the fund’s losses. Therefore, the occasional bankruptcy of a
portfolio company will have very little effect on the fund returns and even less on the private
equity firm that sponsored the investment, although it may be devastating for the failed company,
its employees, creditors, supplies, vendors and sometimes the economy as a whole.
B.

HEDGE FUNDS

Despite the prevalence of hedge funds and the massive attention that hedge funds have
received over the last several years, neither U.S. nor European regulators have been able to
formulate a legal or statutory definition of what constitutes a “hedge fund”.48 There is also no
45
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definition of the term “hedge fund” under U.S. securities laws. Rather, “hedge funds are typically
described as lightly regulated private investment vehicles that try to maximize risk-adjusted
returns for investors as compared to simply beating some index or the market as a whole.”49
A hedge fund is a private pool of capital through which investments are made using a
strategy designed to “hedge” against risks in equity investments.50 The term “hedge fund” comes
from the funds’ traditional role as a hedging vehicle against downturns in more conventional
investments.51 These funds tend to trade actively and usually try to exploit market inefficiencies
by taking positions based on market moves. In recent years the term has been expanded to cover
funds that employ very complex investment strategies and financial instruments. Hedge funds
have regularly been structured as limited partnerships or limited liability companies, to benefit
from the flow-through tax treatment with fund investors being limited partners or LLC members,
respectively, who acquire their interests in the fund in private placements that are exempt from
the registration requirements of the federal securities laws.52 Hedge fund managers usually
charge a management fee equal to 2% of the total asset value of the fund and a performance
incentive fee equal to 20% of any profits earned by the fund.
Although private equity and hedge funds are often lumped together, it is important to
distinguish between the two categories, particularly for the purpose of understanding and
evaluating Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. Hedge funds are short-term investors which seek to
profit from short-term speculative investments, much of which is not even directed at company
stock.53 They usually have holding periods of weeks or months, not years. Hedge funds differ
from private equity in that hedge funds implement investment strategies while private equity is
an asset class in itself. A hedge fund typically engages in short-term trading of financial
instruments and compensates its managers on an annual or quarterly basis.54 Hedge funds
generally implement a wide array of investment strategies including long or short positions in
equity securities, arbitrage, emerging markets and event driven investments. They usually invest
in stocks, bonds, currencies, options or commodities (or any combination of these categories)
and aim to capitalize on short-term gains, using a variety of trading strategies and derivative
financial instruments. The goal is to produce risk-adjusted positive returns from various market
opportunities.55 They also seek to maintain relative liquidity so that their investors may invest
and disinvest at regular intervals ranging from monthly to annually. Unlike mutual funds that
own very diversified portfolios, hedge funds sometimes invest a large amount of money in one
single position.
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By contrast, a private equity fund typically takes long-term management positions in
mature companies and compensates the fund managers once every several years upon the sale of
the fund’s assets. Hedge funds may be activist investors that try to influence corporate
governance, but they typically do not acquire controlling interests. They use extensive leverage
and trade complex financial instruments such as derivatives and credit default swaps. In contrast,
private equity funds nearly always acquire a controlling interest in an operating business and
implement restructuring and reorganization measures with the objective of a future public
offering or sale of the business.
Hedge funds traditionally combine long and short positions. They concentrate rather than
diversify and they borrow and leverage their portfolio.56 These strategies allow them to hedge
their bets on stock or commodity prices. By combing these two strategies (“long” bets that some
positions will rise with “short” bets that some positions will fall), “hedge funds essentially try to
minimize the risk of loss in any one position.”57 This strategy “allows for capital appreciation
while hedging against the risk of loss due to different events in the market.”58 In other words, by
shorting stocks, a hedge fund can limit its exposure if the market, or a particular industry or
geographic region dropped, while at the same time reaping gains in other positions if the market
rose.59 Under this hedge fund model, the primary objective is to generate absolute returns
regardless of market conditions.60
C.

VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS

Venture capital is a subset of private equity and the key difference between the two types
of funds lies in their investment focus.61 Whereas venture capital funds usually invest in earlystage pre-revenue startup companies, private equity funds invest in companies along all stages of
a company’s life-cycle (usually more mature operating companies with an established business
model and track record of performance). Venture capital funds usually finance new companies
and then take on an active role as the advisor or director to help the new company grow and
mature, unlike private equity funds which usually acquire controlling positions in their portfolio
companies and restructure/reorganize existing businesses.62
In all other respects, however, private equity funds and venture capital funds are not so
different and share the same characteristics. Both are pools of capital assembled by professional
investment teams from institutional investors and wealthy individuals in private offerings,
exempt from the registration requirements of U.S. securities laws. The primary objective of both
venture capital and private equity funds is to build and develop companies for an initial public
offering or an acquisition.
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Venture capital funds typically do not assume operating control of the businesses they
invest in. They are active investors but not managers. Private equity funds, on the other hand,
typically see themselves not as supporting but rather as taking over management of the
businesses they invest in.63 Additionally, venture capital funds typically do not use leverage or
borrowed capital. Private equity funds, on the other hand, use debt and usually leverage their
equity investments by having the target company take on debt that substantially exceeds the
amount of equity the private equity firm invested. Thus, most private equity investments are in
the form of leveraged buyouts, as discussed above.
Venture capital investments in high growth and technology companies have had many
successes over the last three decades. In fact, “some of the best known and most successful
technology or growth companies and brands in the world are venture backed, including Apple,
Google, FedEx, Intel, Cisco, Starbucks, eBay, Yahoo, Facebook, Home Depot and many
others.”64 Throughout its history, venture capital investments have established and built entire
industry sectors by funding breakthrough technologies and innovations. From “biotechnology to
information technology to clean technology, thousands of start-up ventures have been brought to
life, improving the way we live and work each day.”65
The venture capital industry, similar to the private equity sector, is a major driver of
economic growth and job creation by helping entrepreneurs turn innovative ideas and
breakthrough technologies into products and services that change the way we live and work.66
Venture capital funds simply provide the funding and guidance and assume the risks necessary
for building high-growth companies capable of bringing these technologies and innovations to
market.67 Making investments at the earliest stages of a company’s development, often before
the company has any product or revenues, involves significant risk, which severely limits the
funding sources for such companies.68 Yet, venture capital funds assume this risk together with
the company founders and other investors by providing capital in exchange for an equity stake in
the company.69 These features and particularly the willingness to take these risks at an early
stage of the business make venture capital a very unique asset class. Among the key features that
venture capital fund managers look for when investing in a portfolio company are a growing
market for the company's products or technologies, an effective management team, proprietary
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product or technology, a compelling technical or business advantage over competitors, a solid
business model and an exit strategy.70
During this investment stage, venture capital funds provide more than just funding to the
growing companies they invest in.71 Typically, they sit on the board of directors and provide
strategic counsel regarding development and production, making connections to commercialize
the company’s product and bring technologies to market, aid sales and marketing efforts,
develop an exit strategy and assisting in hiring key management.72 Additionally, venture capital
funds also guide the company through multiple rounds of financing to fund its growth and
operations until the company reaches profitability. The venture capital fund goal is to develop
and grow the company to a point where it can go public or be acquired by a larger corporation at
a price that far exceeds the amount of capital invested.73 Once all the investments of a particular
fund have been liquidated and the proceeds have been distributed to the fund investors, the fund
ends. In most cases, however, the investors reinvest these earnings in a new fund and the same
process begins again.74 Once the structure, nature and activities of private equity funds, hedge
funds and venture capital funds are understood, one can begin to examine how private equity
funds are regulated.
D.

THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS

In reaction to the 2008 financial crisis Congress and the SEC introduced a major
regulatory reform of the private investment funds industry through the enactment of Title IV of
the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules75. Title IV has significantly changed the
regulatory landscape for private investment funds and their managers (fund advisers).76 It
imposes significant new registration and compliance burdens on managers of private equity
funds, hedge funds and other private investment funds with assets under management of $150
million or more.77 Title IV and its implementing rules also establish onerous recordkeeping and
reporting requirements for registered investment funds and their advisers. Under Dodd-Frank and
its implementing rules, these funds and their managers must register with the SEC, screen
potential investors and track information pertaining to such things as their use of leverage,
including off-balance sheet leverage, their counterparty risk exposure, the amount of assets under
management, their trading and investment practices and positions, their asset valuation policies
and practices, the type of assets they hold and side arrangements with different investors in the
fund.78 The information is to be made available for SEC inspection and for potential filing with
the SEC.79 Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require advisers to private equity
and hedge funds to maintain records of such other information as the SEC, in consultation with
70
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the Financial Stability Oversight Council, determines is necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.80 Since private
investment funds like private equity and hedge funds often carry substantial risk and manage
large assets, this enhanced supervision, SEC registration and record keeping are expected to
allow regulators to analyze and evaluate the systemic risk associated with these funds, and hold
fund managers to more stringent reporting and registration requirements.81 The overall objective
is to monitor systemic risk through increased transparency. This paper will demonstrate that in
the context of private equity funds, this legislative approach is inadequate, unnecessary and
inefficient. It falls short of achieving the intended purpose of Title IV and its costs exceed its
benefits. The discussion that follows examines the pre and post Dodd-Frank regulatory
environment for private equity funds.
i)

PRE-DODD-FRANK REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there was very little supervision of private equity funds as
private investment funds along with their investment advisers were historically exempt from
registering with the SEC. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”)82 requires
any person falling within the definition of an “investment adviser” to register with the SEC and
comply with certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements, unless they qualify for an
exemption.83 Managers of private investment funds typically are considered to be “investment
advisers” for purposes of the Advisers Act. Hence, absent an express exemption from
registration, advisers to private equity funds would need to register with the SEC. However, prior
to the Dodd-Frank Act, many private equity fund managers avoided registration with the SEC
under the Advisers Act by relying on the “private investment adviser” exemption which
exempted firms that: i) had fewer than 15 clients over the course of the preceding 12 months and
ii) neither had held themselves out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acted as
an investment adviser to any registered investment company.84 Private equity fund managers
relied on this exemption to avoid having to comply with the numerous requirements associated
with registration, including increased fiduciary burdens, the adoption of compliance policies,
required record maintenance, various reporting requirements, periodic examination by the SEC
and restrictions relating to fees and custody of assets.
Under this exemption, private investment advisers (the actual fund managers) could
manage up to fourteen funds (regardless of the number of investors in the fund), without
80
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registering with the SEC, since each fund counted as one “client” for purposes of the exemption
under the Advisers Act.85 The SEC tried to eliminate this provision in 2004 through the
enactment of the Hedge Fund Rule, which required fund managers to look through to private
fund investors when counting the number of clients they advise. As a result most private equity
and hedge fund advisers were no longer able to rely on the “private investment adviser”
exemption, thereby forcing them to register with the SEC. This effort by the SEC to regulate
private investment funds was driven primarily by the failure of Long-Term Capital Management
in 1998. Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund specializing in high-risk arbitrage
trading strategies. The fund used extensive leverage and at its height in 1998, it had $5 billion in
assets, controlled over $100 billion and had positions whose total worth was over a $1 trillion.86
Due to its highly leveraged nature and a financial crisis in Russia, the fund sustained massive
losses and was in danger of defaulting on its loans.87 Had LTCM gone into default, it would have
triggered a global systemic failure of the financial system and a major financial crisis, caused by
the massive write-offs the fund’s creditors would have had to make.88 In September 1998, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York stepped in and arranged a $3.6 billion private bailout in
order to avoid the potential widespread impact of the fund’s collapse and a major financial crisis
that could have had disastrous consequences to the financial system and the economy as a whole.
A systematic meltdown of the financial market was thus prevented.
Despite the efforts of the SEC to regulate private investment funds through the Hedge
Fund Rule, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in the 2006 case of Goldstein v. SEC
rejected the SEC initiative to eliminate this exemption, thus letting fund managers count their
private funds as single clients and continue to rely on the private investment adviser exemption.89
The court held that the rule adopted by the SEC exceeded the SEC’s rule-making authority and
was thus invalid. This was the first of many attempts by regulators to increase private fund
regulation, supervision and transparency. Although the Hedge Fund Rule was eventually
invalidated and rejected by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. SEC, it provides
an important insight as to the SEC’s view regarding the risks associated with private investment
funds and private equity funds in particular.90 In enacting the Hedge Fund Rule the SEC was
more concerned with defining private investment funds so as to exclude private equity and
venture capital funds from SEC regulation and the registration requirements.91 From the Hedge
Fund Rule release it is clear that the SEC was simply not concerned with fraud associated with
private equity funds the way that it was concerned with hedge fund fraud.92 In addition, the SEC
85
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was also concerned with diverting its limited and already-overburdened resources. It therefore
decided to focus on hedge funds and allocate its resources to address the more serious problem
that could potentially lead to a systemic failure and a global financial crisis, like the LTCM
debacle.93
Additionally, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds were able to avoid
extensive SEC regulation by relying on exemptions from SEC registration under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “ICA”).94 The ICA regulates both the organization of companies,
such as “mutual funds that engage in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose
own securities are offered to the investing public,” as well as what these companies may
ultimately invest in. Investment companies are usually registered with the SEC pursuant to
Section 3(a) of the ICA which mandates SEC registration for any “issuer which is or holds itself
out as being engaged primarily…in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in
securities.”95 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds were exempt from such
registration either under: i) Section 3(c)(1) of the ICA, because they had no more than 100
beneficial owners and did not offer their securities to the public, or ii) Section 3(c)(7) of the ICA,
because their investors were all “qualified purchasers”, namely individuals or family entities
with not less than $5 million in investments, or institutions with not less than $25 million in
investments.96 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity funds, along with venture capital and
hedge funds used to fall within the scope of one of these exemptions and avoid the SEC
registration and reporting requirements.
ii)

POST-DODD-FRANK REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules introduced the most
significant regulatory change in the history of the private investment fund industry in the United
States, taking the regulatory oversight of this industry to an unprecedented level.97 Title IV and
its SEC implementation rules introduced a registration requirement for private investment fund
managers with the SEC and increased the reporting and disclosure requirements pertaining to
confidential and proprietary information. These legislative measures focus primarily on
eliminating excessive risk through SEC supervision and oversight.
Title IV and its implementing rules have replaced the “private investment adviser”
exemption with new, more narrow exemptions, thereby broadly expanding the Advisers Act’s
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registration requirements for private investment funds and their advisers.98 Through the
elimination of the private investment adviser exemption, Title IV and its implementing rules
introduced a general requirement that an investment adviser to any private equity fund or other
private pool of capital, with assets under management of $150 million or more, must register
with the SEC, thus bringing the private equity fund managers within the purview of SEC
regulation. Title IV removed the previous exemptions discussed above in furtherance of
“providing transparency and preventing potential dangers for systemic risk and investor abuse.”99
In place of the “private investment adviser exemption”, Title IV and its implementing rules
added several much more limited exemptions from registration with the SEC. Most importantly,
advisers to private funds with less than $150 million under management are exempt,100 as well as
“foreign private advisers”101 and advisers to venture capital funds.102 If a fund adviser is not
exempt, registration with the SEC will be required and this fund and its advisers will become
subject to extensive regulatory and supervisory oversight by the SEC.
The primary purpose of Congress in repealing the private investment adviser exemption
was to require advisers to private investment funds who had previously been considered exempt
from SEC registration, to register under the Advisers Act. 103 This SEC registration requirement
is intended to limit and control systemic risk, prevent fraud, provide more transparency and
information to investors and help the SEC to control the activities of “market participants
operating in the shadows of our markets.”104 Title IV and its implementing rules also
significantly increase the record-keeping and reporting obligations applicable to fund managers
of private equity funds. Under Title IV and its implementing rules, these funds and their
managers (fund advisers) must also screen potential investors and track information pertaining to
such things as their use of leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage, their counterparty risk
exposure, the amount of assets under management, risks metrics, products used by the fund
managers, their trading and investment practices and positions, their asset valuation policies and
practices, the type of assets they hold and side arrangements with different investors in the
fund.105 The information is to be made available for SEC inspection and for potential filing with
the SEC.106 Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require advisers to private equity
and hedge funds to maintain records of such other information as the SEC, in consultation with
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, determines is necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment and analysis of systemic risk.107
They require the SEC to examine various factors including the investment strategy, size, and
governance of investment advisers in order to assess and determine the systemic risk associated
with private investment funds and their activities.
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The data collected by the SEC under Title IV will be shared with the systemic risk
regulator and the SEC will report to Congress annually on how it uses this data to reduce
systemic risk in the financial system and protect investors and market integrity.108 In effect, these
new standards seek to fill the regulatory gap that previously existed by extending the registration,
disclosure and reporting requirements under the Advisers Act.109 SEC former Chairman Mary L.
Schapiro stated with regard to Title IV that: “these rules will fill a key gap in the regulatory
landscape…in particular, our proposal will give the SEC, and the public, insight into hedge funds
and other private fund managers who previously conducted their work under the radar and
outside the vision of regulators.”110 By requiring private equity fund managers to register with
the SEC as investment advisers, Title IV and its implementing rules effectively seek to end the
“shadow” financial system.111
To register with the SEC, fund advisers must complete Form ADV, which requires
substantial disclosures to the SEC and to the adviser’s clients.112 This form is the main data
collection tool the SEC uses to oversee investment advisers. Form ADV must be updated at least
annually and, with respect to certain key information, at the time of certain changes in the
reported information. Form ADV is divided into Part 1 and Part 2 and is updated by the
registered investment adviser at the end of each year.113 Part 1 requires “information about the
investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, and
any disciplinary events of the adviser or its employees.”114 Part 2 requires registered advisers to
provide new and prospective clients with a brochure and brochure supplements containing most
of the information provided in form ADV’s Part 1.115 All of the information disclosed under
form ADV is fully available to the public. The goal is to provide a level of transparency that will
assist investors in making their due diligence, and will deter fraud and facilitate earlier discovery
of potential misconduct.116
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In addition to mandatory registration requirements, the amended Form ADV, under Title
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, requires substantial disclosure of
information regarding the fund structure, ownership, the gross asset value, the investment
strategy, investment products used by the fund, the scope of services provided and the fund’s use
of consultants. In addition to the filing requirements under the amended Form ADV, Title IV and
its implementing rules also require registered fund advisers to file periodic reports on Form PF.
The reporting requirement in Form PF is intended to enable the Financial Stability Oversight
Council to monitor and control systemic risk in the U.S. financial markets and to facilitate
investigations and examinations by the SEC and the CFTC.
Another important change under Title IV and its implementing rules comes in the form of
increased state supervision, as it raised the assets under management threshold for federal
regulation of investment advisers.117 Title IV and its implementing rules modify the allocation of
responsibility for mid-sized fund advisers between state regulators and the SEC. They establish
the requirements for investment advisers to register with the state authorities if they have assets
under management above $100 million.118 The sections that follow examine the case against the
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing
rules and analyze whether Title IV represents the right approach to the regulation of private
equity funds.
III.

THE CASE AGAINST THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS UNDER TITLE IV OF
THE DODD-FRANK ACT – IS TITLE IV THE RIGHT ANSWER?

The following section of this paper will: i) analyze the political economy of the DoddFrank Act and its impact on the regulation of the private equity sector; ii) examine the political
economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable
v. SEC and the importance, role and application of cost benefit analysis in financial regulation
and particularly private equity regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules; iii) examine
the economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act and its relevance to the private
equity sector; and iv) challenge Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of
reducing systemic risk and protecting fund investors. This section of the paper will argue that the
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing
rules is inadequate, unwarranted and flawed. It is unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the
intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying theory of regulation, too disclosurefocused, based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not
properly address the risks and problems that led to the 2008 financial crisis. It will not
accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic risk in the U.S.
financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. It follows the
traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually excessive, burdensome, flawed and
populist in nature.
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Furthermore, this section of the paper will take the position that Title IV of the DoddFrank Act and its implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit
justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit court in the Business Roundtable decision. The
SEC in implementing Title IV, failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and to
consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. It failed
to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a
rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the
regulatory choices made. This section of the paper will argue that Title IV and its implementing
rules are not supported by i) the cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after
the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating that
the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs.
Like any other post-crisis financial reform legislation, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political need, but will not benefit the financial
market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor welfare and will not reduce the
risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. They go beyond the concerns
that led to the 2008 financial crisis and do not represent the proper legislative response that is
geared toward correcting and mitigating the failures that actually led to the 2008 financial crisis.
Additionally, the economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act does not support
the regulation of private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector.
This section of the paper will further argue that this government intervention in the
private equity sector was driven by the political pressure on Congress to quickly launch a
comprehensive reform of the financial system, following the 2008 financial crisis. It is a
reflection of the political and economic environment following the 2008 financial crisis. It
represents a questionable public policy decision that does not adequately address the propensity
of the financial sector to put the entire system at risk, and fails to protect the benefits that private
equity funds bring to the national economy. It is too broad, excessive, disclosure-focused and its
targeting of the private equity industry is simply unwarranted and misguided.

A.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT

The history of financial regulation in the U.S. suggests that financial reforms are usually
adopted after a major financial crisis or market crash.119 The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were adopted following the 1929 stock market collapse and the
Great Depression.120 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted following the collapse of
Enron and WorldCom and the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s.121 Finally, the
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted following the 2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the
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entire financial system.122 In the words of Professor John Coffee, “In the world of financial
regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Seas Bubble three
hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse, can legislators and regulators
overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive “reform”
legislation.”123 Professor Coffee further explains that regulatory intensity increases after a market
crash and that “in each of these cases, the comprehensive reform legislation that followed in the
wake of the market collapse showed hints of the public’s desire for retribution.”124 These postcrisis reforms are usually a response to public outrage prompted by a financial crisis or market
crash. Professor Stephen Bainbridge also describes the phenomenon that financial reforms tend
to follow market turmoil as the “boom-bust-regulate pattern that characterizes U.S. financial
regulation.”125
Before we examine the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Act and its impact on the
regulation of the private equity sector under Title IV and its implementing rules, it is worth
pausing to consider why is it that financial reform legislation seems only to be introduced after a
market crash or financial crisis. Professor Coffee further explains this legislative pattern by
reference to a basic theory of political science.126 U.S. Investors and shareholders, in Professor
Coffee’s view, are naturally “dispersed, poorly organized, have limited or diffused political
power and so constitute a classic latent group”.127 In contrast, the financial services industry is
well organized, has greater resources, can focus on the important issues concerning this industry
and has an incentive to maintain a powerful lobbying effort and presence.128 Therefore, “such
latent groups of shareholders or investors tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive
and better funded special interest groups, (representing the financial industry) in the competition
to shape legislation and influence regulatory and public policy.”129 Professor Coffee further
explains that “groups representing U.S. investors and shareholders are likely to be at a severe
disadvantage in competing with well-funded business lobbies.”130 However, this relationship and
domination by the financial services industry, in Professor Coffee’s view, changes following a
market crash or financial crisis and creates political pressure for new regulation.131 This change
and political pressure create the right environment for the introduction of a financial reform as
well as opportunities for “political entrepreneurs” to promote their agenda. In the words of
122
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Professor Coffee, “In crises, including market crashes, political entrepreneurs gain attention and
electoral success, by exploiting the popular discontent. Essentially, these entrepreneurs assume
the transaction costs of organizing otherwise latent interest groups in order to secure election (or
re-election) by assisting the public to overcome entrenched business interests.”132 In other words,
the occurrence of a market crash or financial crisis simply interrupts the domination of the latent
groups by smaller groups representing the powerful financing industry and creates the right
environment for political entrepreneurs to take action, promote their agenda and push for
financial reform legislation.
Professor Bainbridge also examines this legislative pattern of post-crisis financial reforms
and emphasizes the populist pressure for new regulation following the occurrence of a market
crash or financial crisis.133 It is this public and political pressure for action that drives post-crisis
reform legislation. In the words of Professor Bainbridge, “When the bubble inevitably bursts,
investigators reviewing the rubble begin to turn up evidence of speculative excess and even
outright rampant fraud. Investors burnt by losses from the breaking of the bubble and outraged
by evidence of misconduct by corporate insiders and financial bigwigs create populist pressure
for new regulation.”134 Professor Bainbridge also refers to the populist outrage that drives
Congress to take action after a market crash or financial crisis. In his words, “It is in the postbubble environment, when scandals and economic reversals occur and when corporate
transactions grab the attention of the American public and the U.S. Congress, that Congress often
acts.”135 He further explains that because such post-crisis periods usually involve “an upswing in
populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for action, they offer “windows of
opportunity to well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their preferred, ready-made
solutions when there is little time for reflective deliberation”.
Professor Larry Ribstein and Professor Roberta Romano have also demonstrated that this
post-crisis legislative pattern is a reoccurring phenomenon in U.S. financial regulation going
back even before the Nineteenth Century.136 Professor Stuart Banner also analyzes this postcrisis legislative pattern and explains that: “the reason for the association is that deep-seated
popular suspicion of speculation comes in bad financial times to dominate otherwise popular
support for markets, resulting in the expansion of regulation. That is to say, financial exigencies
embolden critics of markets to push their regulatory agenda. They are able to play on the strand
of popular opinion that is hostile to speculation and markets because the general public is more
amenable to regulation after experiencing financial losses.”137 The Dodd-Frank Act is clearly the
latest example of this post-crisis legislative pattern driven by the political pressure and public
outrage following the 2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system.
Several commentators and academic scholars have criticized this post-crisis legislative
pattern and argued that financial reforms adopted after a financial crisis or market crash are
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usually flawed, misdirected, overbroad and excessive. They are not supported by a compelling
cost-benefit argument and result in “quack corporate governance”138 or “bubble laws”.139 These
scholars argue that such post-crisis legislation is undesirable and should be discouraged because
it tends to be hasty, rushed, populist in nature and enacted in an environment of political pressure
that does not facilitate careful consideration of its unintended consequences.140 Such post-crisis
legislation is heavily influenced by the post-crisis political and economic environment and often
goes beyond the measures necessary and adopts unwarranted substantive rules, reflecting poor
public policy. The claim is that Congress can do substantial harm when it legislates in haste,
right after a market crash or financial crisis. The excessive influence over the political process in
the aftermath of a market crash or financial crisis usually goes too far and prevents capital
markets from realizing their full potential.141 The result of this legislative pattern is usually overregulation which is costly, inefficient, unnecessary and counter-productive to the economy as a
whole. Additionally, the sense of urgency that is usually associated with “the need to make
significant reforms in the near-term greatly increases the chance that policymakers will make
consequential mistakes and overlook potential implications.”142
This criticism has been specifically directed at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the DoddFrank Act.143 This part of the paper will examine this criticism in the context of private equity
regulation and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. It will analyze the political economy of Title IV
and demonstrate that like any other post-crisis legislation, Title IV may have satisfied the
political need of the political entrepreneurs and interest groups pushing for private fund
regulation, but it will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole and will not
improve investor welfare. Title IV is an example of this legislative pattern and the notion that
legislating in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis is a formula for poor public policy
making as well as excessive, costly, unnecessary, inefficient and overbroad legislation, which is
often not supported by any empirical academic literature. It goes beyond the concerns that led to
the 2008 financial crisis and does not represent the proper legislative response that is geared
toward correcting and mitigating the actual problems and failures that led to the 2008 financial
crisis.
In 2005 Professor Roberta Romano described the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as flawed
legislation and “quack corporate governance.”144 She observed that post-crisis financial reforms
are usually excessive and that “despite Enron and WorldCom being the claimed rationale, the
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act bear absolutely no relation to the source of the firm's
demise.”145 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act appeared to be nothing more than a rush and hasty response
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of regulators “triggered by the immediacy of politics and the panic of American investors”.146
She also argued that the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were not
supported by any empirical academic literature and resulted in a hasty, burdensome and
unwarranted legislation which falls short of achieving its stated objectives.147 She further
suggested that the political pressure after a market crash or financial crisis “tends to give
advantages to interest groups and other policy entrepreneurs who have prepackaged purported
solutions that can be readily adapted into legislative form.”148 She explained that “many of the
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions were recycled ideas that had been advocated for quite some time by
corporate governance entrepreneurs.”149 Professor Bainbridge goes further, and suggests that
“Unfortunately, because the policy entrepreneurs tend to be critics of markets and corporations,
bubble laws often impose regulation that penalizes or outlaws potentially useful devices and
practices and more generally discourages risk-taking by punishing negative results and reducing
the rewards for success.”150 Both Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge agree that this
post-crisis legislative pattern has real adverse economic consequences. They raise concerns that
the U.S. dominant position in the global capital markets has eroded and that U.S. capital markets
are becoming overly regulated and less competitive.151 Other scholars have also argued that the
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created significant new compliance costs that have had a
major negative effect on the economy and the competitiveness of the U.S. capital market.152
These compliance costs are the reason for a major increase in the number of public companies
deciding to go private and private companies contemplating a public offering in Europe rather
than the U.S.153 In the wake of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act “capital flight” was documented in
several studies as precipitated by increased regulation and compliance costs in the U.S.154 It was
also observed that U.S. capital markets were likely to be penalized for over regulation.155
In 2010 Professor Stephen Bainbridge criticized post-crisis financial reforms and used the
corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to demonstrate the concerns associated
146
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with the post-crisis legislative pattern. He argued that the corporate governance provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act are excessive, too broad, misdirected and also qualify for the description of
“quack corporate governance” or “bubble laws.”156 He noted that “bubble laws often impose
regulations that penalize or outlaw potentially useful devices and practices as a result of the
political climate in which they are introduced.”157 He further defined the terms “quack corporate
governance” and “bubble laws” and identified “eight key characteristics of post-crisis financial
reforms: 1) the new law is a bubble act, enacted in response to a major negative economic event;
2) it is enacted in a crisis environment; 3) it is a response to a populist backlash against
corporations and/or markets; 4) it is adopted at the federal rather than the state level; 5) it
transfers power from the states to the federal government; 6) interest groups that are strong at the
federal level but weak at the Delaware level support it; 7) typically, it is not a novel proposal, but
rather a longstanding agenda item of some powerful interest groups; and 8) the empirical
evidence cited in support of the proposal is, at best, mixed and often shows the proposal to be
unwise.”158 Professor Bainbridge uses the corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act to demonstrate how post-crisis financial reforms are burdensome, excessive, too broad, fall
short of achieving their stated objectives and result in “quack corporate governance” or “bubble
laws.”159 For example, one of the provisions he is using in his criticism of the post-crisis
legislative pattern is Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Section 953 requires additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, including
pay-for-performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total compensation and the median total
compensation for all other company employees.160 This requirement is extremely cumbersome.
In the words of Professor Bainbridge, “it practically means that for every employee, the company
would have to calculate and analyze the salary, bonus, stock awards, stock option awards, nonequity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value and all other forms of
compensation. This information would be extremely time-consuming to collect and analyze,
making it almost impossible for a company with tens of thousands of employees worldwide to
comply with this section.”161 The cost of compliance with Section 953 will be enormous with
little benefit to investors, the financial system or the economy as a whole.162 Congress, in
adopting Section 953, clearly sought to correct some of the executive compensation abuses
believed to have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis (which is a valid and legitimate goal by
itself).163 However, the end result is simply a burdensome and unfeasible provision as well as a
great example of Congress’s tendency to over-legislate and over-regulate in the aftermath of a
financial crisis.164 Congress clearly did not take into consideration the unintended negative
consequences of Section 953 and adopted a substantive rule which is simply too broad,
unnecessary and driven by political considerations and agendas.165 In the words of Professor
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Bainbridge: “this provision is part of a key interest group’s agenda and should also be seen as
part of the populist backlash against corporations and markets……the law taps into public anger
at the increasing disparity between the faltering incomes of middle America and the largely
recession-proof multimillion-dollar remuneration of the typical corporate chief.”166
The following section of this paper will apply Professor Romano’s and Professor
Bainbridge’s criticism of the post-crisis legislative pattern and the theory of “quack corporate
governance” and “bubble laws” to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulation of the
private equity sector. It will demonstrate that Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act actually reflects the
same legislative pattern of excessive, overbroad, unnecessary and misdirected post-crisis
financial reforms or “bubble laws”. It was enacted in the aftermath of a massive populist
backlash and motivated by the political pressure and public outrage resulting from one of the
worst financial crisis in American history. It satisfies all or substantially all of Professor
Bainbridge’s criteria and represents an example of the danger of hasty, populist and overbroad
legislation. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the pre-crisis
private equity funds’ conduct. As this paper demonstrates, in the context of private equity
regulation, legislating in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis is a formula for poor public
policy making as well as excessive, inefficient and costly legislation that falls short of achieving
the Dodd-Frank’s primary objectives of increasing transparency, reducing systemic risk and
promoting the stability of the financial system.
i)

TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT – THE SAME LEGISLATIVE PATTERN

Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules are an example of the same
post-crisis legislative pattern, driven by the political pressure and public outrage following the
2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system. As such, it has the
typical characteristics of a post-crisis legislative reform and suffers from the same problems, as
discussed by Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge. It is a reflection of financial market
reform legislation that goes beyond the concerns that led to its enactment and represents a
mismatch between the actual legislation and the pre-crisis concerns it was trying to address. As
this paper shows, by virtue of eliminating the private adviser exemption, Title IV brings the
private equity industry within the regulatory purview of SEC scrutiny and oversight in a way that
is unnecessary, excessive, costly, has many negative implications and targets more than the precrisis private equity activities.167 The way Congress and the SEC chose to regulate private equity
funds under Title IV (through the SEC registration and reporting requirements) demonstrates
how in the aftermath of a major financial crisis, regulators and legislators are driven by political
pressure and sometimes regulate beyond the pre-crisis conduct and the problems that have to be
addressed. This part of the paper will examine the legislative history of Title IV and the
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Congressional and SEC response to the financial crisis to ascertain the justification (if any)
behind the regulation of private equity funds under Title IV.
The enactment of Title IV was very controversial and produced under enormous public
pressure and outrage, following the 2008 financial crisis. Despite reservations on both sides, the
regulation of private equity funds and particularly the SEC registration and reporting
requirements were eventually included within the scope of Title IV. However, an examination of
the legislative history of Title IV indicates very clearly that regulators, including the SEC, were
not too concerned about private equity funds and not directly focused on the private equity sector
when they analyzed the 2008 financial crisis and spoke against the systemic risk concerns of
private investment funds.168
During the testimony of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, given together
with Paul Volcker with regard to private investment funds regulation, Mr. Wolin spoke
extensively about the need to adopt the Volcker Rule169 and the need to control systemic risk in
the financial system and systemically risky behaviors.170 However, the focus of his testimony
was the risks associated with hedge funds and nowhere in his testimony did he discuss the risks
or concerns associated with the private equity sector. He only mentions private equity funds
once, after discussing at length the risky nature of hedge funds and their contribution to the 2008
financial crisis:
“The activities targeted by our proposal tend to be volatile and high risk. Major firms saw their
hedge funds and proprietary trading operations suffer large losses in the financial crisis. Some of
these firms “bailed out” their troubled hedge funds, depleting the firm’s capital at precisely the
moment it was needed most. The complexity of owning such entities has also made it more
difficult for the market, investors, and regulators to understand risks in major financial firms, and
for their managers to mitigate such risks. Exposing the taxpayer to potential risks from these
activities is ill-advised. . . . [Thus], we have concluded that proprietary trading, and the ownership
or sponsorship o[f] hedge funds and private funds, should be separated, to the fullest extent
practicable, from the business of banking—and from the safety net that benefits the business of
banking.”

Additionally, the grouping of hedge funds and private equity funds together as private
funds or private pools of capital throughout the legislative hearings on Title IV suggests that the
private equity sector was not a major concern of regulators:
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“the financial crisis that erupted in the fall of 2008 exposed numerous vulnerabilities in our
present regulatory system for the financial services industry, including a lack of oversight of, and
transparency with respect to, private pools of capital. These pools take many forms, including
hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds and family officers, among others. While
they offer the promise of increased market efficiency and job creation, these pools also pose
potential dangers for systemic risk and investor abuse.”171

In the very next sentence, the section goes on to discuss growing trends in the hedge fund
industry that justify further regulation and government intervention.172 In this report,
Representative Barney Frank never once discusses the risks associated with the private equity
sector. He explains the growth in the hedge fund industry, the lack of transparency associated
with the activities of hedge funds, the “retailization” of hedge funds that has led to the exposure
of ordinary investors, and fraud actions that have been brought against hedge funds and their
managers in recent years.173 Private equity funds are only mentioned as an afterthought and
while being lumped together with hedge funds. The focus of this report and the primary concern
of regulators after the financial crisis were clearly the activities of hedge funds and their
contribution to the buildup of systemic risk as opposed to private equity funds.174
The essence of this report is that “hedge funds are unregulated and because of minimal
transparency in this sector of the financial market, government authorities have limited ability to
monitor and constrain systemic risks”.175 While private equity funds and hedge funds share
certain characteristics, they have very different business models and distinguishing features, as
discussed in Part II of this paper. The legislative history of Title IV indicates that there was a
real and legitimate concern for overall lack of transparency in the private funds industry and
particularly hedge funds. The specific fundamental difference between hedge funds and private
equity funds, as well as the lack of specific instances in which private equity funds created
systemic risk concerns prior to the financial crisis tend to suggest that there was nothing about
these private equity funds that warranted any government intervention in the private equity
sector or their inclusion within the scope of Title IV and its SEC registration and reporting
requirements. Instead, the legislative history of Title IV indicates a major concern regarding
systemic risk and lack of transparency in the hedge fund sector.
In a 2009 white paper, the Treasury Department supported the SEC registration and
reporting requirements of Title IV for the hedge fund industry to “ensure that financial
institutions that are critical to market functioning are subject to strong oversight”.176 SEC
Commissioner Louis Aguilar also commented: “We're totally unable to discern what is going on
in [the hedge fund] market, [we] have no idea how many dollars are involved, [. . .] what type of
risk-taking is happening, [we] don't know if they're investing in vanilla securities or investing in
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the riskiest instruments."177 Still, nothing indicates any specific concern with regard to private
equity funds and their pre-crisis conduct that justifies bringing these funds within the purview of
SEC registration and reporting. In the word of Professor John W. O’Brien of the Haas School of
Business at the University of California - Berkeley: “I don’t think private equity and venture
capital have been an important part of the problem. It has mainly been the leverage and rapidtrading strategies, and those strategies are primarily housed in hedge funds. I don’t think
Congress has a clear understanding of the problem so they wrap everybody into the net.”178
As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the
financial system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the
economy as a whole. No demonstrable market failure was identified in the context of the private
equity industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad provisions. Additionally, there is
no empirical academic literature to support any specific regulatory concern associated with the
private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the context of systemic risk and a potential
financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis had very little to do with private equity funds.179 Private
equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They
did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the
financial system and were simply not part of the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge
funds.180 As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds present none of the systemic
risk factors that led to the financial crisis and thus should have posed very little concern for
regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic
risk and guard against a future financial crisis.
Additionally, according to a study of more than 3200 private equity-backed companies,
“during the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008-2009 private equity-backed businesses defaulted at less
than one-half the rate of comparable companies: 2.84 [percent] versus 6.17 [percent].”181 Also,
while both hedge funds and private equity funds experienced losses during the 2008 financial
crisis, research indicates that private equity funds have actually performed more than 5% better
than hedge funds since 2007.182 Therefore, it seems very unlikely that regulators viewed private
equity funds as excessively risky and were concerned about the risky nature of private equity
funds. This is because, “unlike the troubled hedge funds in need of bailouts as discussed in Mr.
Wolin’s testimony, private equity funds did not pose any unique threat to the financial system
and the economy as a whole.”183
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It is also important to note that the version of Title IV that was approved by the Senate on
May 20, 2010, included an exemption from registration to investment advisers of private equity
funds.184 The Senate explained its reasoning behind providing an exemption from registration to
private equity advisers as follows:
“The Committee believes that private equity funds characterized by long-term equity investments
in operating businesses do not present the same risks as the large private funds whose advisers are
required to register with the SEC under this title. Private equity investments are characterized by
long-term commitments of equity capital - investors generally do not have redemption rights that
could force the funds into disorderly liquidations of their positions. Private equity funds use
limited or no leverage at the fund level, which means that their activities do not pose risks to the
wider markets through credit or counterparty relationships. Accordingly, Section 408 directs the
SEC to define "private equity fund" and provides an exemption from registration for advisers to
private equity funds.” 185

The Senate further explained:
“Informed observers believe that in some cases the line between hedge funds and private equity
may not be clear, and that the activities of the two types of funds may overlap. We expect the
SEC to define the term "private equity fund" in a way to exclude firms that call themselves
"private equity" but engage in activities that either raise significant potential systemic risk
concerns or are more characteristic of traditional hedge funds. The section requires advisers to
private equity funds to maintain such records, and provide to the SEC such annual or other
reports, as the SEC determines necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors.”186

Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, as finally enacted, does not contain the private equity exemption
that was included in the version approved by the Senate. Instead, it incorporates the broad
proposal made by Senator Jack Reed (D-IR). Senator Reed advanced the most aggressive
proposal, the Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, which basically required the registration of
all private investment funds, regardless of size, by eliminating the private investment adviser
exemption.187 Senator Reed offered very little reasoning, evidence and support for the inclusion
of private equity funds in his proposal.188 He stated in his proposal that “"[hedge funds, private
equity, and venture capital funds' . . . role has grown so have the risks they pose," while at the
same time he acknowledged that there is "no reliable data on the number and nature of these
firms or ability to calculate the risks they may pose to America's broader economy."189
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Furthermore, reviewing the SEC adopting releases implementing Title IV and the
amendments to the Advisers Act, indicates the same legislative pattern and provides an important
insight as to the SEC’s view regarding the risks associated with private investment funds and
what the SEC was trying to accomplish.190 It seems from the adopting releases that the activities
targeted by the SEC were primarily hedge funds and the systemic risk concerns associated with
hedge funds.191 The adopting releases indicate that there was a real and legitimate concern about
the activities of hedge funds, their use of leverage, their trading strategies, their involvement in
the 2008 financial crisis and their overall lack of transparency.192 The focus of the SEC was
mainly hedge funds and the need for more oversight over the activities of hedge funds. Private
equity funds were not a concern mentioned in the SEC adopting releases and nowhere in the
adopting releases was there any discussion about private equity funds and their potential risks to
the financial system or the economy as a whole.193 From the SEC adopting releases it also seems
that the SEC was simply not concerned with fraud associated with private equity funds the way
that it was concerned with potential hedge fund fraud. Overall, the SEC adopting releases offer
very little reasoning, evidence and support for the inclusion of private equity funds within the
scope of Title IV and its implementing rules. Additionally, there is no empirical academic
literature or other sources mentioned in the SEC adopting releases to support any specific
regulatory concern associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the
context of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.194
The specific fundamental differences between hedge funds and private equity funds (as
discussed in Part II of this paper), as well as the lack of specific instances in which private equity
funds created systemic risk concerns prior to the financial crisis or caused any market failure
tend to suggest that there was nothing about these private equity funds that warranted any
government or regulatory intervention in the private equity sector or their inclusion within the
scope of Title IV and its implementing rules. As discussed later in this paper, the SEC should
have implemented Title IV in a way that exempts private equity funds from the SEC registration
and reporting requirements. In other words, this paper takes the position that since private equity
funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic
growth, they had no involvement in the 2008 financial crisis and their investors have the
resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC should have included a carve-out
for private equity funds exempting these funds from the requirements of Title IV while focusing
on hedge funds.
This section of the paper has offered a brief overview of the legislative history of Title IV
and its implementing rules and how they follow the traditional post-crisis legislative pattern. An
examination of the legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules indicates that this
piece of legislation reflects the same legislative pattern of excessive, overbroad, unnecessary and
misdirected post-crisis financial reforms or in the words Professor Romano and Professor
Bainbridge “bubble laws”. It was enacted in the aftermath of a massive populist backlash and
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motivated by the political pressure and public outrage resulting from one of the worst financial
crisis in American history. It is not supported by any evidence, research or analysis to justify this
government and regulatory intervention and the need to regulate the private equity industry. It
satisfies all or substantially all of Professor Bainbridge’s criteria and represents an example of
hasty, populist and overbroad legislation. It goes beyond the concerns that led to the 2008
financial crisis and the pre-crisis private equity funds’ conduct, as clearly, regulators had no
specific concerns with regard to the activities of private equity funds or the potential systemic
risk associated with the private equity sector. The only reason private equity funds were
eventually included within the scope of Title IV is the unique political and economic
environment following the 2008 financial crisis, the “emotionally charged” climate, as well as
the public outrage and political pressure on Congress to take action, satisfy angry constituents
and introduce a comprehensive reform of the financial system. Title IV and its implementing
rules are not calibrated to the circumstances that led to the enactment of the legislation as there
is very little ‘nexus’ between private equity activities and the systemic risk concerns underlying
the enactment of Title IV.
As discussed in Part II of this paper, Title IV tries to eliminate excessive risk through
SEC supervision and oversight. While increased transparency and oversight in the context of
private investment funds, and particularly hedge funds, may reduce and control the systemic risk
that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the near collapse of the entire financial system, these
provisions, insofar as they apply to the private equity industry, go beyond the objectives of the
Dodd-Frank Act and the actual concerns that regulators were trying to address. They simply
reflect an inadequate, costly and unnecessary legislative response which is inconsistent with the
intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act. It was all made possible due to the tremendous political
pressure on Congress and sense of urgency to introduce a comprehensive reform of the financial
system which created the right opportunity for “political entrepreneurs” to push their agenda.
The following section of this paper will examine the political economy of financial regulation
following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC195 and the importance, role
and application of cost benefit analysis in financial regulation and particularly private equity
regulation under Title IV and its implementing rules.

B.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL RULEMAKING AFTER BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

We now turn to explore the political economy of financial regulation following the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable and the importance, role and application of cost
benefit analysis in financial regulation as well as private equity regulation under Title IV and its
implementing rules. Choosing whether and how to regulate is generally a question of regulators
and the implementing agency evaluating alternative regulatory approaches, tradeoffs and
whether society, the financial system and the economy gain enough from the regulation to justify
its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and
consequences of their regulatory actions and determine the best course of action. In other words,
the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the proposed legislative action.
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In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit, in striking down the proxy access rule held that
the rulemaking process was “arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law” and that
the SEC had failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis of the rule.196 The court vacated
the rule on the basis that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act197 and that the SEC “failed
adequately to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation”.198 In
concluding that the SEC had failed to meet its cost benefit analysis obligations, the court made
clear that the rule required “a far more rigorous economic analysis and cost benefit justification
than the SEC had assumed was necessary.”199 In the words of Judge Ginsburg, “the SEC fell far
short of its statutory obligation to determine as best it could the economic implications of the
rule”.200
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions
since cost benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators
strictly accountable for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.201 It established a far more
rigorous standard of review than the financial regulators had previously used. The decision
appears to require courts to “police the quality of regulators cost benefit analysis and directs
judges to look more closely at the analysis to determine whether the relevant regulator has
adequately considered and ascertained the rule’s costs and benefits based on all the alternatives
available.”202
The decision in Business Roundtable is also significant as it was the first challenge of a
rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s failure to perform
an adequate cost benefit analysis.203 It also represents a turning point indicative of an
unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new
approach to their rulemaking process.204 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of
financial regulation.205 Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process206 or make the rules that
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”207
This section of the paper will examine the costs and benefits of Title IV’s implementing
rules, in light of the decision in Business Roundtable, and show the deficiencies in the cost
benefit analysis performed by regulators and particularly the SEC in connection with private
equity regulation and the implementation of Title IV. It will demonstrate how cost benefit
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analysis, when used properly, provides a fundamental decision making tool that helps regulators
to ensure that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a
whole. It will evaluate whether Title IV’s implementing rules i) are supported by the cost benefit
analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in Business Roundtable; ii) are
tailored to impose the least burden on society, the financial system and the economy; and iii)
reflect a regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits. This section of the paper will also
discuss how the rigorous cost benefit analysis standards established in the Business Roundtable
decision may affect the political economy of financial regulation and how actors in the political
economy of financial rulemaking may respond to the Business Roundtable decision. Before we
examine the political economy of financial regulation following the Business Roundtable
decision and whether Title IV’s implementing rules are in fact supported by a cost benefit
analysis that is consistent with the standards established in Business Roundtable, it is worth
pausing to consider the history of cost benefit analysis and its specific application to financial
regulation.
i.

THE HISTORY OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND FINANCIAL REGULATION

Cost benefit analysis is considered to be one of the most important decision-making tools
in the context of modern regulation. For more than three decades, under both Democratic and
Republican administrations, cost benefit analysis has been a fundamental tool of effective
regulation, ensuring that regulators maximize the benefits of the proposed regulatory actions and
that these regulatory actions produce a net positive effect on society and the economy as a
whole.208 Both Congress and the Executive have taken numerous steps over the years to require
regulators and federal agencies to engage in cost benefit analysis when deciding how to regulate.
In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “In the past 30 years in particular, cost benefit analysis
has become a fundamental part of how federal agencies think about and ultimately select
regulatory approaches, with all three branches of government participating in the creation of the
cost benefit state.”209 As early as 1902, Congress requested federal agencies to compare costs
and benefits of proposed regulatory actions210, and the New Deal reflected the first large-scale
implementation of this regulatory tool, when “the Flood Control Act of 1936 required that the
Army Corps of Engineers take regulatory action only where benefits were greater than the
costs.”211 The practice of using cost benefit analysis in the context of adopting regulations
became more common as a public policy tool in the 1950s and 1960s “with the growth of the
administrative state and the development of welfare economics concepts that supported the use
of cost-benefit analysis in determining how to implement government policies.”212 The use of
cost benefit analysis was in many ways a response to a wave of safety, health and environmental
regulations.213
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Supporters of cost benefit analysis argue that it is “a natural filtering tool that makes
federal regulations more rational and efficient.”214 It is simply a regulatory tool to ensure that the
costs of regulatory actions do not exceed the benefits of such regulatory actions. Opponents of
cost benefit analysis argue that it is not a “natural filtering tool but a mechanism designed to
further a deregulatory agenda by creating regulatory gridlock, imposing an impossible burden of
proof on the regulators or making it prohibitively expensive for agencies to issue regulations.”215
Despite criticism of cost benefit analysis over the years, in the context of regulation, cost benefit
analysis has become a major regulatory tool used by regulators, policymakers, Presidents of both
parties and members of Congress.
However, it is important to note that the implementation of this major regulatory tool is
extremely complicated as the quality of the cost benefit analysis depends on “the good faith of
the regulator or agency performing the analysis and on the existence of an effective enforcement
mechanism to challenge and invalidate rules that are not supported by an adequate cost benefit
analysis.”216 Without an effective mechanism for ensuring the quality or adequacy of cost benefit
analysis, this regulatory tool may become “a political cover rather than a genuine check on costly
regulations”.217
Regulatory cost benefit analysis requirements were usually limited to executive agencies
and social regulations and substantial or robust cost benefit analysis requirements were not
imposed on financial regulations until 1996. It then took nearly a decade for the first challenge of
a financial regulation based on the adequacy of its cost benefit analysis to reach the courts.218 We
now turn to examine how cost benefit analysis has evolved as a regulatory tool used by
regulators, policymakers and Presidents of both parties to manage and control the rulemaking
process by executive agencies. We will also look at the main Congressional mandates governing
cost benefit analysis reviews of financial regulations and examine the quality or adequacy of the
cost benefit analysis of financial regulation.
Executive Branch Programs
Almost every President since Richard Nixon has had a cost benefit analysis process to
review and filter regulations proposed by executive agencies and has urged independent agencies
to use cost benefit analysis as well.219 However, this cost benefit analysis review process had
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only limited impact on financial regulations since most of the federal financial regulatory
agencies are independent agencies.220 President Reagan established the most rigorous cost
benefit analysis review program of all the presidents in Executive Order 12,291.221 The Reagan
order prohibited executive agencies “from undertaking any regulatory action . . .unless the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs” and required them to
choose the “alternative involving the least net cost to society of all available alternatives.”222 In
other words, when an agency regulates, it must find that the benefits justify the costs of the
proposed regulatory action. It also gave the power to enforce compliance with the program and
these cost benefit analysis requirements to a powerful new Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief.223
The Bush Administration continued this approach, but transferred enforcement authority
to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”).224 President Clinton replaced the Reagan and Bush cost benefit analysis
approach with a less robust process outlined in Executive Order 12,866, which remains in effect
today.225 Still, cost benefit analysis remained the central requirement of these orders. The Clinton
approach is less demanding than the Reagan and Bush approach in two elements. First, it
“directed agencies to consider qualitative measures of cost and benefit in addition to quantitative
measures.”226 Second, it “required an executive agency only to provide a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,” rather than “showing that the
benefits outweigh the costs.”227 Still, regulators and agencies have to choose the regulatory
approach that maximizes net benefits.228
The Obama Administration has continued to follow the standards for cost benefit analysis
set forth by the Reagan Administration and reconfirmed by the Clinton Administration, which
“require an executive agency to adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”; “base decisions on the best reasonably
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for, and
consequences of, the intended regulation”; and “tailor its regulations to impose the least burden
on society.”229 Additionally, by issuing Executive Order 13,563, the Obama Administration has
enhanced the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool, underscoring that “the benefits
must justify the costs of the proposed agency action, that unless the law provides otherwise the
chosen approach must maximize net benefits, and that the agency must use the best available
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as
very limited.” Presidents Ford and Carter implemented more rigorous and effective cost benefit analysis review and
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possible.”230 President Obama also issued Executive Order 13,579,231 which “urges independent
agencies to comply with the cost benefit analysis requirements in Executive Orders 12,866 and
13,563, although they are not binding on independent agencies.232
Statutes and Financial Regulations
Despite the major support for the rigorous use of cost benefit analysis as a fundamental
regulatory tool and its general recognition and acceptance by all three branches of the federal
government, financial market regulators have been slower in adopting this approach than their
executive agency counterparts.233 The reasons for this approach are primarily historical, in that
the executive orders requiring cost benefit analysis by federal agencies expressly do not apply to
independent agencies such as many financial regulators.234
The first government regulatory action to impose cost benefit analysis standards in the
context of financial regulation was the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, or UMRA,
(although it is limited to executive agencies).235 It requires “all federal agencies other than
independent regulatory agencies to conduct a cost benefit analysis of significant regulatory
actions—that is, regulatory actions that could impose annual costs on the public or private
sectors of $100 million or more—and is expressly subject to judicial review.”236 In this
legislation Congress actually required agencies to “prepare a qualitative and quantitative
assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the federal mandate”.237
The first statute to impose cost benefit analysis requirements on an independent financial
regulatory agency was the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.238 Section 106
of that Act added certain cost benefit analysis requirements to Section 2(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933239, Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 240 and Section 2(c) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940.241 These mandates all require the SEC, when engaged in
financial rulemaking under a particular act, to “consider whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”242 Congress also added a similar cost benefit
analysis requirement to Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act 243 in Section 119 of the
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Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.244 This cost benefit analysis requirement
provides that “before promulgating a regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission must consider the costs and benefits of the action and
evaluate them in light of a variety of factors including the efficiency, competitiveness, and
financial integrity of futures markets.”245
The Dodd-Frank Act has brought the regulatory tool of cost benefit analysis in financial
regulation to the forefront by requiring financial regulators and agencies to promulgate hundreds
of new rules affecting the U.S. financial market. The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes a number of
cost benefit analysis requirements on a wide range of financial regulations. As this legislation
was drafted and structured to amend existing laws, the general cost benefit analysis requirements
included in the organic acts of each financial regulator (like the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934) apply as well to any Dodd-Frank financial rulemaking since they were not altered or
eliminated.246 Also the Dodd-Frank Act does not exempt any of the regulations issued under the
amended provisions from the preexisting cost benefit analysis requirements in the respective
securities laws or other financial regulations. Therefore, any regulations implementing the DoddFrank Act rules or amendments are subject to the same preexisting cost benefit analysis
requirements. The Dodd-Frank Act also incorporates as a structural matter all of the cost benefit
analysis requirements that apply to financial rulemaking by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”), including the one in UMRA. Therefore, any time the OCC issues any
financial regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, such as its regulations implementing the
Volcker Rule247, the OCC must comply with the cost benefit analysis requirements of the
UMRA.
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically imposes a cost benefit analysis requirement on all
financial rulemaking by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) under the
consumer protection provisions in Title X.248 It also imposes an express cost benefit analysis
requirement on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) in issuing regulations
governing the designation of financial activities as systemically important under Section 120.249
Additionally, it imposes a cost benefit analysis requirement on the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) in issuing rules governing “the recovery of compensation from officers
and directors who are responsible for the failure of a systemically important financial
company.”250
Additionally, in 2012, Congress passed the JOBS Act, in which it placed a similar cost
benefit analysis requirement on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a
self-regulated body whose proposed rules are subject to SEC review and approval before taking
effect. The JOBS Act provides that any PCAOB rules adopted after its enactment “shall not
apply to an audit of any emerging growth company, unless the Commission determines that the
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application of such additional requirements is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
after considering the protection of investors and whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”251 We now turn to examine the quality and standards of
cost benefit analysis reviews of financial regulation.
The Quality of Cost Benefit Analysis Reviews of Financial Regulation
The quality of the cost benefit analysis performed in the context of financial regulation
has historically been, to some extent, low and almost never included any empirical evidence to
support the proposed regulatory actions.252 Financial regulators seem as if they were simply
going through the motions of performing some form of cost benefit analysis rather than going
through a comprehensive and robust analysis of the actual costs and benefits of the proposed
regulatory action that actually evaluates whether society and the economy as a whole gain
enough from the regulation to justify its costs.253 This lack of robust cost benefit analysis of
financial regulations is consistent with the Business Roundtable decision and the D.C. Circuit’s
conclusion that the SEC had failed to meet minimum quality standards in the cost benefit
analysis review of the proxy access rule.254 It is also consistent with views recently expressed by
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (“CCMR”), which is an independent and
nonpartisan body dedicated to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets. The CCMR
submitted a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate Banking Committee and the
House Financial Services Committee on the lack of adequate cost benefit analysis in the DoddFrank rulemaking.255 The CCMR reviewed 192 of the proposed and final rules that have been
issued under the Dodd-Frank Act so far. It found that “fifty-seven of these rules contained no
cost benefit analysis at all; eighty-five contained cost benefit analysis, but they were entirely
qualitative, and not quantitative; and only fifty rules contained quantitative cost benefit
analysis.”256 In the last category, “the most instances of cost benefit analysis were limited to
administrative costs like the costs of paperwork, legal and compliance review, technological
enhancements, and the like, without any analysis of the broader economic implications of the
proposed rules.”257
Additionally, the Inspectors General of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have found “major deficiencies in the
financial regulators’ use of cost-benefit analysis after the Dodd-Frank”258, and the Government
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Accounting Office (GAO), Congress’s investigative arm has also “faulted financial regulators for
failing to monetize or quantify costs and benefits of proposed regulatory actions.”259
There may be different possible explanations for the low average quality of these
instances of cost benefit analysis of financial regulation. First, as explained above, cost benefit
analysis requirements are relatively new in the context of financial regulations. The financial
regulatory agencies may need more experience using this regulatory tool or more economists
rather than lawyers on their staffs.260 Second, “the financial agencies may view cost benefit
analysis as an intrusion into the exercise of their expert discretion rather than a useful regulatory
tool to sort out the best regulatory alternative.”261 Third, some of the financial agencies may lack
sufficient resources to hire the economists they need to conduct an adequate and robust cost
benefit analysis, consistent with the requirements of the Business Roundtable decision. Fourth,
“the lack of any independent enforcement body similar to the enforcement arms that have existed
in the executive branch may give independent financial regulatory agencies the sense that they
are not accountable to anyone except themselves and their allies in Congress.”262
Academic Reaction to Costs Benefit Analysis
Cost benefit analysis and its importance as a regulatory filter has been the subject of
extensive academic debate. Opponents of cost benefit analysis argue that “cost benefit analysis
promotes a deregulatory agenda under the cover of scientific objectivity.”263 They further argue
that “the motivating factor behind cost benefit analysis in this context is a political bias against
regulation.”264 Cost benefit analysis opponents “want to prevent economic considerations from
eclipsing other important values that ought to inform agency decision making.”265 In contrast,
Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner argue that, “when properly used by regulators, cost
benefit analysis is consistent with a broad array of popular theories of the proper role of
government and is capable of satisfying every political theory that holds that the government
should care about the overall well-being of its citizens.”266 In other words, opponents of cost
benefit analysis as a regulatory tool use the term “ossification” since they believe that rigorous
http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInsp ections/2011/Report_6_13_11.pdf; Officer of The Inspector Gen. of The
CFTC, A Review of Cost Benefit Analysis Performed by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission in
Connection with Rulemaking undertaken pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act ((June 13, 2011) available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents /file/oig_investigation_061311.pdf.
259
See GAO Report GAO-13-101, Dodd-Frank Act Regulations: Agencies’ Efforts To Analyze And Coordinate
Their Rules (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650947.pdf.
260
See Rose and Walker supra note 208.
261
Id.
262
See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and
Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1496, 1509, 1532–33 (2002) (discussing “cost benefit
analysis requirements for executive agencies and arguing for cost benefit analysis requirements for independent
agencies”).
263
See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of
Nothing 9 (2004).
264
See Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-benefit Analysis, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1355, 1366 (2009)
(reviewing Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 254).
265
See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better
Protect the Environment and Our Health 15 (Oxford University Press 2008).
266
See Adler & Posner, supra note 21.
45

review of cost benefit analysis may overpower or take over other important parameters that
ought to determine regulatory choices.267 Proponents of costs benefit analysis, on the other hand,
describe the use of costs benefit analysis as a regulatory tool as the “rationalization of the
regulatory process”, since they believe that the filtering effect is critical for securing efficient
regulatory actions.268 The following section of this paper will examine the many policy
considerations that favor the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool for more efficient
regulatory actions.
ii.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

As the history of cost benefit analysis discussed above demonstrates, cost benefit analysis
has developed over the past three decades as one of the most important tools for effective
regulation. The acceptance of cost benefit analysis by regulators as a major decision-making tool
in the context of modern regulation reflects the many policy considerations that favor its use.
These considerations are based on two major premises and can be divided into two groups. First,
“cost benefit analysis promotes more rational decision-making and more efficient regulatory
actions.”269 It is a tool to measure the economic consequences of a proposed regulatory action
and ensure that regulatory actions are the product of reasoned decision-making. Second, “cost
benefit analysis promotes good public governance as a transparent, democratic, and accountable
regulatory methodology.”270
Cost benefit analysis improves the regulatory process and ensures that regulators
maximize the benefits of the proposed regulatory actions. In the words of Professor Sunstein, “at
its core, cost benefit analysis is a tool of rational decision-making.”271 As explained, for example,
in a 1772 letter that Benjamin Franklin wrote to his friend Joseph Priestley, “listing the pros and
cons of a solution on a piece of paper and carefully weighing them against one another provides
a practical method for solving difficult problems.”272 Over the years Franklin’s approach has
developed into a powerful tool for rational decision-making and efficient rulemaking.273
As a matter of policy, cost benefit analysis provides a decision-making process that helps
to produce effective regulations and ensures that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect
on society and the economy as a whole.274 In other words “society and the economy have to gain
enough from the proposed regulation to justify its costs.”275 Choosing whether and how to
regulate is generally a question of regulators and the implementing agency evaluating alternative
regulatory approaches, tradeoffs and whether society, the financial system and the economy gain
enough from the regulation to justify its costs. The goal is for regulators to ensure they
adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions and determine
the best course of action. In other words, the benefits must justify and exceed the costs of the
267
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proposed legislative action. Cost benefit analysis provides regulators a tool that keeps them
focused on the following “critical questions in the rulemaking process: What are the actual,
quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed regulation? How do these factors weigh against
other values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity,
fairness, and distributive impacts? In light of these costs and benefits, how does this regulation
compare to other possible solutions?”276 Cost benefit analysis provides regulators a structured
method for addressing these questions ensuring they choose the best regulatory solution and that
this choice is in fact justified.
In choosing the best regulatory approach and considering all the relevant factors in the
rulemaking process, regulators and agencies also minimize the risks of unintended consequences
that may result from a particular regulatory action.277 As discussed in Part III of this paper,
financial reforms are usually adopted after a major financial crisis or market crash. These
reforms tend to be hasty, rushed, populist in nature and enacted in an environment of political
pressure that does not facilitate careful consideration of its unintended consequences.278
Such post-crisis legislation is heavily influenced by the specific post-crisis political and
economic environment as regulators have to respond to a crisis quickly and effectively. For
example, a need for regulatory action may present itself because of a major financial crisis or a
high-profile securities fraud case in which it is clear that the existing regulatory regime was
inadequate. In these circumstances of political and economic urgency and pressure on regulators
to act, cost benefit analysis provides an efficient regulatory tool for a measured response and a
more rational decision-making process and balanced approach. By conducting a cost benefit
analysis of a specific regulatory solution, regulators or agencies “force themselves to quantify
risks and reduce the likelihood that cognitive biases will negatively affect regulatory efforts.
Cost-benefit analysis thus helps bring to light potential unintended consequences that may result
from a particular regulatory action.”279 Cost benefit analysis is designed to solve the problem of
hasty regulation that fails to achieve its goals or imposes costs that outweigh its benefits.280
Additionally, “cost benefit analysis helps promote rational decision-making by focusing
regulators on the need to properly allocate their supervisory and enforcement resources.”281
Regulators must ensure not merely that their regulations provide benefits and justify the costs,
but also that they make the most efficient use of their limited resources. In practice, regulators
address this task by evaluating regulatory alternatives and ensuring that the most efficient
alternative is in place, both from the perspective of the rule’s impact on society and the economy
and from the perspective of the regulator’s own resources, supervisory and enforcement
capabilities.282
In essence, if a regulator or agency can produce similar regulatory outcomes in multiple
ways, they should choose the one that does so at the least cost to society and to the regulator
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itself.283 Without some form of cost benefit analysis, the regulator has no grounds for making
such a decision or regulatory choice. For this reason, the OMB’s cost benefit analysis guidelines
require regulators and agencies to “compare leading alternatives to the regulator’s chosen
regulatory solution, including the option of not regulating at all.”284 This process of comparison
is critical to efficient regulation and resource allocation.285 It ensures that the proposed regulatory
action reflects the best and most efficient course of action.
In the words of Professor Sunstein, “By requiring regulators to account for and attempt to
quantify the anticipated costs and benefits of the rules they promulgate, cost benefit analysis
increases the likelihood that rules will take into account all relevant considerations, produce net
positive outcomes, protect and enhance agency legitimacy, avoid unintended consequences, and
distribute resources efficiently.”286
Furthermore, the use of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool also promotes good
governance and democratic accountability. Proper cost benefit analysis reveals to the public the
decision making process by which regulators adopt rules. In the words of Professor Posner, “cost
benefit analysis opens the decision-making process to public comment and thus encourages the
regulatory agency to consider the view of experts outside of the agency and helps mitigate the
likelihood of agency capture.”287 Cost benefit analysis when used properly, simply enhances
governmental accountability, transparency and legitimacy of the proposed regulatory action.
Among the stated goals of Executive Order 12,866 as discussed above, is “to make the
regulatory process more accessible and open to the public.”288 Cost benefit analysis helps bring
transparency to the regulatory process in several ways. At the most fundamental level it requires
a regulator or agency to formally present and quantify its rulemaking reasoning process.289 This
process reveals what aspects of a regulatory problem the regulator or agency have taken into
account and how they address the costs and benefits of a proposed regulatory action. It opens up
the rulemaking process to public scrutiny.290 Cost benefit analysis provides a significant “check”
by requiring the regulator or agency to disclose the factors or considerations that underlie their
analysis and regulatory decision making. If interest-group pressure has distorted the regulators’
or agency’s calculations, discretion or consideration of costs and benefits of a specific regulatory
proposal, the analysis is likely to reflect such influence and provide Congress, the president, the
courts, and the public at large with an opportunity to demand corrections.291 It is a major tool to
monitor and control regulators and agencies in their rulemaking activities.
Another benefit of cost benefit analysis in terms of good governance is that it “leverages
the technical expertise of the regulatory agencies and, applies it in a neutral fashion to a
283
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particular regulatory problem.”292 Cost benefit analysis “facilitates the exercise of this expertise
by providing agencies a framework that insulates the agencies from powerful political
pressures.”293 One way it does so is by “staying focused on the objective effects of the policy in
question. It does not take political or interest group preferences into account.”294 The virtue of
cost benefit is that “it brings an agency’s assumptions and calculations into the light, where
interested parties can raise objections, challenge the regulatory action and demand
improvements.”295 Additionally, as financial markets and their regulations increase in
complexity, regulatory agency expertise, and cost benefit analysis methodologies that facilitate
and leverage the exercise of this expertise, become more important and play a critical role in the
rulemaking process. Since cost benefit analysis provides a methodology to capture all the costs
that can be captured in the rulemaking process, it enables regulators to determine the best course
of action.
As Professor Henry Manne recently argued in an article on cost benefit analysis in SEC
rulemaking, “cost benefit analysis provides an analytical template for the consideration of any
new rule.”296 Regulators will therefore be forced to “give adequate consideration to a variety of
significant economic questions that it now regularly sloughs off or to which it simply assumes
the answer, by making real-world quantitative comparisons.”297 This analysis provides some
form of assurance that regulators will not adopt economically harmful rules. Importantly, cost
benefit analysis would also serve a democratic function by making “the discussion of new
regulations more open to truly informed community comment as opposed to special-interest
pleading. Third parties will know that their comments will be examined by sensible and
knowledgeable experts and not bureaucrats interested mainly in the political implications of a
new proposal.”298
In March 2012, the SEC responded to the criticism from the D.C. Circuit, Congress, and
its own Inspector General by issuing a Guidance Memorandum outlining a new agency approach
to cost benefit analysis in the context of financial rulemaking. Affirming that “high-quality
economic analysis is an essential part of SEC rulemaking” and that the SEC “has long
recognized that a rule’s potential benefits and costs should be considered” in its rulemaking, the
memorandum provides specific advice for conducting cost benefit analysis and clarifies that it
should be performed in every economic analysis of rulemaking.299 The SEC’s Guidance
Memorandum explains that the use of cost benefit analysis in the rulemaking process “ensures
that decisions to propose and adopt rules are informed by the best available evidence about a
292
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rule’s likely consequences,” and that “economic analysis allows the Commission to meaningfully
compare the proposed action with reasonable alternatives, including the alternative of not
adopting a rule.”300 The SEC thus recognizes cost benefit analysis as “an important balancing
tool for potentially harmful regulation and that effective cost benefit analysis provides a means
of protecting against negative unintended consequences of proposed regulatory actions.”301
CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia describes cost benefit analysis as “one of the
principle ways in which the CFTC can improve its rulemaking and protect against potential
regulatory abuses.”302 He further explains that “the failure to produce a rigorous cost benefit
analysis hurts the credibility of this Commission and undermines the quality of our rules.”303 In
the words of Professors Rose and Walker304, “opponents of cost benefit analysis argue that
careful, rule-by-rule economic analysis makes it difficult for agencies to create rules, but that is
precisely the point: it requires regulators to engage in a transparent, rigorous process that, as
President Obama has stated, includes more input from experts, businesses and ordinary
citizens.”305 They further explain that “regulating through a careful, focused process, which
includes an analysis of the costs and benefits of a particular regulation, will naturally be more
time-consuming than hastily pushing through regulations without making the effort to
understand their costs, benefits, and effects. However, as President Obama has argued, the
resulting rules will be more affordable, less intrusive, more effective, and the product of a more
democratic process.”306 Clearly, rather than viewing cost benefit analysis as preventing
regulation and slowing down the rulemaking process, rigorous cost benefit analysis creates
confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate regulatory solutions to
specific market problems.307
Professor Cass Sunstein explains that when President Obama was elected, “critics of cost
benefit analysis hoped he would jettison it. But rather than doing so, the administration doubled
down on cost benefit analysis. First, Obama made an unprecedented commitment to
quantification of both costs and benefits. Second, he ordered executive agencies to review all
significant rules on the books, largely with the goal of eliminating or streamlining excessive
requirements.”308 Professor Sunstein further notes that “the application of rigorous cost benefit
analysis deterred agencies from proceeding with rules that promise to impose big economic
burdens without corresponding gains.”309 He concludes that “at a time when effective regulation
of financial markets is as important and pressing as ever, it is essential not only that regulatory

300

Id.
Id.
302
See Scott D. O’Malia, CFTC Commissioner, Unreasonably Feeble, Opening Statement Regarding Open Meeting
on One Final Rule and One Proposed Rule (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
301

SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement022312.
303

Id.
See Rose and Walker supra note 208.
305
See Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17.
306
See Rose and Walker supra note 208.
307
Id.
308
See Sunstein, supra note 22.
309
Id.
304

50

efforts are appropriately measured and effective, but also that the public and regulated entities
have confidence in the ability of regulators to address market problems.”310
Cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking has particular importance in the context of
the Dodd-Frank Act that follows a “boom-bubble-bust regulate cycle of financial market
regulation,” and which Professor Larry Ribstein characterized as “bubble laws.”311 In the words
of Professors Rose and Walker: “The need for cost benefit analysis is thus especially critical
when implementing the Dodd-Frank Act to not only ensure a proper balance between costs and
benefits, but also to provide an appropriate regulatory platform for long-term economic
prosperity.”312 The scale and scope of Dodd-Frank regulations and the amount of financial
rulemaking have made it critical for regulators to apply rigorous cost benefit analysis to the
rulemaking process and ensure they adequately consider the effectiveness and consequences of
their regulatory actions. Cost benefit analysis provides a regulatory tool designed to ensure that,
despite the accelerated pace and amount of financial rulemaking, regulators will not cut corners
but will engage in more rational decision-making, will produce better regulations, and will
promote good governance.
In essence, from a policy perspective applying economic analysis to financial regulation
is the only way of getting to the bottom of the issues regulators are trying to address. It improves
the quality of regulation and increases the public confidence in the regulatory process. The
following section of this paper will examine the Business Roundtable decision, the rigorous
standard of review established by the D.C. Circuit and the SEC’s experience in the D.C. Circuit
over the past decade.
iii.

D.C. CIRCUIT TRILOGY ON SEC COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Although the executive orders that require executive agencies to engage in cost benefit
analysis have not been extended to independent financial regulators or agencies such as the SEC
and CFTC, these financial regulators have statutory obligations under their respective organic
statutes and the Administration Procedure Act that require these agencies to engage in cost
benefit analysis during the rulemaking process.313 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit in three major
decisions addressed the issue of cost benefit analysis of financial regulation extensively. These
decisions and particularly the Business Roundtable decision are the foundation for our analysis
of the cost benefit aspects of Title IV’s implementing rules and whether they are supported by
the cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after Business Roundtable. Before
we analyze the costs and benefits of Title IV’s implementing rules and whether they are
consistent with the standards set by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable, it is worth pausing
to consider the SEC experience in the D.C. Circuit over the last decade. In a trio of decisions, the
D.C. Circuit has examined the SEC’s rulemaking and defined new standards and boundaries for
economic analysis of financial regulation and the use of cost benefit analysis in financial
rulemaking. This part of the paper explores these decisions and their approach to the economic
analysis of financial rulemaking.
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The first instance indicating that the standard of review of financial regulation would be
more rigorous than the one the financial regulatory agencies expected came in Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC.314 In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the rule at issue required that mutual
fund boards of directors have no less than 75% independent directors and be chaired by an
independent director. The D.C. Circuit rejected the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s challenge to
the SEC’s statutory authority to adopt these two requirements as well as the Chamber’s primary
challenges to the SEC’s reasoning for adopting the rule.315 The D.C. Circuit, however, agreed
with the Chamber that “the SEC did violate the Administrative Procedure Act by failing
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the conditions
and by failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent chairman
condition.”316
In striking down the proposed rule for failure to conduct an adequate cost benefit
analysis, the D.C. Circuit found that “failure to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed
regulatory action may be sufficient to invalidate the whole cost benefit analysis and therefore the
rule itself.”317 The D.C. Circuit explained that under the Administrative Procedure Act’s
“arbitrary and capricious” standard, “the court must be sure the Commission has examined the
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the regulatory choice made.”318 The court further
explained that a proposed rule is arbitrary and capricious if the relevant agency fails to consider
factors under its organic statute and that the SEC’s organic statute requires it to consider costs
and stated that “the agency should consider whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”319
The D.C. Circuit further held that “the SEC need not conduct an independent empirical
study to meet the reasoned decision-making mandate and that it need not provide a
comprehensive explanation for discounting or rejecting empirical studies.”320 However, it must
“apprise itself—and hence the public and Congress—of the economic consequences of a
proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure and adequately consider nonfrivolous alternatives to the proposed regulation.”321 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit blamed the
SEC for failing to consider the costs of compliance that the mutual funds would suffer and found
“incredible” the SEC’s claim that it had no “‘reliable basis for determining how funds would
choose to satisfy the condition and therefore it was difficult to determine the costs associated
with electing independent directors.”322 It is interesting to note that on remand, the SEC was able
to quantify these costs in a matter of weeks. In the words of one commentator, “this rapid aboutface must call into question the Commission’s diligence with respect to cost benefit analysis
before Chamber of Commerce v. SEC forced it to take such analysis seriously.”323
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In 2010, the D.C. Circuit continued with the same aggressive approach with regard to the
economic analysis of financial regulation and the use of cost benefit analysis in financial
rulemaking. In American Equity Investment Life Insurance v. SEC the rule at issue classified
fixed indexed annuities as securities and therefore subject to federal securities laws. 324 The D.C.
Circuit deferred to the SEC’s interpretation of the federal securities law to classify fixed indexed
annuities as securities, but it nevertheless vacated the rule because “the SEC failed to properly
consider the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”325 The D.C.
Circuit faulted the SEC for a number of errors in its cost benefit analysis. First, the court found
the SEC’s consideration of “competition” inadequate, concluding that “the SEC purports to have
analyzed the effect of the rule on competition, but does not disclose a reasoned basis for its
conclusion that the rule would increase competition.”326 Second, and more importantly, the D.C.
Circuit faulted the SEC’s cost benefit analysis for failing to make any “finding on the existing
level of competition in the marketplace under the state law regime.”327 It similarly faulted the
SEC with respect to its efficiency analysis as “incomplete because it fails to determine whether,
under the existing regime, sufficient protections existed to enable investors to make informed
investment decisions and sellers to make suitable recommendations to investors.”328 This
criticism as to the SEC’s failure to consider the status quo goes to a fundamental principle of cost
benefit analysis which is “the need to define a baseline.”329 The D.C. Circuit explained that
“without an established baseline, a regulatory agency cannot truly consider the costs and benefits
of the proposed regulation over the status quo, much less compare the proposed regulation with
other potential alternative regulatory approaches (or no regulation at all).”330 In other words,
“without an empirical baseline, the SEC’s assertion, even if based on common sense economic
theory, was baseless because it was grounded on speculation alone”. 331
The leading decision on the SEC’s use of cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking is
Business Roundtable.332 In Business Roundtable, the rule at issue was the proxy access rule,
which required public companies to provide shareholders with information about, and their
ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors by including in
the companies’ proxy materials the names of any person nominated by a qualifying shareholder
for election to the board of directors.333 The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule based on a number of
criticisms of the agency’s cost benefit analysis. Similar to its approach in Chamber of Commerce
and American Equity Investment, the D.C. Circuit pointed out several steps the SEC had failed
to take in the cost benefit analysis. In particular, the court faulted the SEC for “discounting the
costs of the proposed rule—but not the benefits—as a mere artifact of the state law right of
shareholders to elect directors.”334 In the words of the D.C. Circuit “this is a fundamental error in
Fund Reform Effort, 12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 17 (2006).
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cost benefit analysis: to only discount for the costs of the existing state law but not even attempt
to estimate and discount the benefits of state law”.335
The D.C. Circuit reiterated its discussion in Chamber of Commerce that “this type of
reasoning, which fails to view a cost at the margin, is illogical and, in an economic analysis,
unacceptable.”336 It further held that the SEC had not “sufficiently examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choices made”.337 The D.C. Circuit, however, went beyond its approach
in previous cases to actually re-define the cost benefit analysis standards. The court criticized the
SEC’s extensive review of the empirical evidence and reached its own conclusion that “the
evidence the SEC had relied on was not enough to justify the rule”338 In the words of judge
Ginsburg:
“In view of the admittedly (and at best) “mixed” empirical evidence, we think the Commission
has not sufficiently supported its conclusion that increasing the potential for election of directors
nominated by shareholders will result in improved board and company performance and shareholder
value.”339

The D.C. Circuit eventually vacated the rule on the basis that the SEC “failed adequately
to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation.”340 It further
concluded that “a cost benefit analysis characterized with such faults rendered the rule arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”.341 This approach to
judicial review of the SEC’s financial rulemaking appears much more rigorous than the one the
D.C. Circuit traditionally applied in other agency cases. Indeed, in a subsequent decision, the
D.C. Circuit emphasized that the “evidentiary problem in Business Roundtable was not limited to
the agency’s insufficient treatment of any one study,” but “it was the agency’s larger failure to
deal with the weight of the evidence against it.”342 Ultimately, the court clarified that “an
agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem or offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency.”343
Business Roundtable has become one of the most important financial regulation decisions
since cost benefit analysis was developed in the early 1970s by holding financial regulators
strictly accountable for the quality of their cost benefit analysis.344 It established a far more
rigorous standard of review than the one the financial regulators had previously used. The
decision appears to require courts to “police the quality of regulators cost benefit analysis and
directs judges to look more closely at the analysis to determine whether the relevant regulator
335
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has adequately considered and ascertained the rule’s costs and benefits based on all the
alternatives available.”345
The decision in Business Roundtable is also significant as it was the first challenge of a
rule adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, based on the implementing agency’s failure to perform
an adequate cost benefit analysis.346 It also represents a turning point indicative of an
unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny of financial regulation, forcing the SEC and other
regulators poised to issue rules and regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act, to take a whole new
approach to their rulemaking process.347 Despite extensive criticism, the decision appears to have
mandated more demanding and strict standards of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of
financial regulation.348 Depending on one’s view, such a powerful approach or filter of financial
regulation could either “further ossify the financial rulemaking process349 or make the rules that
emerge from the process more rational, efficient, and transparent.”350 The following section of
this paper will examine the SEC response to the Business Roundtable decision and the Cost
Benefit Analysis Guidance Memorandum issued on March 16, 2012.351
iv.

SEC RESPONSE: 2012 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM

Less than a year after the D.C. Circuit issued the Business Roundtable decision, the SEC
released its Guidance Memorandum on the use of cost benefit analysis in financial rulemaking,
embracing the cost benefit analysis fundamentals set forth in the D.C. Circuit’s trilogy discussed
above.352 These principles are briefly discussed below:
a) Define the Baseline
The SEC proposed that a major step in its cost benefit analysis of financial regulation is
to “define the baseline against which to measure the proposed rule’s economic impact.” 353 The
SEC explained that “the baseline serves as a primary point of comparison because an economic
analysis of a proposed regulatory action compares the current state of the world to the expected
state of the world with the proposed regulation (or regulatory alternatives) in effect.” 354 The SEC
also noted the American Equity Investment decision and its conclusion that “the SEC’s analysis
was inadequate because it did not measure the rule’s likely effect on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation against a baseline that included the existing level of those economic factors.”355
b) Identify and Discuss Reasonable Alternatives to the Proposed Rule
345
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The SEC Guidance Memorandum also proposed that the SEC’s approach to cost benefit
analysis must “identify and discuss reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule.”356 The SEC
further explained that “the release should identify a range of regulatory alternatives to the
approach in the proposed rule in order to make the best regulatory choice,” and it quotes the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Chamber of Commerce for the proposition that “only reasonable
alternatives must be considered: Such alternatives include those that are ‘neither frivolous nor
out of bounds.”357
c) Identify Relevant Benefits and Costs
The SEC Guidance Memorandum also underscores that the release must “identify
relevant benefits and costs” and then provides a nonexhaustive list of potential benefits and
costs.358 Although the SEC does not specifically cite the D.C. Circuit for this principle, the
Guidance Memorandum seems to respond to the Chamber of Commerce decision (failure to
consider certain costs) and the American Equity Investments decision (failure to provide a
reasoned basis for consideration of a statutory factor). Later in the Guidance Memorandum, the
SEC expressly notes that “the release should integrate the cost benefit analysis section with its
analysis of the factors set forth in the statute— efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”359

d) Attempt to Quantify Costs and Benefits and Provide an Explanation in Case
Quantification is Not Possible
The Guidance Memorandum also underscores that the SEC should “quantify expected
benefits and costs to the extent feasible” and that “if not reasonably feasible, the release should
include an explanation of the reasons why quantification is not practicable and include a
qualitative analysis of the likely economic consequences of the proposed rule and reasonable
regulatory alternatives.”360 This principle is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in
Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable and the notion that “the SEC must attempt to
quantify anticipated costs and benefits, even where the available data is imperfect and where
doing so may require using estimates.”361
e) Frame Costs and Benefits Neutrally and Consistently
The Guidance Memorandum directly responds to the D.C. Circuit’s criticism in Business
Roundtable that “the SEC had opportunistically and inconsistently framed the costs and benefits
of the proposed rule.”362 It explains that “the release should evaluate the costs and benefits evenhandedly and candidly, acknowledging any limitations in the data or quantifiable information. To
the extent that the release discusses scenarios that might mitigate the costs or enhance the
356
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benefits, consider and discuss the impact that those scenarios would have on both the costs and
the benefits.”363
f) Shift of Cost Benefit Analysis from Lawyers to Economists
Finally, the SEC also responded to the D.C. Circuit’s more general criticism that the SEC
should conduct sound empirical analysis that includes proper cost benefit analysis. At the end of
the Guidance Memorandum, the SEC includes a separate section titled “Enhanced integration of
economic analysis into the rulemaking process and rule releases.”364 Among other things, this
section of the Guidance Memorandum underscores that economists from the SEC’s Division of
Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation (RSFI) “should be fully integrated members of the rulewriting team, and contribute to all elements of the rule-writing process.”365 The Guidance
Memorandum also goes further and emphasizes that economists—and not just legal
professionals —should be heavily involved in all stages of the agency’s cost benefit and other
economic analysis in rulemaking. In summary, although the SEC’s course of action is one that
other financial regulators can learn from and should follow, it still remains to be seen whether
the SEC will put its Guidance Memorandum into practice in a way that is consistent with the
Business Roundtable decision. The following section of the paper will examine the political
economy of financial regulation following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable. It
will discuss how the rigorous cost benefit analysis standards established in the Business
Roundtable decision may affect the political economy of financial regulation and how actors in
the political economy of financial rulemaking may respond to the Business Roundtable decision.
We will then look more specifically at Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing
rules and examine whether they are supported by an adequate cost benefit analysis consistent
with the Business Roundtable decision.
v.

THE IMPACT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE DECISION ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION

We now turn to the impact of the Business Roundtable decision and the rigorous standard
of judicial review of the cost benefit analysis of financial regulations on the political economy of
financial rulemaking. The most immediate and apparent effect has been to increase the expected
administrative and litigation costs of financial rulemaking and in essence, to slow down the
rulemaking process, given the scope and nature of the cost benefit analysis regulators and
agencies have to go through. This impact is most obvious in the context of the rulemaking
process to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.366 By changing the costs and benefits of the cost
benefit analysis process itself, the Business Roundtable decision has actually created incentives
for different actors in the political economy of financial rulemaking to react in different ways.
This part of the paper analyzes how various actors in the political economy of financial
rulemaking may react to the Business Roundtable decision and the rigorous standard of review
363
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established by the D.C. Circuit as well as how these reactions could lead to a wide range of
outcomes. Those key categories of actors are the financial industry, financial regulators,
Congress and the Supreme Court.
The Financial Industry
The financial industry has already responded to the Business Roundtable decision by
emphasizing the focus on regulators’ and agencies’ compliance with the cost benefit analysis
requirements in its comment letters on proposed regulations as well as by filing lawsuits seeking
to challenge different rules and regulations based on their failure to perform an adequate cost
benefit analysis, consistent with the Business Roundtable decision. It is interesting to note that
within just a few months after the Business Roundtable decision, two major financial trade
organizations filed legal action seeking to challenge a rule issued under the Dodd-Frank Act, on
the ground that it should be vacated because the CFTC had failed to perform an adequate cost
benefit analysis.367 Additionally, a few other major financial trade organizations submitted a
comment letter seeking to challenge the quality of the cost benefit analysis review in connection
with the proposed regulations implementing the Volcker Rule.368 In this Comment Letter, these
financial organizations actually threatened to “challenge the proposed regulations implementing
the Volcker Rule unless the appropriate financial regulatory agencies review and re-submit the
proposed regulations after performing a rigorous cost benefit analysis of the proposed regulatory
actions.369
The Business Roundtable decision clearly sets the foundation for effective challenges to a
regulators' or agencies' rulemaking process. During the notice-and-comment period, Business
Roundtable actually gives opponents of a particular rule or regulation an incentive to submit
detailed comments identifying a wide range of costs—particularly costs that will be difficult for
the agency or regulator to quantify and rebut. The financial industry, with its extensive resources
and financial expertise, for example, can submit such comments in order to increase the costs
incurred by the agency to research and address the comments, and eventually defend itself in
court. Given the D.C. Circuit’s rigorous standard of review and willingness to intervene and
actually second-guess an agency’s review of conflicting studies in the Business Roundtable
decision, the financial industry is likely to include data, empirical analyses, research and expert
witnesses that undercut any unfounded arguments, assumptions, research or reasoning upon
which an agency tries to rely on in adopting the proposed rule. By holding regulators and
agencies to a much higher standard of review, Business Roundtable actually gives the financial
industry a strategic tool to challenge proposed rules the industry considers unfavorable. Business
Roundtable in essence provides the industry with an incentive to raise every aspect of the cost
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benefit analysis that might be poorly reasoned, insufficiently supported, or procedurally
defective because even the smallest flaw could lead to the rule being vacated.370
The Business Roundtable decision both reduced the cost and increased the benefits of
challenges or attempts to challenge financial regulations. It reduced the costs to challengers by
effectively shifting the burden of proof onto the financial regulators or agencies to demonstrate
that the quality of their cost benefit analysis satisfies the relevant statutory mandate and is
consistent with the D.C. Circuit rigorous standards of review in Business Roundtable.371 Instead
of having to handle the burden of proving that an agency’s cost benefit analysis is inadequate,
challengers only have to raise sufficient doubt about whether the agency satisfied its burden of
proof or considered all the relevant factors.372 Business Roundtable has clearly increased the
likely benefits from such litigation or potential challenges to proposed rules. Through holding
regulators or agencies strictly accountable for the quality and standards of their cost benefit
analysis reviews, challengers can expect agencies to respond by creating rules that are most
narrowly tailored to the regulatory goal and least burdensome on the financial industry, the
public and the economy as a whole.373 This process is very much in line with the language of the
executive orders discussed above,374 ensuring that regulators and agencies actually consider the
effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions, determine the best course of action
and propose rules that produce a net positive effect and are based on a rigorous cost benefit
analysis and economic justification. Business Roundtable, and its unprecedented level of judicial
scrutiny of financial regulation, also provide a powerful incentive for the financial industry to
lobby for more statutory cost benefit analysis mandates. The industry is likely to encourage
Congress to enact statutes imposing cost benefit analysis mandates on all financial regulations,
particularly now given the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Financial Regulators
The immediate effect of the Business Roundtable decision is that the financial regulators
or agencies may not be able to adopt as many rules and regulations with their current resources.
This new cost benefit analysis environment may drive up the costs of the rulemaking process for
a couple of reasons. First, the cost of defending rules and regulations in court on cost benefit
analysis grounds will become a major administrative cost for financial regulators and agencies.
Second, the threat of litigation seeking to challenge and vacate the proposed rules over
inadequate cost benefit analysis grounds may become a strong incentive for financial regulators
or agencies to spend more time, money and resources in the rulemaking process, conducting
more rigorous cost benefit analysis in order to minimize the risk of the rule being challenged or
vacated. To avoid the risk of litigation or vacating the proposed rule, regulators or agencies may
need to devote more resources to each rulemaking. They may need to hire more economists, or
redirect economists already on their staffs and utilize their resources more efficiently in order to
improve the quality of their cost benefit analysis and survive judicial scrutiny in a post-Business
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Roundtable environment.375 As the rulemaking process is extremely expensive and time
consuming, it is expected that agencies and regulators will reduce the number of rules and
regulations they adopt. If rulemaking is mandated, as in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act,
regulators and agencies are likely to continue to miss deadlines or adopt as few rules as possible,
which to some extent defeats the purpose of the whole financial regulatory reform of the DoddFrank Act.
Also, it is anticipated that the pace of agency rulemaking procedures will be significantly
reduced or slowed down. There is already evidence indicating that the financial regulatory
agencies have slowed down the process of issuing rules under the Dodd-Frank Act as a result of
the Business Roundtable decision.376 Clearly, financial regulators and agencies are affected and
to some extent pressured by the Business Roundtable decision and the requirement to improve
their cost benefit analysis system. As former CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton explained,
“some regulators live in constant fear and are virtually paralyzed by the threat of spuriously filed
lawsuits focusing on agency cost benefit analysis."377 He further explained that "whether
challenges to agency rules and procedures are spurious or not, Business Roundtable will open a
Pandora’s box of challenges to financial regulations going forward. Rules currently in the
pipeline will be delayed so regulators can revisit the cost benefit analysis portions of their
proposed rules. Therefore, it is better for the agencies to delay a rule and salvage it by
performing a sufficient cost benefit analysis than to risk having the rule overturned or vacated in
court and begin the entire process over again."378
However, it is important to note that despite these implications of the Business
Roundtable decision, these agency responses and changes to the political economy environment
are overall a positive outcome of the Business Roundtable decision. Agencies and regulators will
carefully consider the effectiveness and consequences of their regulatory actions, determine the
best course of action and adopt the best rules, based on a rigorous cost benefit analysis and
economic justification. This approach will enable them to reach the right regulatory solution,
ensuring that the rules will be much more sharply crafted to address the problem to be remedied
and are least burdensome to society and the economy as a whole. This also goes to the essence of
cost benefit analysis as a fundamental regulatory tool which is to ensure a more rational decision
making process, efficient regulatory actions and the best regulatory choices by regulators and
agencies. The risk, however, is that certain areas that require regulation may be left unregulated
or subject to inadequate regulations, given the slower pace, potential delays and higher cost of
financial rulemaking in a post-Business Roundtable environment.
Still, if courts continue to hold regulators and agencies strictly accountable for the quality
of their cost benefit analysis review, like in the Business Roundtable decision, regulatory
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agencies are likely to continue to respond to the Business Roundtable decision by improving and
enhancing the quality of their cost benefit analysis as well as their cost benefit analysis resources
and capabilities. The goal would be to minimize the risk of challenges to the proposed rules and
possibly having the rule struck down by the court. As a result, the quality of regulatory actions
and their cost benefit backup is likely to improve, leading to much more rational, reasoned, least
burdensome and economically efficient regulatory actions.
Case Study: Dodd-Frank Rulemaking - CFTC Positions Limit Rule
In December 2011, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") and
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA") filed a lawsuit against the
CFTC, seeking to challenge the CFTC’s Rule, adopted under the Dodd-Frank Act, imposing
position limits on swap dealers. The complaint of ISDA focused mainly on the failure of the
CFTC to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis, consistent with the standards of the Business
Roundtable decision.379 An opinion granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was
granted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The rule was "vacated for failure
to conduct an adequate cost benefit analysis and remanded to the CFTC for revision."380
The Dodd-Frank Act granted the CFTC the power to create position limits for futures,
options, and swaps.381 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR") for the position limits rule
included only a very short discussion of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule. 382 One of the
Commissioners who voted in favor of the CFTC’s rule stated that “no one has presented this
agency any reliable economic analysis to support either the contention that excessive speculation
is affecting the market we regulate or that position limits will prevent excessive speculation.”383
Commissioner Dunn further explained, his “fear is that position limits, at best a cure for a disease
that does not exist, are a placebo for one that does. At worst, position limits may harm the very
markets the CFTC is intending to protect.”384 The Commissioner further stated that he had
"voted for the position limits rule solely on the assumption that the Dodd-Frank Act required the
establishment of position limits irrespective of cost."385
In its efforts to challenge the proposed rule, ISDA alleged that "the Commission grossly
misinterpreted its statutory authority by finding that Congress did not require the CFTC to
prepare a cost benefit analysis for the rule.386 ISDA alleged that "the Commodity Exchange Act,
as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, authorized the CFTC to establish position limits only if it
first finds that they are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent an undue and unnecessary
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burden on interstate commerce caused by excessive speculation and are otherwise
appropriate."387 This is an important element of the ISDA’s argument because without a cost
benefit analysis mandate, the CFTC’s alleged deficient or inadequate cost benefit analysis is
irrelevant. The statutory language of the relevant provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act does not
clearly require a cost benefit analysis and permits the CFTC to "adopt rules or regulations that
are necessary or otherwise appropriate to accomplish its statutory mandate."388 However,
although these statutory provisions do not clearly require the CFTC to perform a cost benefit
analysis in connection with its rulemaking, this statutory language is very similar and not less
clear than the provisions in the Business Roundtable case that were actually interpreted by the
D.C. Circuit to mandate a rigorous cost benefit analysis.
ISDA further argued that "the CFTC failed to conduct any substantial cost benefit
analysis, much less the rigorous cost benefit analysis required by the Business Roundtable
decision.389 The most critical issue was "the Commission’s repeated admission that its final rule
lacked empirical evidence for many of the CFTC’s assertions."390 ISDA also argued that “rather
than making a genuine effort to estimate the costs, the CFTC cited its own failure to obtain
empirical data that would enable it to assess the impact of the Position Limits Rule."391 It is
important to note that the CFTC’s cost benefit analysis requirements are far less demanding than
the SEC’s analysis was in Business Roundtable. Therefore, given that the CFTC’s cost benefit
analysis of the position limits rule was generally unsupported by adequate evidence, research or
analysis, it seems likely to also fail under the standard of review established in Business
Roundtable, which "will not credit or accept mere speculation that insufficiently supports an
agency’s position."392 The CFTC in this case also engaged in some of the practices that the D.C.
Circuit heavily criticized in the Business Roundtable decision. Although ISDA’s complaint did
not raise these rulemaking flaws, the CFTC "failed to make a good faith effort to quantify the
consequences or costs of the rule on market participation or trading strategies."393 ISDA’s
successful challenge to the position limits rule demonstrates the effectiveness of challenges to
financial rulemaking on cost benefit analysis grounds in the post-Business Roundtable
environment.
Congress
The Business Roundtable decision significantly impacts the incentives of lobbyists,
political entrepreneurs and members of Congress. There are even strategies that legislative
drafters can exploit or use to promote their agenda or interest as well as other purposes like,
387
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budgeting, new cost benefit analysis mandates, statutory language, sunset provisions, and
rulemaking conditions.394 Both opponents and supporters of demanding or rigorous cost benefit
analysis are likely to engage in strategic budgeting practices or behavior. The increased costs of
the rulemaking process resulting from the Business Roundtable decision highlight the
effectiveness of strategic budgeting. Republicans in control of the House "are currently trying to
starve the ability of regulatory agencies to implement a range of programs and regulations
including the Dodd-Frank Act."395 Supporters of cost benefit analysis may try to increase fiscal
pressure on regulatory agencies tasked with implementing the Dodd-Frank Act by reducing their
budgets even further.
Business Roundtable highlights the importance of statutory cost benefit analysis
mandates. Those who wish to “rationalize” the rulemaking process by driving up rulemaking
costs will try to insert cost benefit analysis mandates into new legislation wherever possible.
Supporters of cost benefit analysis have already succeeded in imposing cost benefit analysis
mandates in the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB. In
Section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress explicitly required the CFPB to analyze each
rule’s costs and benefits to consumers, as well as each rule’s expected broader economic
impact.396 Supporters of strict cost benefit analysis have tried to "pass blanket cost benefit
analysis mandates to reach future and past rules promulgated by independent and executive
agencies."397 Bills proposing such mandates have already been introduced. For example, Senator
Shelby introduced the Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, which tried to impose
rigorous prospective and retroactive cost benefit analysis requirements on all financial
regulations.398 Also, Senators Collins, Portman, and Warner introduced the Independent Agency
Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, which would "authorize the President to require independent
financial regulatory agencies, other than the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), to comply with the cost benefit analysis mandates applicable to executive
agencies under existing Executive Orders."399 In contrast, opponents of rigorous cost benefit
analysis review are likely to try to reduce cost benefit analysis mandates given the strong
position of the D.C. Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision. The Business Roundtable
decision also gives both opponents and supporters of cost benefit analysis an incentive to fight
over the precise language of cost benefit analysis mandates in the context of new legislation.
The hardest-line cost benefit analysis, which demands pure quantitative cost benefit
analysis, will probably never prevail since even the strong proponents of cost benefit analysis
and the Business Roundtable decision recognize that some costs and benefits associated with the
adoption of a new rule cannot be accurately measured. However, supporters of cost benefit
analysis would have an incentive to push for language that requires benefits to outweigh the
costs of any proposed rule or regulation. Such language would strengthen the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Business Roundtable and legislatively shift or allocate the burden of proof onto the
regulators or agencies. Opponents of cost benefit analysis, however, would have an incentive to
394
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push for vague or even uncertain language in cost benefit analysis mandates requiring that
regulators or agencies merely “consider” costs. Vague language in cost benefit analysis mandates
may expose the Business Roundtable decision to reversal by subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions
or by the Supreme Court itself. Opponents could even try to legislatively reverse the Business
Roundtable decision by introducing language shifting the burden of cost benefit analysis to
parties challenging a final rule in court.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has never actually addressed the proper
scope of judicial review of financial regulation in the context of cost benefit analysis. The
Business Roundtable decision presents the court with this opportunity. The D.C. Circuit review
in the Business Roundtable decision was performed within the scope of the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,400 but as discussed above, the court's
review was much more rigorous and comprehensive than the traditional standard of review in
previous cost benefit analysis cases. It remains to be seen, how the Supreme Court may handle
this question as to the review function of the court beyond the Administrative Procedure Act.
The following sections of the paper will discuss the costs and benefits of Title IV’s
implementing rules, whether they are in fact supported by the rigorous cost benefit analysis that
would survive judicial scrutiny after the Business Roundtable decision and whether they
represent an efficient reform that is consistent with the standard of review set by the D.C.
Circuit.
vi.

TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
ROUNDTABLE

AND

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

AFTER

BUSINESS

We now turn to examine the costs and benefits of Title IV’s implementing rules and
whether they : i) are in fact supported by the rigorous economic analysis that would survive
judicial scrutiny after the Business Roundtable decision, ii) represent the best regulatory choice,
and iii) represent a rational decision-making and efficient regulatory action that advance the
public interest.
The following sections of this paper will demonstrate that Title IV’s implementing rules
do not represent a rational decision-making or the best regulatory choice in the context of private
equity funds. These sections of the paper will further explain that the decision of the SEC to
include private equity funds within the scope of the regulations and subject them to extensive
SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate, unnecessarily costly, inconsistent
with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its underlying economic theory of
regulation, inefficient, too disclosure-focused, does not improve investor welfare, based on
fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the
risk of too much leverage. The rest of this paper will take the position that overall, Title IV and
its implementing rules fail to achieve their intended goals and impose costs that exceed their
benefits. Society and the economy do not gain enough from Title IV and its implementing rules
to justify their costs.
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The following sections of this paper will also demonstrate that Title IV’s implementing
rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost benefit justification standards set by the D.C.
Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision. They will show that Title IV’s implementing rules
are not supported by i) any substantial cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny
after the decision in Business Roundtable, and ii) any other compelling argument demonstrating
that the benefits of Title IV are greater than its costs. This paper takes the position that the SEC,
in implementing Title IV, had actually failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis,
consistent with the Business Roundtable decision, and did not consider any regulatory
alternatives or the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. The
SEC also failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions,
including a rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures Title IV and its
implementing rules were trying to address, in the context of private equity funds, and the
regulatory choices made.
As this paper will show in Part IV, private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the
financial system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the
economy as a whole. No demonstrable market failure was ever identified in the context of the
private equity industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad regulations.
Additionally, the SEC adopting releases provide no empirical academic literature or evidence to
support any specific regulatory concern associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis
conduct in the context of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis
had very little to do with private equity funds. Private equity funds did not cause the financial
crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They did not contribute to the build-up of
systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not
part of the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge funds. Therefore, private equity funds
should have posed very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis.
The rest of this paper also demonstrates that like any traditional post-crisis reform
legislation, Title IV and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political need, but they will
not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole, will not improve investor welfare
and will not reduce the risks that private equity funds may pose to the financial system. I argue,
instead, in the following sections of the paper, that since private equity funds are not a major
source of systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their
investors have the resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their
advisers should be subject to a reduced and different regulatory regime and exempt from the
SEC registration, reporting and disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Reviewing the SEC adopting releases supports this position as nowhere in these adopting
releases was there any discussion of any concerns or risks associated with private equity funds,
and their pre-crisis conduct or any benefit to private equity investors or the financial system as a
result of adopting these rules.
Part III(a) of this paper has already analyzed the legislative history of Title IV and its
implementing rules and demonstrated that the focus of the legislative history and the
implementing rules was clearly on hedge funds and the need to address the lack of transparency
in the hedge fund sector and control the systemic risk associated with the activities of hedge
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funds.401 The examination of the legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules
indicates very clearly that regulators were not at all concerned about private equity funds and not
directly focused on the private equity sector when they analyzed the 2008 financial crisis and
spoke against the systemic risk concerns of private investment funds. In the implementing rules,
there was no empirical evidence, research or analysis discussed with regard to concerns
associated with the private equity sector, failures or risks related to the private equity industry or
the pre-crisis conduct of private equity funds. Also, there was no analysis or evidence to support
or justify the need for this government intervention in the private equity sector, no reasoned
explanation for the regulatory actions and no discussion of other regulatory alternatives. In other
words, nowhere in the legislative history and particularly the SEC adopting releases was there
any discussion about private equity funds. The activities targeted by regulators were only hedge
funds.
This approach is inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit position in the Business Roundtable
decision. The legislative history of Title IV and its implementing rules demonstrates that there
was no credible cost benefit analysis performed in the rulemaking process in the context of the
private equity sector, (and definitely not the rigorous economic analysis required by the D.C.
Circuit in the Business Roundtable decision) as well as no consideration of alternatives to the
selected regulatory choice. The rulemaking process by the SEC was deficient in terms of
performing any adequate cost benefit analysis, analyzing the pre-crisis conduct of private equity
funds, examining the relevant factors, articulating a reasoned explanation for the regulatory
action, establishing the rational connection between the pre-crisis facts the SEC was trying to
address and the regulatory choice made and recognizing that the private equity industry had very
little to do with the 2008 financial crisis.
Additionally, as will be discussed in Part IV, this paper takes the position that there is no
rational connection between the actual facts and the regularity choice made by the SEC as well
as no benefit to society or the economy as a whole with respect to Title IV and its implementing
rules. One of the primary objectives of the Dodd-frank Act is to control or reduce systemic risk
in the financial system and enhance the stability of the financial system.402 However, as Part IV
of the paper demonstrates, private equity funds pose very minimal systemic risk to the financial
system and present no threat to the financial stability of the financial system or the economy as a
whole. No demonstrable market failure was ever identified in the context of the private equity
industry to justify such regulatory intervention and broad regulations. Additionally, there is no
empirical academic literature, study or evidence to support any specific regulatory concern
associated with the private equity sector and its pre-crisis conduct in the context of systemic risk
and a potential financial crisis. As discussed in Part IV of this paper, the 2008 financial crisis had
very little to do with private equity funds. Private equity funds did not cause the financial crisis
and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They did not contribute to the build-up of systemic
risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not part of
the problem or any market failure, unlike hedge funds.403 As Part IV of this paper demonstrates,
private equity funds present none of the systemic risk factors that led to the financial crisis and
thus should have posed very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a
401
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new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis.
Therefore, from the benefits side perspective, the notion of Title IV as a tool to reduce or control
systemic risk and enhance financial stability is questionable, inefficient and does not justify the
regulatory actions taken by the SEC.
From the benefits side perspective, Part III(d) of this paper will also challenge the
disclosure based approach of Title IV and demonstrate its inefficiency. Using financial
regulation like Title IV to protect investors through a disclosure model may be a worthy goal, but
this goal, in the context of private equity funds, is clearly ineffective, unnecessary and
inconsistent with fundamental principles of U.S. securities laws, which presume that investors in
private equity funds, who are necessarily experienced, wealthy and have extensive resources to
conduct their own due diligence or retain professional advisors, are able to protect themselves
without any regulatory intervention. As discussed in Part II of this paper, private equity investors
are usually large, sophisticated institutional investors, capable of identifying, obtaining and
processing the information necessary to evaluate an investment opportunity and make an
informed investment decision. Additionally, Title IV and its implementing rules require private
equity funds to disclose extensive information that is already being provided to private equity
investors by the funds voluntarily during the process of raising capital and on a regular basis.
Therefore, Title IV, its implementing rules and their registration, reporting and increased
disclosure requirements may be viewed as unwarranted and inefficient to the extent that their
purpose is to protect private equity investors who are already able to protect themselves. There is
simply no additional benefit to investors as a result of Title IV’s implementing rules and their
disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, from the cost side perspective, Part IV(d) of this paper demonstrates the
failure of the SEC to recognize that private equity is a major driver of economic growth and
innovation and plays a key role in the economic recovery of the U.S. Given the importance of
private equity as a vital engine that helps drive the American economy, this paper takes the
position that subjecting private equity funds to excessive and unnecessary regulatory
requirements may jeopardize the nation’s economic growth and recovery and the role private
equity funds play in the U.S. economy. Requiring private equity funds to register with the SEC
under Title IV will needlessly divert capital, time and effort from productive investment
activities that could be creating jobs and drive economic growth. It will simply impose an undue
burden on private equity funds (particularly small and mid-size funds), drain their resources and
diminish their ability to continue their investment activities at a critical time. Part IV(d) of this
paper will show that rather than using their resources to invest in businesses and drive growth,
private equity funds will have to use some of their resources to build the necessary compliance
infrastructure and comply with the new regulatory regime that imposes tremendous costs,
seeking to solve a non-existent problem, as discussed in Parts III and IV of this paper.
Additionally, the total cost of compliance with Title IV, a factor that was not considered by
regulators in the rulemaking process, for all new private equity funds may reduce returns to
private equity investors such as endowments and pension funds and may also hurt the economy
in the long run.
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The following section of this paper will examine the underlying economic theory of
regulation behind the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV and whether it supports the regulation of
private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector.
C.

THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION

This part of the paper will examine Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act in terms of the
underlying economic theory of regulation and assess whether it addresses the market failures that
led to the 2008 financial crisis and the relevant externalities. It will demonstrate that the
economic theory of regulation underlying the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV does not support the
regulation of private equity funds or any government intervention in the private equity sector.
This analysis will start with the concept of market failure which is central to regulatory theory
and the economic analysis of financial regulation.404
The underlying economic theory of regulation behind the Dodd-Frank Act is very clear
and its primary focus is on the market failures that led to the near collapse of the entire financial
system in 2008.405 In financial markets, market failure is one of the most important arguments
for government regulatory intervention.406 Regulators and policymakers are concerned with the
causes of market failures and possible means of correction through government intervention.407
Governments usually regulate where there is a market failure and financial regulation is very
often the reaction to a market failure. For example, the corporate accounting scandals of the early
2000s resulted in Congress passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, creating a new regulatory
environment for all public company boards, management and public accounting firms. The
Securities Act of 1933 was a response to the stock market crash of 1929, which had precipitated
the Great Depression. In the words of Professor Charles Whitehead, “new regulation seals up
leaks in the financial system, usually following a crisis that threatens the stability of the financial
system.”408 A leading policy analysis textbook by Professor David L. Weimar and Professor
Aidan R. Vining asks: “when is it legitimate for government to intervene in private affairs? In
the U.S., the normative answer to this question has usually been based on the concept of market
failure – a circumstance where the pursuit of private interest does not lead to an efficient use of
society’s resources or a fair distribution of society’s goods.”409 The market failure approach to
regulation has become a tool by which policymakers and regulators learn how to objectively
determine whether any government intervention is necessary and the exact scope and type of
intervention necessary.
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Adam Smith argued that markets by themselves are efficient and that “in an ideal
economic market individuals maximize the welfare of all simply by pursuing their own selfinterest.”410 This argument has been used as the basis for “unfettered and unregulated markets
and the era of free market capitalism.”411 However, history has shown us that the notion that
markets can regulate themselves and lead to efficient outcomes without government intervention,
has no theoretical or practical justification.412 Without adequate regulation, markets usually fail
to act in an efficient and stable manner or allocate their resources efficiently.413 They fail to
optimize social welfare and do not act in the way they are supposed to.414 In the words of
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning economist and former Chief Economist at the
World Bank: “unfettered markets often fail and do not serve society well.”415
Market failure is “the inability of an unregulated market to achieve allocative efficiency
in all circumstances. In financial industries, market failure includes fraud, manipulation,
deception, public loss of funds, and corporate collapse.”416 Market failure can occur due to
externalities, market power (such as monopolies), asymmetric information, or common-pool
resources/public goods. For example, without environmental regulation, a noisy factory might
move next door to a residential area, adversely affecting property values.417 Anti-trust laws are
necessary to prevent the creation of monopolies and anti-competitive practices.418 The sub-prime
mortgage crisis would have been less severe had legislation or regulations to restrict predatory
lending been adopted.419 Therefore, when markets fail to produce efficient outcomes, there is a
strong rationale for regulatory government intervention.
Professor Stiglitz argues that “nowhere are market failures more pervasive or more
important, with such profound consequences for our economic system, than in the financial
sector.”420 Over the past two hundred years, economic theory and financial history have
demonstrated that “financial markets often fail to perform their key functions of managing risk
and allocating capital well, with severe social and economic consequences.”421 These financial
sector market failures are usually the most important justification for regulatory government
intervention in the financial system.422 These regulatory interventions can take different forms
including: disclosure requirements, restrictions on incentive schemes, restrictions on ownership,
restrictions on particular behaviors and taxes designed to induce appropriate behaviors.423
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This theory of economic regulation is based on the idea that governments must step in to
regulate financial markets in instances when “these markets are unable to regulate themselves or
where the price mechanism that regulates supply and demand breaks down, forcing governments
to take action.”424 In other words, under this theory, government regulation is necessary when
markets fail to provide the information that individuals need to protect themselves from harm or
to correct for the negative side effects of or externalities of business activity.425 Therefore,
regulatory intervention is critical if the public interest is to be protected and market failures are to
be corrected. Regulating financial markets to correct market failures is sometimes referred to as
the “public interest theory”.426
The most common form of market failure, particularly in the context of the financial
sector, is negative externalities.427 An externality or a transaction spillover is “an economic side
effect or the effects of an economic activity on unrelated third parties, which are not captured in
the price of the activity.”428 It is a situation where an economic transaction imposes costs (or
benefits) on individuals who are not parties to the transaction.429 The classic example of a
negative externality is pollution, in which the impact of a firm’s industrial activity causes harm
to those geographically proximate to the polluting firm.430 Pollution is an unavoidable byproduct
in many industries, and without proper regulation, most polluting companies will do very little to
reduce their pollution levels due to the costs involved. Another example of negative externality is
the systemic risk associated with a potential broad-based failure of the financial system.431 In the
words of Professor Stiglitz:
“We have regulations designed to mitigate the extent of externalities. These include, for instance,
zoning restrictions and environmental regulations. We have regulations designed to maintain
competition (restrictions on anti-competitive practices), and to ensure that natural monopolies do
not abuse their monopoly position (utilities regulations). We have a large set of regulations aimed
at protecting consumers (ensuring that the banks where they deposit their money are sufficiently
sound, that food and products are safe, or that they are not taken advantage of by unscrupulous
merchants, advertising or lenders).”432

Professor Stiglitz further explains that “the recent financial crisis has highlighted the need
for government intervention in the event of a failure of a systemically important institution,
recognizing the existence of key externalities – the goal is to prevent the occurrence of these
market failures in the future.”433 He further suggests that “one of the big failures that this
financial crisis has exposed is that we allowed financial institutions to grow too big to fail. Not
only may such large institutions be able to exploit market power, but they also pose systemic risk
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to the economy and have perverse incentives which encourage such behavior. They know that if
they undertake high risk activities and fail, the government will pick up the pieces, but if they
succeed, they walk away with the gains”.434 It is these externalities which traditionally have been
viewed as justifying regulatory intervention by the government in the financial sector. Financial
regulations are designed primarily to remedy and mitigate the effect of these externalities or side
effects and prevent a similar market failure in the future.
In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the externality that led to the market failure and
the near collapse of the financial system, was the enormous buildup and emergence of systemic
risk in the financial system, specifically the risk that large financial institutions, funded with
short-term debt would fail all at once and cause a credit crisis and a systemic-wide collapse, if
there is a correction in the housing market.435 The market failure here is that, although each
financial institution may have been behaving optimally on an individual basis, the firms had no
incentive to take into account the effect of their actions on the financial system as a whole.436 As
a result, their actions produced external costs on the overall financial system and a failure of
major financial institutions and the economy as a whole.437
In the words of Professor Stiglitz: “the key market failure is that there is an important
externality from the collapse of the financial system. Just like toxic wastes pollute the
environment, America’s toxic mortgages polluted the world’s financial system.”438 These market
failures do not always have clear solutions and much of modern financial regulation involves
designing proper arrangements to remedy and mitigate the effects of these externalities. In the
financial sector, the purpose of regulatory intervention is to manage systemic risk through
regulation and requirements directed at individual firms and their behavior.439 The 2008 financial
crisis has clearly demonstrated the need for government intervention in the financial sector in the
event of a failure of a systemically important institution.440
Like the regulatory reform of the 1930s or the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Dodd-Frank Act was passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis and these market failures that
caused the near-collapse of the financial system.441 The Dodd-Frank Act is clearly well intended
by focusing regulation for the first time on the negative externality of systemic risk in the
financial sector.442 Additionally, the legislation introduces major reforms in other areas of the
financial system that failed and contributed to the financial crisis, like off-balance sheet
financing, over-the-counter derivatives, rating agencies and mortgage underwriting.443 Its
primary purpose is to fix the negative externality of systemic risk in the financial industry,
enhance financial stability, correct the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis and
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reduce the likelihood of a future financial crisis.444 The question however, is whether this
underlying economic theory of regulation and the notion of market failure as a justification for
regulatory intervention, support any government intervention in the private equity sector and are
even relevant to the private equity industry and the pre-crisis activities of private equity funds.
i)

TITLE IV AND THE MARKET FAILURE THEORY OF REGULATION

Viewed using the lens of this economic theory of regulation, this paper takes the position
that the Dodd-Frank Act and Title IV do not address any market failure in the private equity
sector. They impose substantial new reporting and compliance burdens on all private equity
funds, not merely those large financial institutions whose risk-taking activities have been the
primary concerns and causes of the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
As Part IV of this paper will demonstrate, an analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
in terms of the economic theory of regulation seems to suggest that unlike other areas that spread
systemic risk across the financial system (e.g. derivatives, lending practices), the theory does not
apply to the private equity sector at all. It does not support the regulation of private equity funds
or any government intervention in the private equity sector. No demonstrable market failure was
identified during the financial crisis in the context of the private equity industry to justify such
excessive regulatory intervention and broad registration and reporting requirements.
Additionally, there is no empirical academic literature to support any direct involvement of the
private equity sector in the 2008 financial crisis and any regulatory intervention in the private
equity sector. The 2008 financial crisis had very little to do with private equity funds.445 Private
equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They
did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the
financial system and were simply not part of the problem or any market failure. 446 As part IV of
this paper will show, private equity funds present none of the systemic risk factors that Congress
was concerned about and thus should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers
seeking to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future
market failure or financial crisis. Private equity funds and their activities prior to the crisis have
not produced a convincing case of market failure that justifies government intervention in the
private equity sector.
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is clearly well intended by focusing regulation for the
first time on systemic risk associated with the activities of private investment funds and the
stability of the financial system. However, this paper takes the position that in the context of
private equity funds, there is no market failure to correct nor is there any externality that has to
be addressed by regulators. As private equity funds pose minimal systemic risk to the financial
system, the case for the regulation of private equity funds under Title IV or for any government
intervention in the private equity sector is very weak. The following section of this paper will
examine Title IV’s reliance on disclosure as the primary method of reducing systemic risk and
protecting fund investors as well as the inconsistent treatment of private equity funds under Title
IV.
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D.

TITLE IV AND ITS UNDERLYING DISCLOSURE-BASED APPROACH

As explained in Part II of this paper, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act sets out a major
reform of the private investment fund industry and establishes a new framework for regulatory
and supervisory oversight of private investment funds. It introduced extensive registration,
reporting, disclosure and compliance requirements for private investment funds and their
advisors. It requires that investment advisers to private equity funds, hedge funds and certain
other funds with assets under management of $150 million or more register with the SEC,
comply with certain SEC books, records and reporting requirements, and be subject to extensive
periodic SEC examination, unless they qualify for specific exemptions.447 This new regulatory
regime and increased disclosure requirements are designed to bring transparency and oversight to
the activities of private investment funds, protect investors, control the build-up of systemic risk
in the financial system and address the market failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
Using financial regulation like Title IV to protect investors through a disclosure model
may be a worthy goal, but this goal, in the context of private equity funds, is ineffective,
unnecessary and inconsistent with fundamental principles of U.S. securities laws, which presume
that investors in private equity funds, who are necessarily experienced, wealthy and have
extensive resources to conduct their own due diligence or retain professional advisors, are able to
protect themselves without any regulatory intervention.448 As discussed in Part II of this paper,
private equity investors are usually large, sophisticated institutional investors, capable of
identifying, obtaining and processing the information necessary to evaluate an investment
opportunity and make an informed investment decision. Additionally, Title IV requires private
equity funds to disclose extensive information that is already being provided to private equity
investors by the funds voluntarily during the process of raising capital and on a regular basis.
Therefore, Title IV and its registration, reporting and increased disclosure requirements may be
viewed as unwarranted and inefficient to the extent that their purpose is to protect private equity
investors who are able to protect themselves.449
This Part of the paper will examine the disclosure philosophy of Title IV and whether it is
an effective tool to regulate private equity funds and protect their investors. It will demonstrate
that while the disclosure philosophy in general may offer major advantages for regulating
securities and financial markets, the reliance of Title IV on this approach, in the context of
private equity funds, is practically unnecessary, inefficient, falls short of achieving its purpose
and does not contribute anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors who can
“fend for themselves”. It is also unlikely to address the risk of excessive leverage which is
practically the main risk that Congress was concerned about and perceived as being sufficiently
serious to merit direct regulation. Before we examine the underlying disclosure philosophy of
Title IV and its drawbacks, it is worth pausing to consider disclosure as the primary method of
protecting investors and regulating securities and financial markets in the U.S.
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Disclosure is the primary method of protecting investors and regulating the securities and
financial markets in the U.S. It has always been the central focus of securities and financial
regulations and the regulatory solution to all of the securities market problems. It represents a
minimalist form of government intervention and preserves investors’ autonomy to make their
own investment decisions. In the words of Professor Kathryn Judge, “disclosure is one of the
most commonly used tools in financial regulation.”450 For the last eighty years, U.S. securities
laws and financial regulations have consistently relied on a disclosure approach as the primary
method for protecting investors and regulating securities and financial markets.451 In the context
of regulating these markets the disclosure of information is said to do “everything from
producing more transparent and efficient markets, to making corporate executives behave more
honestly and diligently, to decreasing investor risks and protecting the public interest. The main
goal of the securities laws is to provide sufficient disclosure to enable investors to make
informed decisions about the securities they buy and sell.”452 For example, the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which were adopted following the 1929 stock
market collapse are based on a philosophy of disclosure. The fundament goal of this legislation
was to eliminate abuses, restore investor confidence and maintain the integrity of the capital
markets. The primary method to achieve this goal was through a comprehensive disclosure
system.453 In other words, the goal is to require issuers of securities to fully disclose all material
information that a reasonable investor would require in order to make an informed investment
decision. So long as corporations disclosed all material information regarding their business and
securities, investors could make their own investment decisions.454
Another example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was adopted following the collapse of
Enron and WorldCom and the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s. The goal of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws” or in other words to improve the
disclosure of information about corporate activities and behavior to investors so they are better
positioned to make informed investment decisions.455
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Clearly, there are several rationales behind the disclosure-based system of regulation.
First, a disclosure-based approach can cause corporate executives to behave more responsibly,
honestly and ethically since they know that their actions and behavior will be exposed and
subject to public scrutiny.456 The premise is that the potential of public exposure and scrutiny can
deter corporate misconduct or fraudulent behavior. It is a tool for inducing corporate executives
to manage and behave better.457 In the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, “sunlight is said to be the
best disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”458 Second, the disclosure-based
approach enables investors to make fully informed investment decisions as to whether to buy,
sell or hold securities.459 It provides the basis for forming a judgment as to the value of the
securities. In the words of Professor Ripken, “by reducing the information asymmetry that exists
between corporations and investors, disclosure levels the playing field so that all market
participants have equal access to information about corporations and their securities. Investors
can then make informed valuation judgments about the price of securities and determine for
themselves whether a certain piece of stock is worthless.”460 The fundamental premise behind the
disclosure-based approach is that without it, investors would have inadequate information as to
the risks involved with a specific investment and consequently, will not be able to make an
informed investment decision.461 In essence, disclosure promotes fairness, enhances the integrity
of the market, increases the transparency and efficiency of the securities market and produces
increased price stability.462 Since there is more accurate public information about a particular
security, the price of this security can be expected to shift less. 463 The disclosure-based approach
also increases overall investor confidence in the securities market and its integrity by virtue of
deterring corporate misconduct and allowing equal access to information.464 Investors are more
“substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor . . . .”). The House Report on the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 explained the significance of providing investors with sufficient information to
make intelligent investment decisions: “No investor . . . can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
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[T]he hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value.”
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likely to participate and invest in the capital market when they are convinced that the market will
treat them fairly and that the relevant rules are enforced. In the words of Professor Ripken,
“investor trust is therefore critical for the securities markets to work, and disclosure helps to
facilitate that trust.”465
Overall, disclosure reduces investor risks, protects the public interest and preserves
investor autonomy. It is a tool to remedy “the social and economic wrongs that occur when those
with greater information exploit those with less information”, and it achieves this goal through a
minimalist form of government intervention.466 Therefore, the key advantage of the disclosurebased approach is that it promotes the protection of investors and the public with minimum
intervention in the operation of the free market.467 The following section will examine the
inconsistent treatment of private equity investors under Title IV and demonstrate that while the
disclosure philosophy may offer certain advantages for the regulation of securities and financial
markets in general, it is the wrong tool for regulating the private equity sector.
i)

THE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS UNDER TITLE IV

U.S. securities laws contain many exemptions for wealthy investors who are professional,
experienced and have extensive resources to conduct their own due diligence, or retain
professional advisors, to evaluate an investment opportunity and make an informed investment
decision without any regulatory intervention. The rationale behind these exemptions is that
wealthy investors can “fend for themselves” since they have the financial experience, resources,
sophistication and other tools to make an informed investment decision or to retain the services
of professional advisors who have the necessary experience and sophistication.468
For example, under the Securities Act of 1933, (the “Securities Act”) a company that
offers or sells its securities must register the securities with the SEC or rely on an exemption
from the registration requirements.469 However, the Securities Act provides companies with a
number of exemptions for experienced, wealthy and sophisticated investors who satisfy certain
requirements. Private equity funds' securities usually fall outside the scope of this registration
requirement since these securities are placed with wealthy investors through an exempt private
offering under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.470 Pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D
promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act, the issuance of securities to “accredited
investors” is generally not considered a “public offering” and is therefore exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act.471 In essence, Rule 506 of Regulation D provides
a “safe harbor” within Section 4(2) of the Securities Act for sales of securities to an unlimited
465
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number of “accredited investors”, defined as institutional investors and individuals with a net
worth in excess of $1 million or annual income in excess of $200,000 or $300,000 with spouse,
and most other entities having total assets in excess of $5 million.472 The rationale behind this
exemption is that wealthy investors who meet the “accredited investor” requirements are
sophisticated and experienced enough and therefore can “fend for themselves”. They simply do
not need any regulatory intervention in order to make an informed investment decision.
Another example of the federal securities laws approach to sophisticated, wealthy and
professional investors is Rule 144A promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act. Under
Rule 144A, resales of minimum $500,000 units of restricted securities to “qualified institutional
buyers” are also exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 473 Qualified
institutional buyers are defined in Rule 144A and include “specified institutional investors that
own and invest at least $100 million on a discretionary basis in securities of issuers that are not
affiliated with the entity.”474
The premise underlying these exemptions (and many other exemptions under federal
securities laws) for wealthy, sophisticated and experienced investors is the fact that wealthy
investors can “fend for themselves” since they have sufficient financial experience, resources,
sophistication and other tools to make informed investment decisions or to retain the services of
professional advisors who have the necessary experience and sophistication.475 They can tolerate
the economic risk associated with private equity investments. As explained by former SEC
Commissioner Troy Paredes “this animating principle reflects an implicit cost-benefit analysis
that the costs of SEC intervention in such instances exceed the benefits to wealthy investors of
such intervention.”476
As discussed in Part II of this paper, investors in private equity funds usually include
large institutions like corporate pension funds, public retirement plans, foundations,
endowments, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and to a lesser extent high net worth
individuals.477 These investors have extensive resources, experience and sophistication to “fend
for themselves” and make informed investment decisions. They usually go through an extensive
due diligence process, prior to making an investment decision, and use professional advisors like
accountants, lawyers and other business consultants, as part of their evaluation process. They are
very experienced in evaluating risk and are strong enough to absorb significant losses and
downturns in the economy. In fact, these professional and experienced investors do not need the
registration and reporting requirements of Title IV in order to make an informed investment
decision. They rely on their own due diligence efforts to verify or investigate matters of
importance and make an informed investment decision. They can simply protect themselves
utilizing their own resources and experience.
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In essence, what Title IV has done, in the context of private equity funds, is to create a
regulatory environment where the due diligence efforts of institutional wealthy investors in
private equity funds are to some extent subsidized by the public through the SEC enforcement of
unnecessary registration and reporting requirements under Title IV.478 This public subsidy of
wealthy institutional, professional and sophisticated investors is completely unnecessary and
inconsistent with the principles of federal securities laws and the exemptions available for
sophisticated and experienced investors. It is contrary to the fundamental principle that such
investors can “fend for themselves” and simply do not need the benefit of any government or
regulatory intervention.479 It also raises the question of why the government is allocating its
limited SEC resources in a way that benefits and protects the small number of American
investors who can “fend for themselves”.480
It is important to note that even in instances where investment funds collapsed like in the
case of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 (which due to its highly leveraged nature and
the 1998 financial crisis in Russia collapsed and required a $3.6 billion private bailout arranged
by the Federal Reserve) or the collapse of the hedge funds of Bear Stearns in 2007 (which
required Bear Stearns to incur losses of more than $1 billion), the primary issue was systemic
risk and the potential impact of the collapse on the financial system and the economy as a
whole.481 The issue was not investor protection or whether investors were defrauded or misled.
This paper takes the position that Title IV and its registration, reporting and increased
disclosure requirements may be viewed as unnecessary, burdensome and inefficient to the extent
that their purpose is to protect private equity investors who are able to protect themselves and
have the resources to conduct their own due diligence. It offers very little by way of protection
for investors in private equity funds. The premise that these investors need protection in the form
of regulatory intervention is a misconception and simply incorrect. While the disclosure
philosophy in general may offer major advantages for regulating securities and financial markets
and protecting investors, the reliance of Title IV on this approach, in the context of private equity
funds, is practically unwarranted, falls short of achieving its purpose and does not contribute
anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors who can “fend for themselves”.
It is also unlikely to address the risk of excessive leverage which is practically the main risk that
Congress was concerned about and perceived as being sufficiently serious to merit direct
regulation. Additionally, there is nothing to suggest that private equity funds and their
institutional investors should be subject to inconsistent investor protection regulation under
federal securities laws. The inevitable conclusion of this analysis is that the registration and
reporting requirements of Title IV may be necessary in order to protect other investors and the
financial market from systemic risk that might be caused by private equity funds (since the
investors in private equity funds do not actually need the protection offered by Title IV as they
can ‘fend for themselves’). The following sections will examine the relationship between private
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equity funds and systemic risk and analyze whether private equity funds in fact create a systemic
risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of private equity funds and the use
of leveraged buyout techniques, and how (if at all) those risks should be regulated.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE EQUITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK

This part of the paper examines the relationship between private equity funds and
systemic risk and analyzes the use of leverage by private equity funds as well as the risk of
excessive leverage. It looks more closely at the question of whether private equity funds create a
systemic risk problem (particularly through their use of leverage) in a way that justifies
regulatory intervention. It further offers a conceptual framework for examining whether private
equity funds create a systemic risk problem, what risks are truly “systemic”, in the context of
private equity funds and the use of leveraged buyout techniques, how (if at all) those risks should
be regulated and whether Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act through its registration and reporting
requirements is the right answer.
This part of the paper takes the position that from a systemic risk perspective, the
regulation of private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is unwarranted and
flawed. It will not accomplish the legislation’s purpose of helping identify and reduce systemic
risk in the financial system and will not make the financial system more stable or less risky. This
part of the paper further demonstrates that i) private equity was neither a cause nor a contributing
factor to the 2008 financial crisis which had its roots in the unsound lending practices of the U.S.
housing market; ii) private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk to the stability of
the financial system and the failure of a private equity fund would be highly unlikely to trigger
cascading losses that would lead to a financial crisis; iii) for regulatory purposes and from a
systemic risk perspective, there is no distinction between private equity funds and venture capital
funds and therefore, both should benefit from the same exemption from registration under the
Dodd-Frank Act (currently available to venture capital funds only); and iv) from an economic
policy perspective, private equity funds are a major driver of economic growth and play a key
role in the economic recovery of the U.S. Therefore, requiring private equity funds to register
with the SEC and be subject to extensive reporting requirements will needlessly divert capital,
time and effort from investment activities that could otherwise be creating jobs and drive
economic growth.
This part of the paper argues that in the context of private equity funds, Title IV is simply
an unnecessary and inadequate legislative response to the 2008 financial crisis and goes beyond
the ways in which private equity funds operated prior to the financial crisis. It is based on
fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of private equity funds and how they operate. It
tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that are not a major source of
systemic risk problems.
This part of the paper concludes that since private equity funds are not a major source of
systemic risk, they play a critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the
resources and sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, these funds and their advisers should be
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration and reporting
requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. The concerns associated with the use of
79

leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage should be addressed through
more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices,
standards and policies. Before we examine the complex relationship between private equity
funds and systemic risk, it is worth pausing to briefly analyze the 2008 financial crisis and the
near-collapse of the entire financial system which took the concept of systemic risk to a different
level and brought it to the attention of regulators and policymakers.
A.

PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

Although the causes of the 2008 financial crisis are many and complex (and largely
beyond the scope of this paper), the general background of the crisis will help shed light on
private equity regulation under Title IV and the relationship between private equity and systemic
risk.482 While regulators and scholars have different views regarding the causes of the 2008
financial crisis, it is widely recognized that the primary causes of the financial crisis were the
unsound lending practices of the U.S. housing market, the use of securitized products and the
build-up of systemic risk associated with derivatives that were the financial tool that enabled the
risk to spread, exacerbating the condition of global financial markets.483 In particular, credit
default swaps, financial derivatives that operate like insurance for bondholders, and other related
swap instruments played a significant role in creating systemic risk essentially allowing the
consequences of the collapse of the U.S. housing market to spread throughout the global
financial system.484 It is now widely accepted that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar over-thecounter credit default swap market helped drive and expand a mortgage crisis485, then a credit
crisis, and finally a once-in-a-century systemic financial crisis that, without a government
bailout, would have led the world economy into a major depression.486 While the financial crisis
started due to the unsound practices of the U.S. mortgage lending industry and excessive
482

See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse College: Four Questions About the
Financial Crisis, (Apr 14, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200
90414a.html (“what caused our financial and economic system to break down to the extent it has? Not surprisingly,
the answer to this question is complex, and experts disagree on how much weight to give various explanations.”).
483
See Mark Jickling, “Causes of the Financial Crisis,” Congressional Research Service (Jan 29, 2009) available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40173_20090129.pdf (offering twenty-six causes for the financial crisis, including
“imprudent mortgage lending”, “Securitization”, the “Shadow banking system”, “Off-balance sheet finance”, credit
default swaps, and “over-the-counter derivatives).
484
See John C. Hull, Options, Futures, And Other Derivatives 1 (David Alexander ed., Prentice Hall 6thed. 2006).
“A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative contract that functions like insurance against the default of a company.
The buyer of the CDS makes payments to the seller until the CDS expires or the reference entity suffers a "credit
event," such as bankruptcy. If the credit event occurs, the buyer is entitled to sell a bond for its face value to the
seller.”
485
See Rene M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis 3-4 (NBER, Working Paper No. 15384, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15384 (arguing that derivatives contributed to the financial crisis by: (1)
enabling the credit boom; (2) allowing financial institutions to take on massive risk, and (3) providing a total lack of
transparency regarding risk exposures and the resulting strength of financial institutions with large positions).
486
See Ben Moshinsky, [Joe] Stiglitz says Banks Should Be Banned From CDS Trading, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct.
12, 2009, http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a65VXsI.90hs; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed.,
Looters in Loafers, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk; Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues to Watch on Financial Reform - We
need an independent consumer watchdog and strong derivatives regulation. Industry lobbyists are trying to water
them
down,
WALL
ST.
J.,
April
22,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704133804575197852294753766.html.
80

foreclosures resulting from the collapse of the housing market, over-the-counter derivatives and
particularly credit default swaps created unwarranted risks that fueled the financial crisis.487 The
massive use of these financial instruments shook the foundation of the most prominent financial
institutions that were heavily invested in these markets and took large positions in over-thecounter derivatives in order to hedge or speculate on mortgages.488 These events exposed the
interconnectedness and linkages between financial institutions and the potential such linkages
and interconnectedness had for causing extreme damage to the financial system and the economy
as a whole.489 Financial innovation in the form of mortgage securitization, derivatives and other
financial engineering products increased the systemic vulnerability to financial shocks that could
be spread throughout the entire financial system and create a major financial crisis.
The 2008 financial crisis is a powerful example of systemic risk becoming a major threat
to the stability of financial markets. As homeowners defaulted on their subprime mortgages
(following the collapse of the U.S housing market), this created a ripple effect through the
previously flourishing asset backed security market.490 Institutions that had purchased protection
against mortgage defaults in the form of credit default swaps demanded more capital to back up
their contracts, and the undercapitalized investment banks and insurers that had sold this
protection were increasingly unable to meet collateral demands.491 Additionally, the
collateralized debt obligation contracts (CDOs) in which these credit default swaps sellers had
heavily invested stopped making payments and plummeted in value.492 As a result, the CDS
insurers came under tremendous pressure to compensate banks and other protected buyers for the
loss of value in their CDO portfolios from mortgage defaults.493 However, they were not
adequately capitalized to perform their obligations and thus the CDO and CDS markets were
completely destroyed.494 This chain of events caused a major liquidity crunch and led to the nearcollapse of the global financial system.
Additionally, there was an overall lack of transparency in the financial market which
clearly enhanced the threat of systemic risk. These derivatives transactions were largely invisible
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to regulators and market participants.495 This regulatory environment created a situation where
neither market participants nor regulators had accurate knowledge of the full range of the
exposures and interconnections of the various market participants.496 Because of this limited
transparency it was unclear which banks were exposed and to what degree. 497 Banks and
financial institutions as well as regulators did not understand the magnitude of aggregate
derivatives exposures in the system and had no basis to measure the risks embedded in their
derivatives exposure.498 Additionally, due to the large derivatives positions the major Wall Street
financial institutions like AIG held, there were concerns that if one major financial institution
were to default on its credit default swaps, its counterparties would go bankrupt and, as a result,
the entire financial system could collapse.499 This chain of events, combined with tremendous
uncertainty and fear in the marketplace, led to the unfortunate failure and near-collapse of the
global financial system.500 It forced the government to step in with a massive bailout program to
keep the major banks and financial institutions afloat during this crisis, bring stability to the
market and prevent a total collapse of the financial system.501
However, these events had very little to do with the private equity industry.502 It is
universally accepted that private equity funds did not cause the financial crisis and did not play
any part in the credit crisis.503 They did not contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that
eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial system and were simply not part of the
problem.504 In fact, private equity funds are helping to mitigate the damage of the financial crisis
and drive long-term economic growth through their investment activities. As will be discussed in
the following sections, the factors which brought down Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG
and caused a major systemic crisis in financial markets, are simply not present in the private
equity sector.505 Private equity funds did not incur direct losses in the subprime mortgage crisis
since they do not invest in asset based securities or the derivatives based on them, nor do they
invest or lend funds to other institutions trading in those securities and derivatives.506 While
private equity was a major consumer of cheap debt and created an intense demand for loans (like
many other industries), the private equity sector itself did not create or spread systemic risk in
the financial system.507 On the contrary, the structure of most private equity funds and their ring
fenced investments actively restricted the spread of risk from excessive borrowing by any of the
495
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target companies. In essence, this paper takes the position that the private equity sector did not
play any role in the problems and failures that caused the 2008 financial crisis. The leverage ratio
of the companies in which the private equity sector invests has averaged 3-to-1, compared to up
to 32-to-1 in the financial institutions whose failures triggered the crisis. As will be discussed
later in this paper, the banking markets and the lenders were the source of the systemic risk, not
the borrowers.508 This desire to borrow inexpensive capital from banks or other lenders in order
to fund leveraged buyout transactions was the only form of involvement private equity funds had
in the 2008 financial crisis.509 This involvement is no different than any other sector or industry
using debt in the ordinary course of business.
And yet, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act completely ignores the fact that private equity
funds were not part of the problem and subjects these firms to extensive SEC registration,
compliance and reporting requirements. Title IV therefore raises the inevitable question, which is
the essence of this part of paper: what, if anything, did Congress see about the risk associated
with private equity funds that warranted regulatory intervention in the private equity sector,
while at the same time granting an exemption to venture capital funds? In other words, given the
original exemption from registration under the Advisers Act,510 what was the change about
private equity funds that generated concerns about the exemption of the private equity industry
from registration and ultimately drove the decision to regulate these funds? After all, there were
no failures of private equity funds that had a systemic effect or caused damage to the financial
system and required any regulatory intervention.
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, its primary objective was to identify and
manage threats to the stability of the nation’s financial system, protect investors and control the
buildup of systemic risk.511 In the context of private equity funds, the main concern that drove
Congress to regulate these funds was the use of leverage and the risk that too much leverage
contributes to the buildup of systemic risk that can potentially lead to a major credit crisis.512 The
premise was that lending connects financial institutions to one another and the failure of a
leveraged institution to repay its debt obligations causes risk to spread among the financial
institutions that lend capital.513 Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could, in theory,
trigger cascading losses that would ultimately lead to a financial crisis. Congress operated on the
assumption that private equity funds cause systemic risk by virtue of using leverage and
therefore should be regulated and subject to SEC oversight. This paper takes the position that
these concerns are unfounded and based on fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of
private equity funds and the way they operate. In the word of Professor John W. O’Brien of the
Haas School of Business at the University of California - Berkeley: “I don’t think private equity
and venture capital have been an important part of the problem. It’s mainly been the leverage and
rapid-trading strategies, and those strategies are primarily housed in hedge funds. I don’t think
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Congress has a clear understanding of the problem so they wrap everybody into the net.”514
Private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk to the financial system and present
no threat to the financial stability of the market or the economy as a whole. Therefore, the
registration and reporting requirements of Title IV are unwarranted, unnecessarily costly and
inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act. The following section examines
the relationship between private equity funds and systemic risk and whether private equity funds
create a systemic risk problem (particularly through their use of leverage) in a way that justifies
regulatory intervention.
B.

PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK

i)

SYSTEMIC RISK

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis regulators and policy makers started to focus
on the concept of systemic risk and the potential for systemic failure of the entire financial
system. Systemic risk became the primary concern of legislators all over the world. 515 In fact,
one of the primary objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act is to reduce and control systemic risk in the
financial system, enhance financial stability and thus prevent or reduce the likelihood of a future
financial crisis.516 Nonetheless, there is still a great deal of confusion and academic debate as to
the meaning of the term systemic risk, what types of risk are actually systemic, what types of
systemic risk should be regulated and whether the concept is even relevant to the private equity
sector.517 Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, explained the confusion as to the
definition of the term systemic risk and stated that “Although it is generally agreed that systemic
risk represents a propensity for some sort of financial system disruption, one observer might use
the term ‘market failure’ to describe what another would deem to have been a market outcome
that was natural and healthy, even if harsh. As a result, the very definition of systemic risk is still
somewhat unsettled.”518
Systemic risk is the risk that financial problems in one institution or market will spread to
other institutions and markets with the result that the losses from a seemingly isolated market
event might threaten the entire economy.519 It refers to the linkages and interdependencies
between participants in the financial market, such that “a significant loss initially touching only a
small number of participants can spread and threaten the entire system.”520 The essence of
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systemic risk is a chain of failures or losses. It is a “market shock” that triggers institutional
failures which in turn lead, or can lead, to a chain of institutional or market failures. 521 In other
words, it is “a failure in the functioning of the financial system that imposes significant
externalities, adversely affecting persons removed from the financial institutions at the core of
the crisis.”522 It is usually created by counterparty credit risk and spreads through the
interconnections between financial institutions, for example, in the context of derivatives
trading.523
Some commentators define systemic risk as “the probability that cumulative losses will
occur from an event that ignites a series of successive losses along a chain of financial
institutions or markets comprising….a system.”524 Other scholars define it as “the potential for a
modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset prices, significant reductions in
corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency losses.”525 Alternatively, other scholars
and regulators define the concept of systemic risk as “the risk that a default by one market
participant will have repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of
financial markets. For example, Customer A’s default in X market may affect Intermediary B’s
ability to fulfil its obligations in Markets X,Y and Z.”526 In the words of Professor Katheryn
Judge the concept of systemic risk can be understood as “the risk that the financial system will
fail to function properly because of widespread distress.”527 Despite the different views as to the
concept of systemic risk and the meaning of the term, the essence of the different definitions is
very similar. In the words of Professor Steven Schwarcz, the common feature is a “triggering
event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, that causes a domino effect or a chain
of detrimental economic consequences like losses, decrease in credit availability, increase in cost
of capital or liquidity crisis.”528 It is the risk of a “potential breakdown in an entire financial
system as opposed to the collapse of individual participants in the financial system.”529
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It has been noted by regulators and academic scholars that the most severe consequences
of systemic risk are “the increase in the cost of capital and decrease in its availability.”530
Accordingly, the concept of systemic risk is usually associated with banks and other financial
institutions, as these institutions are providers of capital, and therefore the “failure of such
institutions can adversely affect the cost of capital and its availability as well as the entire
financial system.”531
Historically, the main source of systemic risk was a banking failure and the classic
example of systemic risk is a “bank run” in which the inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawaldemands causes its failure, in turn causing other banks or their creditors to fail.532 As more
people withdraw their deposits, the likelihood of default increases, thus triggering further
withdrawals. This can bring the bank to the point where it runs out of cash. A bank run can lead
to a chain of failures very quickly because “banks are closely intertwined financially as they lend
to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other and make payments
through the interbank clearing system.”533 A good example of a bank run causing systemic risk is
the great depression and the crash of October 1929 when bank depositors tried to convert their
bank deposits into cash. Many banks were simply unable to satisfy these demands causing them
to fail, therefore leading to a major financial crisis.534 In the words of Professor Katheryn Judge:
“Historically, the paradigmatic source of systemic risk was a banking crisis. This is
because of the central role banks play in moving capital from savers to productive
undertakings and because of instability inherent in their structure. Banks tend to use
short-term liabilities like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans to
businesses, so even a solvent bank may lack the requisite funds if too many depositors
demand their money back at the same time; and because of the interconnectedness of
banks and the potential for problems at one bank to signal problems at others, a run on
the bank can lead to the failure of other banks and an overall contraction of the financial
system.”535
While bank failures are still the classic example and a major source of systemic risk,
changes in the roles played by banks, the relationship between banks and capital markets and
other developments in the financial system have “created an environment in which the potential
sources of systemic risk have become much more diverse.”536
As the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated, extensive speculation in derivatives markets is
dangerous for the financial system due to the systemic risk that arises from the complex linkages
and interdependencies between participants in the global financial market.537 For example, if a
bank defaults on a derivatives contract, it could cause its transactional counterparty to default on
its own outstanding derivatives contracts with third parties (assuming the counterparty was
530
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relying on income from the derivatives contract to meet its obligations to third parties). 538
Therefore, massive derivatives losses at one firm leading to defaults could quickly lead to a chain
reaction of defaults among other firms and as a result spread systemic risk throughout the
financial system.539 This is the reason why derivatives have been described by legendary investor
Warren Buffet as “financial weapons of mass destruction carrying dangers that, while now latent,
are potentially lethal.”540 As evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis, the combined threats of lack
of transparency, lack of regulatory oversight and massive systemic risk in the financial system,
can be extremely dangerous and jeopardize the entire economy.
In laying out its financial regulatory reform, following the 2008 financial crisis, the
Obama administration articulated “three fundamental factors that trigger systemic risk concerns:
i) the impact that a firm’s failure would have on the financial system and economy; ii) the firm’s
combination of size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures) and degree of reliance on
short-term funding; and iii) the firm’s criticality as a source of credit for households, businesses,
and state and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.”541 This
paper takes the position that private equity funds present none of these systemic risk factors and
thus “should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking to develop a new
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against a future financial crisis.”542
When applying these systemic risk factors to private equity funds, it is hard to see how
any particular private equity fund could be considered a major source of systemic risk that
justifies regulatory intervention.543 It is important to note that the factors which brought down
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG and caused a major systemic crisis in financial markets,
are simply not present in the private equity sector.544 Bear Stearns’ crisis and later the failure of
Lehman Brothers and AIG began with funds these firms formed for the purpose of trading
mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives.545 Private equity funds did not incur direct
losses in the subprime mortgage crisis since they do not invest in asset based securities or the
derivatives based on them, nor do they invest or lend funds to other institutions trading in those
securities and derivatives.546 Additionally, private equity funds “occupy a place in the U.S.
capital market that is simply too small to trigger the elements of systemic risk and a potential
financial crisis” (despite the risk of excessive leverage that will be discussed below).547 The
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sections that follow examine the connection and relationship between private equity funds and
systemic risk and further explain why private equity is not a major source of systemic risk. They
illustrate that these systemic risk factors have very little to do with private equity funds and the
way they operate.
ii)

THE USE OF LEVERAGE BY PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

The first misconception that drove Congress (and the lobbyists promoting Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act) to regulate the private equity sector relates to the use of leverage by private
equity funds and the risk that too much leverage contributes to the buildup of systemic risk that
can potentially lead to a major financial crisis.548 Congress operated on the assumption that
private equity funds cause systemic risk by virtue of using leverage and therefore should be
regulated and subject to SEC oversight under the Dodd-Frank Act. The concern was that lending
connects financial institutions to one another and the failure of a leveraged institution to repay its
debt obligations causes risk to spread among the financial institutions that lend capital.549 The
premise is that leverage amplifies systemic risk in the financial system as a result of connections
and linkages among financial institutions.550 Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could,
in theory, trigger cascading losses that would ultimately lead to a financial crisis.
As high levels of leverage have been a major factor in other instances of systemic
financial failures, including the subprime mortgage crisis, high leverage raises legitimate
concerns about systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.551 This is especially true when
leverage is used to speculate on highly volatile instruments like derivatives and credit default
swaps. The collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and other financial institutions heavily
invested in mortgage backed securities and subprime mortgage derivatives involved extremely
high levels of leverage. On February 29, 2008, the leverage ratios for Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers were nearly 33-to-1.552 With such levels of leverage and extensive speculation on
volatile instruments, major losses that occur suddenly can trigger a chain of systemic failures as
the use of leverage amplifies losses well beyond a financial institution’s capital resources.553
Nonetheless, these conditions for systemic financial failures are simply not present in the
private equity sector. The leverage ratio of private equity transactions is substantially lower,
usually 3-to-1.554 The business and nature of private equity funds (as will be discussed below)
are very different and do not fit this pattern of systemic financial failures. Also, private equity
funds “occupy a place in the U.S. capital market that is simply too small to trigger the elements
of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis.”555 The failure of private equity portfolio
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companies is simply not large enough to jeopardize the viability of the financial system and the
economy as a whole.556
Private equity funds almost never use debt or leverage at the fund level.557 This is a
fundamental premise in the way private equity funds operate. Where debt is used in private
equity transactions, it is taken on by the target companies that are acquired, not by the fund
itself.558 Also, the institutional investors who are the limited partners in private equity funds are
not highly leveraged themselves. In fact, it is common for private equity fund managers to
commit to their investors that the fund will not incur any debt at the fund level. This is due to the
requirements imposed by tax-exempt investors like pension funds, endowments and foundations
that are nevertheless, required to pay taxes on income from debt financed investments.559 Thus,
the target companies, those in which private equity funds invest, are responsible for the debt
obligations.
Additionally, the debt used in private equity transactions is secured against the assets or
cash flow of the target companies. Therefore, if a target company defaults on its debt obligations,
the banks or lenders can look only to the assets of the target company not the fund or its
investors for recourse.560 The default is contained and losses are absorbed by the fund
investors.561 This is a very isolated and non-systemic exposure as losses do not compound
beyond the amount of capital committed by each investor in the fund.562 Thus the risk of debt
used in private equity transactions is on the portfolio companies, not the economy as a whole. As
a result, there is no systemic risk concern that interconnections or linkages between financial
institutions, resulting from the use of leverage, could spread systemic risk throughout the
financial system, cause a chain of failures and eventually lead to a financial crisis.563 In essence,
the risk with private equity funds is limited entirely to the operational success or failure of the
target companies in which the private equity funds invest. The investment is based on a longterm relationship and partnering with the management team of the target company with the
objective of building or restructuring a company as discussed in Part II of this paper. This risk is
very different from the systemic risk that was the basis for the 2008 financial crisis and the
Dodd-Frank legislation.564
For example, a million dollar mortgage can create a multiple of assets flow because of
derivatives and bets regarding interest rates of that mortgage pool.565 In the context of private
equity funds, the exposure associated with a million dollar investment is limited to a million
556
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dollars.566 There is no multiplier effect because there are no side bets or other unmonitored
derivative securities based on the transaction. When a portfolio company fails the investment is
gone but the losses end there and the financial exposure is self-contained. No outside parties are
betting on the success or failure of the private equity industry and hence cannot be affected.
Additionally, the potential losses of a private equity fund are known with some degree of
certainty and the underlying assets (the portfolio companies) are much less affected by sharp and
sudden shifts in value or fluctuations like in the case of highly speculative investments. The
value of the investments made by private equity funds in various target companies is much less
volatile and much more limited and certain than those seen in cases of systemic financial failures
like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.567
Therefore, the concern about systemic risk associated with the use of leverage by private
equity funds and a potential chain of financial failures is simply unwarranted and unfounded.
There is a complete lack of direct nexus between private equity investments and the systemic
risk concerns underlying the enactment of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. There is nothing
unique about a lender’s loan to private equity portfolio companies that would make them more
risky than a wide range of other types of loans made by a bank or other lender, in the ordinary
course of business, to other companies owned by public shareholders, public companies or other
institutional investors.568 The way in which private equity portfolio companies use leverage is no
different from the way in which companies backed by private or public investors use leverage in
the ordinary course of business. In case a private equity portfolio company defaults on its debt
obligations, lenders and investors in the private equity fund may not be repaid in full but this is
no different than any other company defaulting on its debt, which is addressed as a regulatory
matter through federal bankruptcy law.569 Also, there is no modern instance of a financial crisis
or a major systemic failure triggered by the failure of a private equity fund or a failure of its
portfolio companies. Therefore, the SEC registration and reporting requirements of Title IV seem
misplaced and disproportionate in the absence of evidence showing that private equity portfolio
companies are more likely to default on their debt obligations and create systemic financial
failures.
This paper takes the position that private equity funds are not a major source of systemic
risk and do not present a threat to the financial system or the economy as a whole. Unlike the
2008 financial crisis where the potential losses were virtually unlimited due to the use of
excessive leverage and highly speculative financial instruments, the losses that could arise from
the failure of private equity portfolio companies are self-contained, non-systemic and limited to
the amount of capital committed by these funds. Private equity funds, however, do present
certain concerns with regard to the use of excessive leverage which will be discussed in the
following section.
iii)

THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESSIVE LEVERAGE

566

Id.
See Appelbaum and Batt, supra note 27.
568
See Lowenstein, supra note 24.
569
Id.
567

90

Private equity funds and their leveraged buyout activities have been the subject of some
controversy and extensive criticism due to their use of leverage and the risk of excessive
leverage. This paper recognizes the concerns associated with the use of leverage by private
equity funds and the risk of excessive leverage which are valid and legitimate concerns, although
unlikely to cause cascading losses and systemic failures in the US financial system. Nonetheless,
this paper suggests that the regulatory approach of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank is not the right
answer to address these risks and concerns.570 Perhaps a better approach to control the risk of
excessive leverage is to enhance leveraged lending regulation and foster an environment in
which the discipline of banks and other lenders constrains excessive leverage and risk-taking by
private equity funds.571
The 2008 financial crisis clearly underscores the risk of excessive leverage and how
leverage can amplify systemic risk in the financial system as a result of connections and linkages
among financial institutions. The notion that excessive leverage by financial institutions was one
of the key contributing factors to the 2008 crisis financial is widely accepted and has generated
widespread support.572 In the words of Professor Steven L. Schwarcz: “excessive leverage can
increase the likelihood of a general breakdown in the functioning of financial markets by
increasing the likelihood of transmitting problems.”573 He further explains that “high leverage,
however, can cause institutions to absorb losses exponentially in the sense that losses beyond a
certain level—depending on the institution’s size and leverage—will precipitously degrade an
institution’s ability to pay its debts. Default in paying debts might well cause the institution’s
failure, as well as trigger a potential chain of defaults as other institutions are not paid amounts
owed to them (and in turn, if highly leveraged, such other institutions might then be unable to
pay amounts owed to yet other institutions).”574 The risk of excessive leverage is well illustrated
by the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, which had a leverage
ratio of twenty five to one shortly before it was bailed out with the assistance of the Federal
Reserve of New York. The fund had $125 billion of investments financed with $5 billion of
assets under management.575 This is clearly not the case with private equity funds and their use
of leverage in the context of leveraged buyout transactions. Private equity portfolio companies
use significantly less leverage than the financial institutions that collapsed in the 2008 financial
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crisis. The average gross leverage ratio of private equity deals is usually about 3:1 while Lehman
Brothers was leveraged at approximately 32:1.576 With such levels of leverage, major losses that
occur suddenly can quickly trigger a chain of systemic failures as the use of leverage amplifies
losses well beyond a financial institution’s capital resources.
Private equity owned buyout companies have significantly higher levels of debt than
other comparable publicly traded companies.577 As discussed in Part II above, the use of leverage
in private equity transactions is a key element to enhance the potential return for investors.578
Financial leverage magnifies the potential positive or negative impact that any change in the
Company’s earnings has on the return on equity. Therefore, high levels of leverage “increase the
risks of financial distress, debt restructuring, bankruptcy, or even liquidation, particularly in
economic downturns and periods of slow growth such as the 2008 financial crisis.”579 The risk of
financial distress associated with high levels of leverage is well known in finance and
economics. Greater leverage increases the odds of financial distress, high default levels and even
insolvency by magnifying lenders losses relative to equity. In the words of Professor
Appelbaum: “as the debt ratio rises, the probability of bankruptcy rises and the expected value of
bankruptcy costs increase. Even companies that are able to restructure their debts and avoid
insolvency bear costly expenses – legal fees and other costs associated with restructuring debt as
well as higher borrowing costs in the future.”580 The less equity invested in any given private
equity buyout transaction, and the higher the amount of debt, the greater the risk of losing the
equity.581 Furthermore, the less equity that a company has, the smaller the cushion against
banking problems, adverse market conditions, economic downturns and insolvency or failure.
Therefore, high leverage increases both the risk of losing the equity invested and the risk that a
company becomes unable to repay its lenders and therefore becomes insolvent.582
In the context of leveraged buyout transactions, portfolio companies are under pressure to
continue to service high levels of debt, which makes them very vulnerable to changing market
conditions and even defaults during economic downturns. The actual benefits of using debt to the
balance sheet, as discussed in Part II of this paper, diminish as debt rises to an excessive level
thereby making borrowers very vulnerable to interest rate rises, unexpected business events,
economic downturns or adverse market conditions. A financial crisis affecting target companies
that are carrying high levels of debt on their balance sheet could have serious repercussions for
investors, many of whom are themselves highly leveraged hedge funds or pension funds seeking
higher returns. In other words, leverage creates an externality and the stakeholders who usually
bear the costs of this externality are the creditors.583 The concern associated with the use of
leverage is also the fear that excessive leverage might lead to costs that have to be borne by the
rest of the economy.
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Additionally, the effect of financial distress and bankruptcy resulting from excessive
leverage and the failure of a portfolio company may be devastating for other stakeholders in the
leveraged buyout environment like managers, employees, customers, suppliers and bond holders
of the affected company. For the individual portfolio company, bankruptcy and financial distress
usually mean a disaster for managers, employees, creditors and suppliers whose jobs and
livelihood depend on the success or failure of the company.584 Many private equity portfolio
companies also struggle with high levels of leverage and debt-financed dividend payouts to
private equity investors that put tremendous pressure on cash flow and limit the ability to adapt
during economic downturns.585 Clearly, excessive leverage used by private equity funds can
leave the portfolio company in a weaker financial position. Net worth is lower since the target
company has not retained the proceeds of the loans. Profits are reduced by the burden of the new
interest payments and cash flow is down even further due to the payments of principal on the
leveraged loans. Also, funds for new developments, business growth or investments may be
unavailable.
It is important to note that leverage plays an important role in financial markets. Former
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explained that “stripped of its complexities, the purpose of
a financial system is to let those who want to save…save and let those who want to borrow –
whether to buy a house or build a business – borrow. The use of significant amounts of debt to
finance the acquisition of a company has a number of advantages, as well as risks. The most
obvious risk associated with a leveraged buyout is that of financial distress. Unforeseen events
such as recession, litigation, or changes in the regulatory environment can lead to difficulties
meeting scheduled interest payments, technical default (the violation of the terms of a debt
covenant) or outright liquidation.”586
This paper takes the position that the possibility of financial distress and even bankruptcy
is built into the business model of private equity funds. The primary goal of private equity funds
is to maximize returns for investors through investments in underperforming, undervalued and
undermanaged companies and the turnaround and restructuring of their business and
operations.587 In the words of Professor Appelbaum: “The expectation that some portfolio
companies may need to restructure their debt or even default on their debt obligations is inherent
in the private equity model whereby funds hold a portfolio of companies, some of which may
yield spectacular gains when sold and some of which will not succeed. The high risks faced by
highly leveraged firms are more than offset by the very large payoffs from successful portfolio
companies.”588 Occasional bankruptcies of portfolio companies have little effect on the overall
return of private equity funds that are usually diversified over different industries and geographic
regions.
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Additionally, as discussed above, this paper takes the position that private equity
investors are in fact protected from the effects of financial distress, default or bankruptcy of
companies in the fund’s portfolio. When a portfolio company fails the investment is gone but
the losses end there and the financial exposure is self-contained. The potential losses of a private
equity fund are known with some degree of certainty. The legal structure of private equity funds
limits their investors losses to the equity capital invested in the portfolio company. The financial
exposure associated with private equity owned companies is very different from the unlimited
risks associated with the pre-crisis activities of Bear Stearns, AIG, Lehman Brothers and other
major financial institutions prior to the 2008 financial crisis. The value of investments made by
private equity funds is much less volatile and much more limited than those seen in the cases of
systemic capital market failures.
This paper argues that the risk in private equity leveraged buyout transactions and their
use of leverage is not the systemic risk regulators were seeking to control through Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act. The default, bankruptcy or failure of a private equity portfolio company (which
may be devastating for different groups of stakeholders) are unlikely to cause cascading losses,
present a threat to the financial system or shake the economy. Also, there are no modern
instances of a systemic failure or financial crisis triggered by a bankruptcy or failure of a private
equity fund or its portfolio companies.
In the final analysis, as this paper argues throughout, the regulatory environment has to
change and constrain the kind of financial engineering and excessive leverage by private equity
funds that raises the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy. This approach will protect
the different groups of stakeholders whose interests may be adversely affected by financial
distress, default and bankruptcy of a portfolio company. Nonetheless, this paper takes the
position that Title IV fails to achieve this purpose and is not the right regulatory approach.
Regulating the source or providers of debt capital is much more likely to reduce the externality
associated with the use of leverage and control the risk of excessive leverage in leveraged buyout
transactions.
iv)

FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTIONS OR LINKAGES

Financial interconnections or linkages among financial institutions are a key feature of
modern financial systems and systemic risk. They facilitate risk sharing, investment
opportunities and access to capital by financial institutions and market participants. They are the
result of a wide range of transactions and relationships between banks, financial institutions and
other market participants. They are also the mechanism through which systemic risk spreads over
the financial system and subsequently creates a financial crisis. These financial interconnections
of the modern financial system are generally viewed as a key contributing cause of the 2008
financial crisis. Due to the complex network of connections between market participants and
financial institutions, failure of one financial institution can spread to other financial institutions
very quickly through these interconnections and lead to a system-wide threat to the financial
system and the economy as a whole.589
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In 2000 Professor Franklin Allen and Professor Douglas Gale developed an important
model of financial networks that explains how complex financial networks and interconnections
can influence systemic risk and lead to a financial crisis.590 In their analysis “systemic risk arises
through liquidity shocks that can have a domino effect, causing a problem at one bank to spread
to others, potentially leading to failures throughout the system.”591 They further explain that
“interbank deposits and interconnections between financial institutions are the primary
mechanism for the transmission of liquidity shocks and systemic risk from one financial
institution to another.”592 In essence, financial shocks and systemic risk are magnified and spread
rapidly through the economy via financial interconnections, linkages and a complex network of
financial connections between participants in the financial system.
This paper takes the position that private equity funds do not pose systemic risk because
they are not interconnected with other financial institutions or market participants and have no
counterparty exposure.593 Although there are different lines of interconnections in the financial
system, interconnectedness usually refers to “institutions’ connections by virtue of derivatives
positions, brokerage relationship, counterparty exposure relating to, for example, swaps or
securities lending, reliance on short-term credit for operations, or the provision of credit to
financial system participants.”594 Private equity funds simply do not use these financial
instruments or strategies and therefore are not interconnected with other financial institutions or
market participants. They do not hold derivatives positions, do not have counterparty exposure
and do not rely on short-term credit for their operations.595 As discussed in Part II of this paper,
private equity funds usually acquire a majority interest in mature operating companies.
Therefore, private equity portfolio companies that fail are very unlikely to be interconnected to
other financial institutions or market participants so as to cause systemic failures and a potential
financial crisis.
Interconnectedness is a critical element of systemic risk. It creates the risk of “spillover”
namely, that the failure of one financial institution will have cascading negative effects on other
financial institutions or market participants and the entire financial system.596 In the absence of
this interconnectedness between financial institutions (like in the case of private equity funds),
there is no element of spillover risk that can lead to a systemic failure and eventually a financial
crisis. Furthermore, private equity funds are not interconnected with each other, because they
neither pledge their assets as security for, nor do they guarantee, each other’s obligations.
Therefore, a failure of a private equity fund could not create cascading losses that would lead to a
systemic failure and eventually a financial crisis.597 A highly leveraged financial firm that is
interconnected with other financial firms is less likely than an unleveraged firm to be able to
absorb massive losses and the spillover effects if another financial system participant fails.598
However, this is not the case with private equity funds as they are not interconnected with other
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financial institutions. Additionally, they do not lend to financial system participants and are not
operationally linked to other financial institutions. Unlike hedge funds which generally rely on
derivatives, leverage and short-term credit, private equity funds do not use these financial tools
and therefore, pose no systemic threat to the financial system. The links or “channels of
contagion, by which one financial institution’s failure spreads to other financial institutions”, are
simply not present in the context of private equity transactions.599
Private equity funds are also organized and structured in such a way that the funds
owning the portfolio companies are limited partnerships, with no interconnections even between
other portfolio companies managed by the same private equity firm.600 Furthermore, private
equity investments are not cross-collateralized. Neither private equity investors nor debt holders
can force a fund to sell unrelated assets or another portfolio company to satisfy debt obligations
resulting from the default of a portfolio company.601 In essence, private equity investments in
portfolio companies are protected and separated from one another so that a non-performing
investment does not affect any other investment in the portfolio of the fund. The failure of one
portfolio company does not impact the fund’s other portfolio companies. Losses are limited to
the underlying value of the original capital investment.602 Thus in the context of private equity
funds, the concern about systemic risk resulting from financial interconnections or linkages
between financial institutions and the potential for systemic-wide failure are simply nonexistent.
v)

LONG-TERM ILLIQUID ASSET CLASS

Liquidity, which is a major component of systemic risk and a potential financial crisis, is
not a practical concern in the context of private equity funds. Liquidity generally refers to how
quickly and cheaply certain assets can be converted into cash. Generally, institutions that offer
highly liquid investments, such as banks, pose more systemic risk because they are more
susceptible to runs during times of financial distress.603 However, liquidity is not a systemic risk
concern in the context of private equity funds because they require long-term capital
commitments from investors and do not offer their investors redemption or withdrawal rights
that could force the fund into liquidation.604 Private equity investors usually cannot exit a fund
without giving considerable notice, even when major losses occur. Also, the pension funds,
endowments and other institutional investors that invest in private equity funds are much less
susceptible to selling pressure resulting from sudden financial losses or failures. Therefore,
private equity funds don’t have to sell assets to fund investors’ redemptions. Additionally,
private equity funds invest in long-term illiquid assets that are typically the equity securities of
operating companies, as opposed to highly speculative financial instruments, like in the case of
hedge funds.605 They rely on long-term, stable financing in the form of capital commitments
from their investors and do not normally invest in short-term securities such as derivatives,
options or swaps.606 In the word of the economist Dr. Robert Shapiro “In good and bad times, the
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core business of private equity funds is to identify firms with long-term potential for higher
productivity, sales and profits, secure the capital to purchase these firms, and inject additional
capital, improve their strategies and reorganize their operations, to achieve higher returns.”607
The investment focus of private equity funds on undervalued operating companies simply limits
the fund’s downside exposure and largely precludes a systemic failure or systemic-wide financial
crisis.
Also, private equity funds do not rely on short-term financing that can dry up and
therefore a lender’s liquidity shortage will not affect the operations of a private equity fund.
Rather private equity investors commit their capital for approximately 10-12 years thus making
the risk of a run on the bank (the same risk that forced Bear Stearns into a desperate fire-sale in
March 2008) impossible.608 Private equity funds simply cannot be forced to rapidly unwind their
portfolios and sell assets to satisfy investor or other claims, thus driving down investment values
and potentially adversely affecting other financial institutions, creating a systemic financial
crisis.609 The risk of systemic failure resulting from a liquidity crisis, in the context of private
equity funds, is therefore non-existent.
vi)

MARKET CONCENTRATION AND DIVERSIFICATION

Market concentration and the potential of creating systemic risk are also not a practical
concern in the context of private equity funds. Market concentration refers to the extent to which
a given institution is concentrated within a given industry or geographic region.610 The failure of
such an industry or geographic region would signal a near-certain failure of an institution that is
concentrated in such an industry or geographic industry. However, this is not generally a concern
for private equity funds as they are diversified geographically and across multiple sectors and
industries.611 Private equity funds pursue a variety of investment strategies (e.g., growth capital,
venture capital, buyout, real estate, distressed and mezzanine investing) and invest in a broad
range of industries and geographic regions.612 While a specific private equity fund may hold a
limited number of investments, and while some private equity funds have an industry or
geographic focus, private equity funds in general are diversified across different industries and
geographic regions and thus lack concentrated exposure in any single region or sector. 613 If the
investment in a particular region or sector becomes unattractive or fails, only a portion of the
private equity sector will be adversely affected, because private equity investments are not
concentrated in any one sector or region and most importantly, private equity funds are not
interconnected with other financial institutions or market participants, as discussed above.614
Therefore, as there is no over-exposure to any single sector, the concern about systemic risk or a
systemic-wide failure associated with market concentration is simply non-existent.
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As described above, this paper takes the position that private equity funds do not pose
systemic risk and present no threat to the financial stability of the economy as a whole because:
i) they do not use leverage at the fund level; ii) losses do not spread throughout the financial
market but are contained and handled by the fund investors; iii) their activities are not
interconnected or linked with the financial system; iv) they offer long-term illiquid investments;
and v) they are not concentrated in any one market. It is simply hard to see how any particular
private equity fund or its failure could be considered a systemic threat that justifies regulatory
intervention. The organization of private equity funds and the nature of their investments and
operations are fundamentally different from the circumstances and conditions that led to the
2008 financial crisis and the near-collapse of the entire financial system.615 The diversified
portfolios of private equity funds make it extremely unlikely that problems or failures with some
portfolio companies could trigger systemic failures in the financial system. The diversification of
private equity funds and their portfolios provides another barrier to broad, systemic and
cascading losses or financial failures that can create a major crisis. Therefore, this paper argues
that private equity funds should pose very little concern for regulators and policymakers seeking
to develop a new regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and prevent the next financial
crisis.616 The following section examines the regulatory distinction between private equity and
venture capital funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, from the perspective of systemic
risk, and argues that both should enjoy the same exemption from the SEC registration and
reporting requirements and be subject to a reduced regulatory regime.
C.

THE REGULATORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL

As noted in Part II of this paper, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing
rules amended the Advisers Act to exempt from SEC registration advisers that only manage
venture capital funds.617 The implementing rules adopted by the SEC in order to give effect to
the provisions of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, defined the term “venture
capital funds” for purposes of the new Investment Advisers Act exemption available for advisers
to venture capital funds under Title IV. Venture capital fund advisers who satisfy the exemption
must still comply with certain SEC reporting and recordkeeping requirements. This Part of the
paper argues that for regulatory purposes, there is no distinction between private equity and
venture capital funds and therefore both should be treated in the same way, enjoy the same
exemption from registration and be subject to a reduced regulatory regime.
The exemption granted to venture capital funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
appears to be motivated by the lack of systemic risk posed by venture capital funds.618 Congress
was operating on the assumption that venture capital funds do not present the same risks as the
large private funds whose advisers are required to register with the SEC under Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act.619 This is because venture capital funds do not use leverage or borrowed
capital, their activities are not interconnected with the global financial system, they offer long615
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term illiquid investments, and they generally rely on equity funding so that losses that may occur
are born by the fund investors and do not spread throughout the world financial markets.620
Unlike hedge funds, venture capital funds do not trade complex financial instruments such as
credit default swaps and do not utilize short-selling strategies. Therefore, they present no threat
to the financial stability of the economy as a whole. Additionally, venture capital funds had very
little to do with the 2008 financial crisis.621 It is universally accepted that venture capital funds
did not cause the financial crisis and did not play any part in the credit crisis. They had no
involvement in the mortgage-backed securities market, either directly or indirectly, and did not
contribute to the build-up of systemic risk that eventually led to the near-collapse of the financial
system.622 They were simply not part of the problem.623 The exemption granted to venture capital
funds under the Dodd-Frank Act and the logic behind it, as described above, clearly validate and
strengthen the argument presented in this paper that private equity funds should also be exempt
from SEC registration and should be included within the scope of the venture capital exemption.
Venture capital is a subset of private equity and the key difference between the two types
of funds lies in their investment focus.624 Whereas venture capital funds usually invest in earlystage startup companies, private equity funds invest in companies along all stages of a
company’s life-cycle (usually more mature companies with an established business model). In all
other respects, however, private equity funds and venture capital funds are not so different and
share the same characteristics. The primary goal of both venture capital and private equity funds
is to build and develop companies for an initial public offering or an acquisition. They have
virtually the same business model, skill set and compensation structure.625 In essence, private
equity and venture capital funds are two sides of the same coin. Both made no contribution to the
2008 financial crisis, do not use leverage at the fund level, are not interconnected to other
financial institutions or market participants, offer illiquid long-term investments and are typically
funded by equity.626 They contain none of the systemic risk factors that led to the 2008 financial
crisis and pose no viable threat to the financial system. The risk associated with both private
equity and venture capital funds is non-systemic, contained and limited entirely to the
operational success or failure of the portfolio companies in which these funds invest.627
Therefore, these funds should pose very little concern for regulators seeking to develop a new
regulatory regime to monitor systemic risk and guard against cascading losses that can lead to a
financial crisis. The ability of private equity and venture capital funds to contribute to systemic
financial risk or systemic failure is simply non-existent.628
Given these similarities between private equity and venture capital funds, this paper takes
the position that there is no justification for the regulatory distinction between the two under
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.629 Private equity and venture capital funds should be regulated
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in the same manner and enjoy the same exemption from the SEC registration and reporting
requirements. The fact that private equity funds usually invest in more mature and developed
companies while venture capital funds invest in early stage startups, is irrelevant for regulatory
purposes and from a systemic risk perspective. The distinction that the Dodd-Frank Act makes
between private equity and venture capital funds, for regulatory purposes, is simply artificial,
inadequate and inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank legislation, given the
similarities discussed above. In the words of Douglas Lowenstein, former President and CEO of
the Private Equity Growth Capital Council: “Twin brothers, both productive and contributive to
the common good, unjustly subjected to different standards. Why should Abel’s gifts be
accepted, while Cain’s gifts are rejected?”630 It is important to note that these similarities have in
the past caused the SEC and other regulators to focus regulation on hedge funds and to exempt
private equity funds for the same reasons discussed above.631
Furthermore, on June 22, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules implementing the private
fund registration requirements and exemptions under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.632 These
final rules define the term “venture capital” as a fund that: i) invests primarily in “qualifying
investments” (generally, private operating companies that do not distribute proceeds from debt
financings in exchange for the fund’s investments in the company); may invest in a “basket” of
non-qualifying investments of up to 20 percent of its committed capital; and may hold certain
short-term investments; ii) does not incur leverage apart from a limited amount of short-term
borrowing; iii) does not offer investors non-extraordinary redemption rights; iv) represents itself
as a venture capital fund to investors; and v) is a private fund.633 This definition is designed to
clearly distinguish such investment vehicles from other types of private funds, such as hedge
funds and to address valid concerns about systemic risk.
The distinguishing features of the SEC definition, which qualify venture capital funds for
the exemption from SEC registration under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, are primarily the
non-use of leverage and the lack of redemption rights. The premise behind this definition is that
these features eliminate any potential systemic risk to the stability of the financial system and the
risk that a failure of a venture capital fund could trigger cascading losses that might lead to a
financial crisis. Given the similarities between venture capital and private equity funds, as
discussed above, the same logic applies to private equity funds too and therefore, they should
qualify for the same exemption from the SEC registration and reporting requirements. This paper
argues that from a regulatory perspective and for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk, there
is no difference between private equity and venture capital funds that justifies the different
regulatory treatment under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Unfortunately, the failure of regulators to recognize the similarities between venture
capital and private equity funds from a regulatory perspective, has led to overly broad,
unwarranted and costly regulations and registration requirements that try to prevent the rise of
systemic risk in investment vehicles (private equity funds) that do not pose any systemic risk
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problem.634 They try to protect investors whom the system of securities laws views as capable of
protecting themselves. This is counterproductive since both private equity and venture capital
funds are helping to mitigate the damage of the financial crisis and drive long-term economic
growth and innovation through their investment activities. The following section examines the
role of private equity as a major driver of economic growth and argues that requiring private
equity funds to register with the SEC and subjecting them to extensive and unnecessary reporting
requirements will needlessly divert capital, time and effort from investment activities that could
be creating jobs and drive economic growth.
D.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS - PRIVATE EQUITY AS A DRIVER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Private equity funds are a major driver of economic growth and job creation and play a
key role in the economic recovery of the U.S. They are an important source of capital for
companies undertaking restructuring or operational changes and a major component of a
dynamic and efficient capital market. They have a long track record of preserving and generating
jobs by providing capital and management resources to small and mid-size American businesses
(that otherwise might have gone into bankruptcy).635 They simply deliver the capital necessary
for companies to compete, succeed, and grow. In the words of Professor Eileen Appelbaum
“private equity is an integral part of the everyday lives of millions of Americans. When you buy
coffee in the morning at Dunkin’ Donuts, you are interacting with private equity; when you see a
movie produced by MGM Studios and buy a pizza at Domino’s afterwards, you are interacting
with private equity. When you shop at Toys R Us for the hottest new video game or the latest
“must have” doll or when you buy a new outfit at J. Crew, you are touching private equity.”636
By creating stronger companies and businesses “private equity funds create an economic ripple
that flows through the economy, saving and creating jobs and driving long-term growth.”637
Between 2002 and 2012, 2,400 U.S.-based private equity funds invested more than $1.6
trillion in 15,200 U.S.-based companies which employ more than eight million people.638 By
investing in promising companies and those needing a turnaround, private equity has helped
grow key sectors of the economy including manufacturing, technology, health care, automotive,
energy and retail. In 2011 alone, the private equity industry invested more than $150 billion in
U.S. companies, creating jobs and driving long-term economic growth.639 Throughout 2013
2,830 private equity-backed buyout deals were announced with an aggregate value of $274
billion, the highest value since $661 billion worth of deals were announced in 2007. 640 North
America experienced its strongest year in 2013 since 2007 in terms of total value of buyout
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deals, with 1,516 deals valued at $171 billion, a 10% increase compared to the total value of
private equity-backed buyout deals in 2012.641
The business model of private equity funds is based on long-term investments in
businesses and people (not publicly traded securities) with the objective of building and growing
companies.642 As discussed in Part II of this paper, private equity funds raise capital from
institutional investors such as pension funds and university endowments to invest in
underperforming, undermanaged or undervalued companies.643 The fund managers work to
increase the value of the companies they buy through capital investment and managerial
expertise. With infusions of capital, talent and strategy, private equity funds improve the
productivity, performance and financial strength of the companies in which they invest with the
objective of turning these companies around. Among other things, they improve business
strategy, purchase more efficient machinery and equipment, commercialize new technologies,
streamline the operations, cut costs and expand product distribution in an effort to strengthen
companies and build shareholder value.644 Within several years after the initial investment,
private equity funds usually look to sell the portfolio companies or take them public with the
objective of generating superior returns to their investors.645
Private equity funds only make money for their investors and partners when the
companies they acquire grow, increase earnings and become more successful.646 This business
model is clearly beneficial for the companies in which private equity funds invest, their
employees, the communities in which they operate and, of course, the economy as a whole.
Despite the common perception that most of the earnings and growth of private equity come
from cutting costs and eliminating jobs, it is important to note that most of these target
companies might have gone into bankruptcy without the capital infusion of private equity funds
and the restructuring and reorganization efforts of the fund managers. The long-term focus of the
private equity business model aligns the interests of private equity funds with the portfolio
companies they buy and ensures that these companies have lasting success.647 Professor Josh
Lerner of Harvard Business School and Professor Jerry Cao of Boston University reported that
“based on an analysis of 496 acquisitions between 1980 and 2002—companies that went public
again after being acquired by private equity firms and operated by them for more than a year
consistently outperformed the market and other IPOs.”648 Additionally, private equity funds
provide their institutional investors various investment opportunities that otherwise would be
unavailable to most institutions, as well as high net-worth individuals, namely, the opportunity to
take part in the reorganization, restructuring and turn-around of privately owned operating
companies.649
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A real life example of how private equity funds turn around and restructure
underperforming operating businesses is Commonwealth Laminating and Coating (CLC), a
small company based in Martinsville, Virginia. CLC manufactures, sells and distributes solar
control window films that help shield cars, houses and commercial properties from the sun’s
heat. Its products are sold all over the world.650 In 2006 CLC needed additional capital to fund its
continued growth and operations. However, the company’s existing shareholders were not able
or willing to provide the necessary capital and the company’s future was at risk. CLC then
approached the Riverside Company, a major private equity fund and over time Riverside
acquired a majority ownership interest in CLC and invested an additional $16 million to improve
the company’s production capacity. Through various restructuring efforts, investments in
equipment and reorganization measures, the company improved its product quality and
strengthened its market position and customer base. By the time Riverside sold CLC 4 years
later, the Company had grown its earnings by 277%.651 Together, Riverside and CLC grew jobs
by 73%, adding 61 jobs in Martinsville, Virginia and provided a major return to the teachers,
firefighters and government employee pensions funds that invested through Riverside. With the
help of Riverside’s capital, management expertise and restructuring and reorganization
experience, CLC became a great success.652
Another example of how private equity funds restructure, reorganize and turnaround
operating companies is Burger King. In 2002 several major private equity funds acquired Burger
King, seeing an opportunity to restructure and turnaround the world’s second largest fast-food
chain.653 At the time of the transaction, Burger King was struggling and its financial performance
was weak due to various operational and business challenges. Despite these tremendous
challenges, the private equity funds recognized an opportunity to reorganize the company
and revive the brand through various investments, operational and restructuring measures.
Following a major infusion of capital, the private equity funds recruited a new management
team and developed a new strategic plan for the business. The company implemented major
cost reductions, large-scale operational improvements, restructuring measures and invested
heavily in sales and marketing. These restructuring efforts resulted in reversing the decline in
overall restaurants and opening nearly 1,000 international stores. Over time these measures
drove outstanding financial results and profitability across the business.654 As a result of
these efforts, the chain performance and customer experience improved significantly.
Revenues grew considerably, increasing earnings by 37%. The chain had a successful public
offering in 2006.
Additionally, through superior investment returns, private equity funds deliver important
financial support for universities, research institutions and pension funds that benefit tens of
millions of Americans.655 The private equity investor base is dominated primarily by pension
funds of such household names like GM, GE, IBM and Boeing as well as private and public
universities. Public pension and retirement funds also invest heavily in private equity funds. In
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short, the largest beneficiaries of private equity returns are the millions of Americans who rely
on pensions, college endowments, and other charitable foundations as well as leading
universities and other foundations.656 In the words of economist Dr. Robert Shapiro, “in good
and bad times, the core business of private equity funds is to identify firms with long-term
potential for higher productivity, sales and profits; secure the capital to purchase these firms; and
inject additional capital, improve their strategies and reorganize their operations, to achieve
higher returns. Public policy should support these activities, especially during the current crisis
and refrain from imposing additional burdens that could hamper these activities or redirect them
to other economies.”657
Given the importance of private equity as a vital engine that helps drive the American
economy, this paper takes the position that subjecting private equity funds to excessive and
unnecessary regulatory requirements may jeopardize the nation’s economic growth and recovery
and the role private equity funds play in the U.S. economy.658 Requiring private equity funds to
register with the SEC under the Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act will needlessly divert capital,
time and effort from productive investment activities that could be creating jobs and drive
economic growth. It will simply impose an undue burden on private equity funds (particularly
small and mid-size funds), drain their resources and diminish their ability to continue their
investment activities at a critical time.659 Rather than using their resources to invest in businesses
and drive growth, private equity funds will use some of their resources to build the necessary
compliance infrastructure and comply with the new regulatory regime that imposes tremendous
costs, seeking to solve a non-existent problem, as discussed in Parts III and IV of this paper.
Additionally, the total cost of compliance with Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for all new
private equity funds is estimated to be as much as $500 million (at least $500,000 per year for
each private equity fund that has to comply with Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act).660 These costs
may reduce returns to private equity investors such as endowments and pension funds and may
also hurt the economy in the long run. According the Congressional Budget Office, the SEC is
expected to expend approximately $140 million from 2010 through 2015 to implement Title IV
and private investment funds are expected to expend approximately $130 million per year to
comply with the requirements of Title IV.661 It seems that these resources can be put to a much
better use.
Therefore, this paper takes the position that from an economic recovery perspective, there
is no compelling argument to justify the excessive regulation of private equity funds and their
advisers under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly since Title IV does not add anything
from an investor protection standpoint and does not solve a systemic risk problem. The
regulatory approach adopted by Congress is clearly detrimental to the U.S. economy and may
decrease the capital available to drive economic growth and job creation. This over-regulation of
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private equity funds is expected to slow down the funding activities of the private equity industry
and adversely affect long-term economic growth.
V.
A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

LEVERAGED LENDING STANDARDS - AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE REGULATION
OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

The essence of the discussion to this point has been the problems associated with Title IV
of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules, the SEC registration and reporting
requirements and the overall approach to the regulation of private equity funds. This paper has
taken the position that the decision of Congress and the SEC to regulate private equity funds and
subject them to extensive SEC registration and reporting requirements is inadequate,
unnecessarily costly, inconsistent with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and its
underlying theory of regulation, too disclosure-focused, based on fundamental misconceptions as
to the nature of private equity and does not properly address the potential risk of too much
leverage. It does not add anything substantial to the protection of private equity investors and in
fact, tries to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that do not pose systemic
risk problems. Since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a
critical role as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and
sophistication to ‘fend for themselves’, this paper takes the position that these funds and their
managers should be subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC
registration, reporting and disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. For
purposes of Title IV, there is a compelling argument why private equity funds should be lumped
together with venture capital funds and benefit from the same exemption from SEC registration
available for venture capital funds.662
The concerns associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds as discussed in
Part IV of this paper and the risk of excessive leverage (which are valid and legitimate concerns,
although unlikely to cause a systemic-wide failure of the financial system) should be addressed
through more substantive rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter and prudent
underwriting practices, standards and policies. This paper takes the position that by setting new
standards for underwriting of leveraged loans by banks and other lenders engaged in leveraged
financing activities, regulators and policymakers can ensure that private equity firms will have to
meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans, therefore, reducing the risk of high leverage
and the remote probability of a systemic financial crisis. This approach will: i) eliminate the
unnecessary, costly and burdensome compliance requirements of Title IV; ii) reduce and
mitigate the potential risk posed by private equity funds and their use of leverage; and iii) protect
and preserve the benefits that private equity funds offer the financial system and the economy.
This approach is already being implemented by regulators in the form of leveraged lending
guidelines.663 It is actually causing banks and other lenders to tighten the underwriting of
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leveraged loans, be more cautious about leveraged lending and change the decision making
process as to leveraged lending transactions.664
For example, in May 2014, three major banks for the private equity fund KKR & Co.,
(formerly known as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and one of the largest and most prominent
private equity funds in the world) denied a request for a $725 million buyout loan due to
concerns that the loan was too risky and inconsistent with leveraged lending standards and
guidelines issued by regulators.665 The same banks had actually funded a similar transaction six
months earlier. In December 2013, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs were
among the banks that helped finance KKR’s $1.6 billion leveraged buyout of landscaping
company Brickman Group Ltd. Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse acted as the lead bankers in
this leveraged buyout transaction.666 The leverage component of the transaction was based on 6.8
times the Company’s annual earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA).667 However, under the recently issued leveraged lending regulatory guidelines,
leverage in excess of six times EBITDA should raise concerns and be subject to additional
scrutiny.668 Accordingly, the same three banks decided to deny KKR’s request for a similar
buyout loan as it is inconsistent with the latest leveraged lending guidelines. The decision by
these three major banks not to back one of their largest, most profitable and most prominent
private equity clients clearly demonstrates how leveraged lending regulation implemented after
the 2008 financial crisis is in fact reshaping the leveraged lending environment and how banks
and lenders are becoming more cautious about leveraged lending. This paper supports this
regulatory approach and recommends that the primary mechanism for regulating the risk of
excessive leverage by private equity funds should be tightening underwriting practices and
fostering an environment in which the discipline of banks and other lenders constrains excessive
leverage and risk-taking by private equity funds.
Prompted by the concerns about increasing leveraged lending volumes over the last
decade and deterioration of prudent underwriting practices, on March 21, 2013, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued joint guidance on leveraged lending, replacing the
regulatory interagency guidance in effect since 2001.669 This guidance seeks to establish a risk
management obligation or framework for banking institutions and lenders engaged in leveraged
lending activities. The guidance specifically identified: “i) debt agreements that included features
that weakened lender protection by excluding meaningful maintenance covenants and included
other features that could limit lenders’ recourse in the event of weakened borrower performance;
ii) aggressive capital and repayment structures for some transactions, whether originated to hold
or to distribute; and iii) less than satisfactory management information systems that were unable
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to aggregate exposure on a timely basis.”670 Under the guidance banks are required to define
leveraged lending in their policies and procedures to ensure consistent application across all
business lines using criteria appropriate to the lending institution.671 The guidance further
provides the following examples for a bank to consider in developing its definition of leveraged
lending activities: “i) proceeds used for buyouts, acquisitions, or capital distributions;
ii) transactions where the borrower’s total debt divided by EBITDA or senior debt divided by
EBITDA exceeds 4.0X EBITDA or 3.0X EBITDA, respectively, or other defined levels
appropriate to the industry or sector; iii) a borrower recognized in the debt markets as a highly
leveraged firm, which is characterized by a high debt-to-net-worth ratio; and iv) transactions
when the borrower’s post-financing leverage, as measured by its leverage ratios (for example,
debt-to-assets, debt-to-net-worth, debt-to-cash flow, or other similar standards common to
particular industries or sectors), significantly exceeds industry norms or historical levels.”672
The guidance includes key areas to be addressed by banks and other financial institutions
engaged in leveraged lending, such as:
• Establishing a sound risk-management framework: The regulators expect that
management and the board of directors of the lending institution will identify the institution’s
risk appetite for leveraged finance, establish appropriate credit limits, and ensure prudent
oversight and approval processes.673
• Underwriting standards: An institution’s underwriting standards should clearly define
expectations for cash flow capacity, amortization, covenant protection, collateral controls,
levels of due diligence and the underlying business premise for each transaction, and should
consider whether the borrower’s capital structure is sustainable, regardless of whether the
transaction is underwritten to hold or to distribute.674
• Valuation standards: An institution’s standards should concentrate on the importance of
sound and clear methods in the determination and periodic revalidation of enterprise value.675
• Pipeline management: An institution should be able to accurately measure exposure on a
timely basis, establish policies and procedures that address failed transactions and general
market disruptions, and ensure periodic stress tests of exposures to loans not yet distributed
to buyers.676
• Reporting and analytics: An institution should ensure that management information
systems accurately capture key borrower characteristics and aggregate them across business
lines and legal entities on a timely basis, with periodic reporting to the institution’s board of
directors. The guidance further imposes a duty on institutions to analyze the viability of a
670
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borrower within the context of the borrower’s industry, and integrate that information into
both general risk and stress assessments. This analysis should include: cash flow analysis,
liquidity based upon metrics in the industry; merger and other corporate transactions;
variations in the borrower’s business and operating plans (performed on a quarterly basis);
collateral shortfalls; changes in the debt and equity markets; and interest and foreign
exchange risk. 677
• Risk rating leveraged loans: An institution’s risk rating standards should consider the use
of realistic repayment assumptions to determine a borrower’s ability to de-lever to a
sustainable level within a reasonable period of time.678
• Participations: An institution that participates in leveraged loans should establish
underwriting and monitoring standards similar to those for loans underwritten internally.679
• Stress testing: A lending institution should perform stress testing on leveraged loans held
in a portfolio as well as those planned for distribution, in accordance with existing
interagency guidelines.680
Under the guidance, financial institutions engaged in leveraged lending must review and
revise their leveraged lending policies and procedures, underwriting standards, and management
processes to ensure they address the specific areas covered in the guidance and required by
regulators. Failure to follow these standards could result in a finding that “a bank or lending
institution is conducting lending activities in an unsafe and unsound manner.”681
While the full implications of this guidance and the changes that will be made by banks
and other lenders remain to be seen, it seems that this regulatory approach is already starting to
reshape the leveraged lending environment and how banks underwrite leveraged loans. It shows
“a clear intention by regulators to control and constrain aggressive and risky leveraged lending
practices” which is in line with the intended purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.682 The main policy
recommendation of this paper is for regulators to continue to tighten underwriting practices and
foster an environment in which the discipline of banks and other lenders controls excessive
leverage and risk-taking. Going forward, financial institutions engaged in leveraged lending will
clearly have to reevaluate their internal procedures and tighten their underwriting standards to
ensure that they are in compliance with the new leveraged lending requirements imposed by
regulators. The following section of the paper explores some of the recent challenges of
implementing leveraged lending regulation.
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B.

THE CHALLENGES OF LEVERAGED LENDING REGULATION

While the guidance on leveraged lending discussed above is definitely a step in the right
direction in terms of regulating leveraged lending and reducing the risk of excessive leverage, it
seems that the implementation process is still in its early stages. Now, almost two years after the
initial implementation of the guidance, we continue to see robust leverage markets and highly
leveraged mergers and acquisitions. A combination of vague and inconsistent regulations,
creative banking practices and a wide range of alternative non-bank lenders have slowed down
and to some extent inhibited regulators’ ability to control and manage leverage levels. In essence,
banks and other lenders continue to try to retain the profitable business of leveraged lending and
meet demands from clients and investors as leveraged lending is one of the most lucrative forms
of loans for banks.
As discussed above, the fundamental purpose of the guidance on leveraged lending was
simple: “to promote safe-and-sound leveraged activities by providing restrictions on credit and
underwriting policies, institutional risk appetite, stress testing, approval processes and internal
management and reporting.”683 However, it appears that over the past two years, banks have
been selectively ignoring the restrictions, and using the guidelines themselves to find loopholes
for funding non-compliant deals.684 For example, the new regulations state that transactions in
excess of 6X total debt/EBITDA raise concerns for most industries.685 However, the term “most
industries” has never been defined or clarified in this context. Also, it has never been determined
who makes the decision as to which industries are regulated and how are banks supposed to
know which industries are considered exempt.
Banks and lenders are also becoming more creative in their lending strategies in order to
circumvent the new restrictions entirely. Reuters recently reported on banks looking into
arranging Paid-in-Kind (PIK) bonds that would split overall debt between the holding company
and its operating subsidiaries.686 Some banks are even exploring partnerships with Business
Development Companies (BDCs) and participating in “unitranche” deals, whereby the banks
hold the senior loan and the BDC issues the subordinated debt, thereby allowing the banks to
hold less leverage.687 It is clear that as leveraged lending is an extremely lucrative business for
banks and lenders, these institutions are starting to think outside the box in order to maintain
their market share and prevent alternative lenders from entering the lucrative market of leveraged
loans.
Also, non-bank lenders have always been a viable alternative for obtaining leveraged
financing, but with the new guidelines in place, their value has increased. In fact, non-bank
players handled 83% of total middle-market volume in 2013, up from 77% in 2012 and 70.6% in
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2011.688 It is very likely that as leveraged lending restrictions continue to increase and banks pass
on more and more deals, non-banks such as finance companies, hedge funds and insurance
companies among others, will become the alternative lenders for mid-market firms to secure
leveraged financing.
The Federal Reserve is now increasing its oversight of high-risk leveraged loans, shifting
to a deal-by-deal review after its previous guidelines were largely ignored by banks. The Federal
reserve is now examining leveraged loans as they are made, demonstrating a sense of urgency in
avoiding the kind of overly risky lending that was one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis.
In the event this regulatory approach does not work, regulators have other options. They can
change supervisory ratings on banks, which could limit leveraged transactions and they could
also resort to fines or other sanctions for failure to comply with the guidance. However, despite
the efforts of regulators, it remains to be seen how the new leveraged lending regulations will
reshape the leveraged lending environment and regulate the risk of excessive leverage. Thus far,
these regulations do not seem to have a major effect on banks and lenders and big leverage deals
are still being funded. It is anticipated that Wall Street banks will continue to play “cat-andmouse” with regulators over leveraged lending rules as they try to retain a very profitable
business and meet demands from clients and investors.
C.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

It is interesting to note that there is a recent legislative initiative to amend the Advisers
Act and exempt private equity funds from the SEC registration and reporting requirements under
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.689 The Small Business Capital Access and Job Preservation Act,
H.R. 1105, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Jim Himes, a
Democrat from Connecticut, and Congressman Robert Hurt, a Republican from Virginia in
March 2013. The bill has 12 cosponsors: seven Democrats and five Republicans. It seeks to
expand the scope of the venture capital exemption under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and
include private equity funds within the same category.690 Private equity funds that have
outstanding debt or leverage in excess of two times their invested capital commitments would
not be able to benefit from this exemption and would still be required to register with the SEC.
The bill further requires the SEC, within six months of enactment, to publish rules defining the
term “private equity fund” and requiring exempted fund managers to “maintain records and
provide reports that the SEC determines are necessary and appropriate in the public interest and
for the protection of investors.”691 In establishing these rules, the SEC will take into account
factors like “fund size, governance, investment strategy and risk.”692
This bill is designed to reduce the regulatory burden of Title IV in order to facilitate
access to capital, economic growth and job creation. It is expected to help private equity funds by
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removing costly and unnecessary regulatory requirements that tie up financial resources and may
even waste investor capital that would otherwise be used to grow and develop small businesses.
This proposed legislation (which is consistent with the arguments presented in this paper) is
based on the premise that i) private equity funds did not contribute to the 2008 financial crisis, ii)
these funds are not a major source of systemic risk, iii) the risk associated with private equity
funds is very different from the systemic risk that was the basis for the 2008 financial crisis and
the Dodd-Frank legislation, iv) many of the rules and requirements of Title IV have no relevance
for the private equity sector, and v) the registration and reporting requirements of Title IV
interfere with the flow of capital and do not provide any protection to investors in private equity
funds, who can fend for themselves. This proposed legislation confirms the position taken in this
paper that private equity funds pose no systemic risk to the U.S. economy nor do they raise
investor protection concerns that justify regulatory intervention.
Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas), Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee
said after the House vote in favor of the bill in December 2013 that “many of us would argue on
a bipartisan basis that part of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires small-business investors who are
private equity advisors to register with the SEC is perhaps one of those provisions that is in need
of reform. This is a provision that many of us believe was aimed at Wall Street but it ends up
hurting Main Street.”693 Nonetheless, the prospects of the bill are still uncertain. On December 3,
2013, President Obama released a statement strongly opposing the bill and threatening to veto it.
Also, the bill was never passed by the Senate. It remains to be seen whether Congress is going to
accept the idea that private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk and therefore,
should be exempt from the SEC registration and reporting requirements and subject to a reduced
regulatory regime.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Douglas Lowenstein, the former President of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council
indicated in his Congressional testimony in 2010 that “private equity investments do not create
systemic risk. Private equity firms invest in companies, not exotic speculative securities and their
investors are long-term investors, eliminating the ‘run on the bank’ type of risk that helped create
the 2008 financial crisis.”694 As this paper demonstrates, the decision of Congress to regulate
private equity funds under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the implementation of Title IV
through the SEC rules are inadequate, unnecessarily costly and inefficient. Title IV and its
implementing rules follow the traditional post-crisis legislative pattern which is usually
excessive, burdensome, flawed and populist in nature. They are based on fundamental
misconceptions as to the nature of private equity and the alleged systemic risk associated with
private equity funds. They try to prevent the rise of systemic risk in investment vehicles that do
not pose any systemic risk problems. Additionally, they fall short of achieving the objectives of
the Dodd-Frank Act and are inconsistent with the underlying theory of regulation. They are is too
disclosure-focused and do not add anything significant to the protection of private equity
investors who are financial institutions who can fend for themselves. Like any other excessive
post-crisis financial reform, Title IV and its implementing rules may have satisfied a political
need, but they will not benefit the financial market or the economy as a whole and will not
improve investor welfare. This government intervention in the private equity sector was simply
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driven by the political pressure on Congress to quickly launch a comprehensive reform of the
financial system, and reflects a poor public policy decision. It has gone beyond the concerns that
led to the 2008 financial crisis and the measures necessary to address and control the risks
associated with private equity funds. It seems to fall within the definition of “quack law” or
“bubble laws” in the words of Professor Romano and Professor Bainbridge.695
As a matter of economic theory and history the activities of private equity funds to turn
around, restructure and reorganize existing operating companies are very unlikely to pose
systemic risk to the financial system and the economy as a whole. As discussed throughout this
paper, the business of private equity funds is simply very different from the patterns of cascading
losses and failures that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
Additionally, Title IV’s implementing rules do not meet the economic analysis and cost
benefit justification standards set by the D.C. Circuit Court in the Business Roundtable decision.
The SEC, in implementing Title IV, had failed to perform an adequate cost benefit analysis and
to consider the impact of this legislation on efficiency, competition and capital formation. It
failed to articulate a satisfactory and reasoned explanation for its regulatory actions, including a
rational connection between the pre-crisis conduct and failures it was trying to address and the
regulatory choices made. In essence, Title IV’s implementing rules are not supported by any
substantial cost benefit analysis that would survive judicial scrutiny after the decision in
Business Roundtable or any other compelling argument demonstrating that the benefits of Title
IV’s implementing rules are greater than its costs.
Since private equity funds are not a major source of systemic risk, they play a critical role
as a driver of economic growth and their investors have the resources and sophistication to ‘fend
for themselves’, this paper takes the position that these funds and their managers should be
subject to a reduced regulatory regime and exempt from the SEC registration, reporting and
disclosure requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing rules. The
concerns associated with the use of leverage by private equity funds and the risk of excessive
leverage, which are valid and legitimate concerns, should be addressed through more substantive
rules like leveraged lending regulation and tighter underwriting practices, standards and policies.
This is especially true since there is nothing unique about a lender’s loan to private equity
portfolio companies that would make them more risky than a wide range of other types of loans
made by a bank or other lender, in the ordinary course of business, to other companies owned by
public shareholders, public companies or other institutional investors. By setting new standards
for underwriting of leveraged loans by banks and other lenders, regulators and policymakers can
ensure that private equity funds will have to meet higher standards when seeking buyout loans,
therefore, reducing the risk of high leverage and the remote probability of a systemic financial
crisis.
The alternative approach suggested in this paper, namely exempting private equity funds
from the SEC registration requirements under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and its
implementing rules, is supported by precedents. On October 26, 2001 President Bush signed into
law the USA Patriot Act in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.696 The
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primary purpose of this legislation was to combat terrorism and money laundering activities.
Among other things, the legislation imposed anti-money laundering compliance obligations on
financial institutions, including broker-dealers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool
operators and investment companies.697 Although the term “investment companies” was not
specifically defined, most legal opinions concluded that the term was intended to include both
registered investment companies and private investment funds.698 In addition to compliance with
the new anti-money laundering regime, the new legislation imposed significant and costly new
obligations, including designating a compliance officer, establishing training programs and
arranging independent audits to ensure compliance. However, as the regulatory process unfolded,
legislators recognized that private equity and venture capital funds did not meet the requirements
for money-laundering risks and concluded that funds which do not permit investors to redeem
the investment within two years, would not be required to comply with the anti-money
laundering regime of the Patriot Act.699 Thus the regulations were adjusted to address the fact
that there was no money-laundering risk involved in the investment activities of private equity
and venture capital funds. This is exactly the position this paper takes with regard to the
regulation of private equity funds. U.S. regulators should use the same approach in the context of
Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act and its implementing rules. They should recognize that private
equity funds pose no systemic risk to the stability of the financial system and therefore, should
be exempt from the SEC registration and reporting requirements and subject to a reduced
regulatory regime. The potential risks of excessive leverage should be regulated through
leveraged lending regulations as discussed above.
From a financial regulation perspective, this paper has argued that overall financial
regulators should ground their rulemaking in rigorous cost benefit analysis and standards,
consistent with the Business Roundtable decision, to arrive at more rational decision-making and
efficient regulatory actions that advance the public interest. This legislative approach, unlike
Title IV’s implementing rules, will avoid hasty regulation that fails to achieve its goals and
imposes costs that exceed its benefits. It will ensure that society and the economy gain enough
from the regulation to justify its costs. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “rigorous cost
benefit analysis creates confidence in the ability of regulators to craft effective and appropriate
solutions to market problems. It also deters regulators from proceeding with rules that promise to
impose big economic burdens without corresponding gains.”700
The ultimate effect of Title IV and its SEC registration and reporting requirements is
difficult to predict at this point and it is impossible to determine with certainty whether
regulators made the right decision to include private equity funds within the scope of Title IV.
Nonetheless, it still seems that until Congress eliminates or reduces this unnecessary and costly
regulatory burden, these registration and reporting requirements are expected to have an adverse
impact on the private equity sector and possibly the U.S. economy in the long run.
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